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                                             PROLOGUE

It is my professional background that encouraged me to conduct this research. I have worked as Education Department Director in the Givat Shmuel Local Council for the past 18 years, and as Chairman of the National Administration of the education department directors in the local authorities for the past six years. Throughout this time, I have observed one common thread: most local authorities in Israel experience education budget deficits and budgetary difficulties.These difficulties have led over the years to the occasional outbreak of sanctions and demonstrations on the part of the local authorities against the government. The local government’s main argument is the lack of real government financing for local education, which in reality is a state service that should be financed by the state. I was professionally aware of the existence of budgeting gaps in general, based on information that I received from department directors of other localities and from various politicians; however, I did not have the benefit of hard facts on the situation or information on the true extent of these gaps and the differences in their extent in the various local authorities. The information that was available to me, coupled with my innate curiosity regarding more detailed aspects of the subject, spurred me into seeking an opportune moment to investigate the causes of the problem. 

By 1997 I had acquired an academic and professional education as follows: a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science and French at Bar-Ilan University, a Master’s degree in Political Science (in the field of public administration and local government) at Tel Aviv University. In addition to my degrees, my qualifications include a teaching certificate in social sciences at Tel Aviv University, and two academic courses in school system administration in local government at Bar-Ilan University. In 2000 I decided to submit  a research about  the subject  “The municipal education budget as an issue in Israel’s central-local government relations “ to  the management of the Pinchas Sapir Mifal Hapais Foundation ( Israeli National Lottery ). Afterwards I decided to submit my candidacy for studies towards a doctoral degree (PhD) at New Bulgarian University, I thought that it is the opportunity to conduct a comprehensive research study on the subject of government financing of the municipal school system had finally presented itself. This study discusses the influence of the interrelationship between the central government and local government in Israel on the allocation of education budgets in the local authorities.   The main research question is whether there is a gap between the government budget policy in education and the actual implementation of this policy, and if there is indeed such a gap, what are the factors that give rise to its formation and how does it affect scholastic achievements?
 The findings of the present study, however, have allowed me to better understand the factors responsible for the gap in implementing the budgetary policy of the Ministry of Education by the local authority (budgetary gap), as well as to examine the differences between the various local authorities with respect to this gap.
Thus, my professional background and academic qualifications provide a solid foundation for these doctoral studies. They complement each other and provide me with sets of experience and insights which are appropriate to the following research.                                
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THE LOCAL  EDUCATION BUDGET AS AN ISSUE BETWEEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (THE ISRAEL CASE STUDY).

By   MAX  ABISROR
This study discusses how the interrelationship between the central government and local government in Israel influences the allocation of education budgets in the local authorities. The main research question was whether there is a gap between the government budget policy in education and the actual implementation of this policy, and if there is indeed such a gap, what factors give rise to its formation and how it affects scholastic achievements.     
The theoretical research model is a combination of relevant features of three different models that identify the relationship between central and local government. A conceptual framework was formulated, and transposed into an empirical research structure. This is an exploratory research. Its population is comprised of 36 education department directors in the local authorities in Israel. Thus, this research design sought both objective and subjective data combined cumulatively. The topic for this research was in the national context, therefore it was decided that its outcomes could be applied to the general population.
The research question and sub-questions required a combination of the qualitative research and quantitative research. Therefore, the preferred methods that were included in this research were a triangulation of research tools, such as questionnaires, interviews and archival documents.
The main research findings indicate that the average gap in all the authorities that appeared in the sample amounts to 34.61%. Factors causing the formation of a gap in the implementation of the budgetary policy were the socio-economic strength of the local authority; large local authorities are usually capable of accumulating a greater quantity of alternate resources to those provided by the Ministry of Education, and so the magnitude of the gap in these authorities is greater. Additional primary factors are the differences in perception of the needs between the Ministry of Education and the local authorites, differences of opinion between the two entities as to the task distribution among them, lack of trust between the two systems, political ties between local authority heads and government ministers, particularly with the Minister of Education, which pave the way to larger budgets; lack of transparency in budgeting and no clear definitions in the distribution of funds among the two government strata of the education system within the local authorities.  There was no link found between the involvement of the Head of the local authority and/or the holder of the education portfolio in managing the local education system budget, the external and internal supervision and control processes and the magnitude of the gap.  A significant finding is the discovery of a link between the extent of the gap and the scholastic achievement level – meaning the greater the gap in budgetary policy implementation, the higher the scholastic achievements. 









The interrelationship between the central government and the local government in the field of education in Israel is highly significant in the political, national and local system. This research focuses on the education budget of the local authority in general, and on the Ministry of Education’s policy regarding budgeting of the municipal education system in 1997 in particular. The research relates to the entire State of Israel.

Previous analyses and research studies show that there is a gap between the Ministry of Education budget earmarked for the local authorities and their actual expenses. Local authorities in Israel differ from one another in their socio-economic level, and do not always receive their rightful share for education according to uniform criteria, and use additional sums from their budgets beyond the funds they receive from the Ministry of Education.  
The research will provide evidence to the following question and sub-questions:
In a centralist system as exists in Israel in the year 1997, can the government’s school system budgeting policy be inconsistent with its implementation by the local authorities?  If there is indeed such a gap, what are the factors that give rise to its formation?
The subsidiary questions that derive from the main question are:
1. 	Does the Education Ministry’s budget policy create gaps between local 	authorities in the level of education services?
2.     Do gaps in the level of education services serve as an impetus for                                                                          of the local authorities to invest more of their budget in education?
3. 	Do the differences in the level of education services actually affect 	educational results (scholastic achievements)?
	
The professional literature includes research studies on the nature of local government in general and in Israel in particular, and the proposal of the theoretical model which characterises the status of local government in Israel and its interrelationship with the central government.  It includes a historical description and analysis of the nature of the comprehensive interrelationship that exists between the central government and the local government in general and in education in particular (prior to the establishment of the State and until the present day) and enables us to understand and identify the components of the government budgeting policy, the causes of the gap between the education policy and its implementation by the local government.

The empirical research attempted to deal with the research questions, its hypotheses and to examine the link between the number of relevant variables and the gap in policy implementation and the scholastic achievments. The combination of comprehensive field research among the numerous local education authorities, and interviews with some of the local authority representatives and representatives of the relevant institutions (the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Finance, the local government establishment and members of the academe) and the evidence of the survey of the professional literature laid a foundation for the research conclusions.

The following is a summary of the parts and chapters:
Part 2 (Theoretical Perspectives) refers primarily to the fact that the current government budgeting policy of the municipal education system was formulated by the central-local government relations from pre-state times to the present day, particularly subsequent to the legislation of the Direct Mayoral Election Law (which encouraged and/or compelled the mayors to invest more of the local authority’s resources for the benefit of the local education system).  Likewise, the current policy is the outcome which characterises central-local government relations in Israel, and which views both of the theoretical model government strata as two strategic partners that are interdependent.

The professional literature also provided the following possible reasons for the gap between policy and implementation: inadequate legislation, lack of agreement on objectives, differences in perception of needs, lack of sufficient and appropriate resources to implement policy, lack of coordination in controlling and supervising the body formulating the policy and the one implementing it, lack of flexibility in implementing the policy due to previous commitments and failure to coordinate policy formulation and implementation.

Part 2 constituted a firm basis for preparation of Part 3 (Research Design and Research Methodology).  It facilitated formulation of the research questions, via which the research assumptions were raised.  The research assumptions were formulated into 4 categories which constitute the conceptual framework of the research (the legal system, the historical workings, the central-local authority relations from a political and professional perspective and the socio-economic status of the local authorities). This framework enabled the development of five research hypotheses.

The research methodology included a combination of the quantitative method and the qualitative method in the data collection process. The research approach was deductive, relatively large sample, theory testing and theory developing through deductive methods leading to Reliability and Generalisation. The hypotheses that were derived from the basic assumptions were based on the theoretical perspectives. The deductive method was chosen for this research because there were hypotheses derived from the conceptual framework of the research.  The theories relating to the relationship between the central and the local governments directed the subsequent research, and the specific questions arose from within the general framework.  The questions did not emerge from the field work.  In this manner, the conceptual framework led to the research, design and testing of the hypotheses. 

The data required for examining the research questions and hypotheses were collected by using questionnaires distributed to education department heads (when 36 responses were available to me), conducting interviews with 17 representatives from the local education authorities, from government offices, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Finance, the local government establishment in Israel and the  Dovrat Governmental Commission.  The data were collated among the three sources (professional literature (including archival documents), questionnaires and interviews) in order to confirm the data and validate them to as great an extent as possible.

The last Part discusses the research discussion, the research results, the conclusions and a replicate of the intellectual journey that I underwent in the course of this research. The data analysis forms a part of the exploratory analysis, in other words, the preliminary analysis aims to provide general trends and direction to the future research study.  The research is exploratory because no one has explored this area before, and there was a need to pave an unmarked route, as there are no roots to hang onto here.  There was an initial analysis in order to uncover/characterize the main trends of this field.  Performing this preliminary analysis enabled the researcher to arrive at the broader analytical research study aiming to examine the specific hypotheses. 

The principal findings of the research:
	There is a clear gap between the education policy of the Ministry of Education and its implementation by the local authorities. This policy is vague, aimed at achieving industrial peace, and positively views additional financing by the local authorities. The average gap in all the local authorities amounts to about 35%.
	The factor responsible for the creation of the gap is the socio-economic level of the local authority, i.e. the higher the socio-economic level of the local authority, the larger is the gap. Large local authorities are able generally to raise more alternative resources to those of the Ministry of Education and therefore the extent of the deficit in them is larger. Additional factors are under funding by the government of the municipal education system, deficiencies in legislation, the historical background of the State of Israel (and in the local-central authority relations), the disparity in perception of needs by the two levels of government, and differences of opinion between them regarding the division of responsibilities in the field of education.

The research discussion refers to the link between the theoretical model of the research study and its results and each one of its hypotheses. The main research conclusions emanating from its objectives and conclusions suggest that there is a gap between the government budgeting policy of the local education system and its implementation by the local authorities because currently the government has no overall municipal perception in general, and no clear budgeting policy for the local education system in particular. Likewise, the budgetary policy of the Ministry of Education generates gaps in the level of education services provided by the local authorities. These gaps urge strong local authorities to invest more of their own resources and these resources should be considered as education expenses yielding positive scholastic benefits. 

The research focused on the budgetary aspects of the municipal education system and not the pedagogic-academic aspects. The research intends to supplement missing knowledge in the theoretical and practical professional aspects. The surplus value of this research is in this design of the unique conceptual framework which provides an explanation for the phenomenon. This framework is manifest in the research conclusions.

The knowledge gap which is the subject of this research is a very crucial issue, politically and budget-wise; each year it is on the public agenda – however, to date there has been no scientific research to provide direction as to how to evaluate this situation and its resulting complications. The information gap justifies the entire research study.

The research facilitated additional knowledge introduced in the field of study:
a) The theoretical model that was illustrated in this research, including its limits, is designed to constitute a theoretical infrastructure for the entire research process and is innovative in the field of central-local government relationship.

b) The formulation of the  original conceptual framework enables the researcher and the reader to focus on all the research-related issues within four categories and to examine the research findings in view of this framework, and to reach conceptual conclusions that reflect the surplus value which the research provides to the knowledge available on this topic.

c) Understanding the background to the government budgeting policy of the school system and the analysis of this policy.

d) Detecting the differences in budgeting among  the different local authorities in Israel and between the Jewish and non-Jewish localities.

e) Indicating the link between the financial resource volume and scholastic achievements, meaning viewing educational spending as an investment which will yield profit in the form of scholastic achievements.

It appears that this research will better elucidate the mechanisms creating the budgetary gaps in the various local authorities, as well as the possible impact these gaps have on scholastic achievements at the local authority level.  If a future study should reinforce the preliminary findings of this research, it will explain the functional problems of public government in Israel, and furthermore, it will clarify the resulting complications in the level of scholastic achievement and spatial inequality throughout Israel. I contend that this would be an onerous task for one research study.

The subject of the research has drawn the attention of quite a number of relevant bodies (the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Finance, the local government establishments and members of the academic world).  Few research studies have been conducted in this field, although there were several state commissions which examined the issue over the years, but did not succeed in making a change and finding a solution for the problems in this area.  I hope that this research will spark an interest in the subject and will be a topic for a public discussion, leading to operative conclusions.






























Chapter 2: Description of Three Case Studies

This research focuses on the education budget in the local authorities in general and on the municipal education system budgetary policy implemented by the Ministry of Education in particular. The main research objective is to examine whether there is a gap between the government policy in budgeting the municipal education system and its implementation by local authorities. If such a gap indeed exists, what is the scope of this gap in the various local authorities? And what are the causes of this gap?

The State Comptroller in Report no 48, dating from 1998, took note of this issue and identified government under funding of the municipal education system which creates differences between the local authorities. The following cases will provide a factual description of the phenomenon and will enable the reader to understand the research issue.

Case Number 1(see HRW.ORG, 2001).
The funding for state education derives from four sources: the central government, local councils or municipalities, private organizations, and parents. Arab schools on average receive proportionately less money than Jewish schools from each of these sources.  The greatest source, by far, is the central government, which is legally responsible for providing free education to children ages three to sixteen Through the Ministry of Education, the government accredits schools, determines curricula and approves textbooks; certifies, hires, supervises, and pays teachers; administers the matriculation examinations and awards diplomas; and finances about three quarters of the total cost of education. Local governments are responsible for setting up and maintaining educational facilities, and providing administrative staff. 

The local government is funded by local taxes and transfers from the central government, including the Ministry of Education. Organizations such as the Jewish Agency, which is privately funded but which fulfills certain basic government functions, have historically funded only Jewish education, but their role has decreased in recent years. Supplements to the basic school day, funded by parents and known as "gray education," have increased in importance as real funding from the government has decreased. 

International law requires states to provide education "without discrimination of any kind irrespective of the child's race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status." As a party to the Convention against Discrimination in Education, Israel must not allow "in any form of assistance granted by the public authorities to educational institutions, any restrictions or preference based solely on the ground that pupils belong to a particular group." 

Government Acknowledgement of the Problem - 
For at least the last ten years, Israeli government bodies have acknowledged that the government spends more on Jewish students than on Arab students. The State Comptroller documented this gap in several annual reports in the 1990s. In February 2001, the Israeli government reported to the Committee on the Rights of the Child that in 1991, the total investment in education per pupil in Arab municipalities was approximately one-third of the investment per pupil in Jewish municipalities. Government investment per Arab pupil was approximately 60% of the investment per Jewish pupil. 

In the last decade, the government has attempted to correct, at least in part, for certain inequalities in government funding to Arabs by allocating lump sums of money through what it has called "five-year plans." In plans passed in 1991 and 1998, allocations were made for Arab education, but these plans have been implemented only in part. In July 1999, the Ministry of Education announced that it was activating a five-year plan to allocate NIS 250 million ($62.5 million)--NIS 50 million ($12.5 million) annually--to correct imbalances in education. Following demonstrations in early October 2000 in which thirteen Arab citizens were killed, the Prime Minister's office on October 22, 2000, ratified a plan to allocate NIS 4 billion ($1 billion) over four years to seventy-four Arab localities that included some funding for Arab education. Because the funds for these plans are not separately designated, it is impossible to determine whether they were allocated in the 2001 budget. 

Even if all aspects of the 1991, 1998, 1999, and 2000 plans were to be fully implemented, the monies allocated are insufficient to equalize the two systems or correct past discrimination against Arab students. Most importantly, none of the plans address the most significant structural problems in the Arab educational system. For example, the education provisions of the 1999 plan consist of supplementary programs for only a limited number of schools, implemented by private contractors, not by the education system itself. The plan does not address schools' physical conditions and focuses on only a small minority of Arab students.

The Adva Center, a nonprofit policy analysis and advocacy organization, concluded that "the Ministry of Education's decision to focus in its five-year plan on the advancement of a minority of Arab pupils is misguided. . . . [T]his decision was evidently meant to assure fast results; since a small percentage of Arab high schoolers qualify for matriculation certificates, even a small increase in their numbers would probably raise the overall proportion considerably." More generally, the 1999 five-year plan failed to change the way the education system works.  

Apparently the Ministry of Education would like to attain this worthy goal at minimum cost, without undertaking to improve the Arab education system on a permanent basis. If the Ministry outsources the program, the funds earmarked for it will not be added to the budget base of the Arab education system. In other words, the privatization of the five-year plan makes this allocation a nonrecurrent and replaceable item that, in all probability, will not have a sustained effect. Furthermore, the project will not enhance the capabilities of Arab teachers, because most of the contractors will probably be Jewish agencies that have already participated in similar projects for the Education Ministry. As privatization continues apace, the Ministry and the contractors become interdependent. As the contractors prosper, gather strength, and become permanent fixtures, the Ministry accustoms itself to tackling education problems not by making substantive and long-term change but by putting out fires by means of private firefighters. The 1999 plan began operating in early 2001, and not all targeted schools had the programs at the time of writing. 

Funding from the Ministry of Education - 
The Ministry of Education provides several kinds of funding to schools. The largest amount goes to teachers' salaries and related expenses such as in-service teacher training. The second type funds a great variety of supplemental programs, both enrichment and remedial, that play a critical role in the Israeli education system. Some of this funding is purportedly allocated on the basis of need, although even the least needy schools depend heavily on this funding. The ministry also finances school construction. 

Despite its acknowledgement of past disparities in its report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the Israeli government does not officially release data on how much it spends total per Arab child compared with how much it spends per Jewish child. There are no separate lines in the budget for Arab education, and when Human Rights Watch requested this information, the Deputy Director General, Head of Economics and Budgeting Administration in the Ministry of Education, on behalf of the ministry's director general, responded:
 "On the Ministry level (headquarters and districts), the administration, operation and inspection are common to both Hebrew and Arab education. Similarly, there is no budgetary separation. Therefore, I regret that it is not possible for us to determine the exact amount spent on Arab education." 
The government's continued failure to make public such basic data further indicates the weakness of its commitment to real improvements in the Arab education system. As a party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Israel is required to monitor educational programs and spending patterns, to disaggregate educational data "by the prohibited grounds of discrimination," and to use this information "to identify and take measures to redress any de facto discrimination." 

The government allocates much, but not all, funding in terms of "teaching hours," one teaching hour being a unit that represents a particular sum of money. The Ministry of Education referred Human Rights Watch to the 1990/2000 distribution of teaching hours when we requested information about how much it spends per Arab student and per Jewish student. According to the ministry, "[t]he schools' main resource is that of teaching positions, 72% of the total budget in 2001." Because not all teaching hours are worth the same amount and vary in value from year to year, it is difficult to convert the allocation of teaching hours into exact sums of money. Nonetheless, comparison of how teaching hours are distributed between Jewish and Arab education does show how resources are apportioned. At every grade level, Arab education receives proportionately fewer teaching hours than Jewish education. In 1999-2000, although 21.4 percent of children in kindergarten through secondary schools were Arab, only 18.4 percent of total teaching hours were allocated to Arab education. 







Sources: CBS, Statistical Abstract of Israel 2000, no. 51, table 22.27; and Ministry of Education, Proposed Budget for the Ministry of Education 2001 and Explanations as Presented to the Fifteenth Knesset, no. 11, October 2000, p. 144. 
For example, Arab official (government-run) kindergartens received 11.5 percent of the teaching hours for kindergarten education, while Jewish official kindergartens received the remaining 88.5 percent. Arab primary schools received 21.7 percent of the teaching hours for primary education, and Arab secondary schools received 15.3 percent of the teaching hours for secondary education. 

Per student, in 1999-2000, Jewish students received an average of 1.84 teaching hours per week, and Arab students received an average of 1.51 teaching hours per week. The differences were greatest at the kindergarten through intermediate levels and smaller at the secondary level. 
Table 2.2: Distribution of Teaching Hours-Weekly Hours/Student 1999-2000   






Sources: CBS, Statistical Abstract of Israel 2000, no. 51, table 22.27; and Ministry of Education, Proposed Budget for the Ministry of Education 2001 and Explanations as Presented to the Fifteenth Knesset, no. 11, October 2000, p. 144. 
Although data by sector was not available for 2000-2001, the average number of teaching hours per student, Jewish and Arab, was virtually unchanged from 1999-2000. In 2000-2001, 22.2 percent of kindergarten through secondary level students were Arab.  












Source: Daphna Golan, Chair, Committee for Closing the Gap, Pedagogical Secretariat, Ministry of Education, Closing the Gaps in Arab Education in Israel: Data About Hebrew-Arab Education; Recommendations of the Committee for Closing the Gap; Protocol of the Meeting of the Directorship, December 13, 2000, December 2000, p. 2 (citing data from the acting chief executive of the Northern District). 

Although the above data are averages and thus allow for significant variation among individual schools, they are generally in accord with what the schools Human Rights Watch visited told us they received. For example, the principal of a primary school in Um El-Fahm with 360 children told us that the Ministry of Education gave the school 582 teaching hours per week, an average of 1.35 hours per child. 
Class Size and Teaching Staff 
At every grade level, Arab schools' classes are, on average, larger than Jewish schools' classes. 











Source: CBS, Statistical Abstract of Israel 2000, no. 51, table 22.9. 

In 1998-1999, the most recent year for which data were available, there were an average of twenty-six students per class in Jewish schools and thirty students per class in Arab schools. Classes for Negev Bedouin were, on average, even larger, averaging thirty-three students per class at the primary and intermediate levels, and twenty-nine students per class at the secondary level. A primary school teacher who had taught for the past four and a half years in the Negev told us that her classes averaged forty students every year. 

Although the highest national average for any grade level in 1998-1999 was thirty-three students per class, many teachers we interviewed in both Jewish and Arab schools reported having thirty to forty students in their classes. For example, an eleven-year-old Arab boy told us his class had forty-three students. We visited a third grade science class in an Arab school in a mixed city with thirty-nine students and a first grade class in an unrecognized Bedouin village in the Negev with forty-six students. "In some classes we have thirty-nine," an eleventh-grade Arab girl in Nazareth told us. The principal of a Jewish middle school in a development town told us that the classes in her school were as large as forty, and the principal of a Jewish primary school told us about thirty-eight students were in her school's classes. We also saw classes with fewer than thirty-one students. Several school principals told us that the Education Ministry capped primary classrooms at forty students. The Ministry of Education also allocates more total teaching staff per child to Jewish schools than it does to Arab schools, particularly at lower grade levels. 







Sources: Ministry of Education, Proposed Budget for the Ministry of Education 2001 and Explanations as Presented to the Fifteenth Knesset, no. 11, October 2000, p. 144; and CBS, Statistical Abstract of Israel 2000, no. 51, tables 22.10, 22.27. 

For example, in 1999-2000 the Ministry of Education allocated the equivalent of one full-time teacher for every 16.6 children in Jewish primary schools and every 19.4 children in Arab primary schools. In kindergartens, the number of children per full-time teacher (or teacher's aide) was twice as high in Arab kindergartens (39.3 students per teacher) as in Jewish kindergartens (19.8 students per teacher). Human Rights Watch visited schools that averaged both somewhat more and somewhat fewer children per teacher. Class size affects the quality of education provided. "It's a problem for me," an Arab English teacher with around forty students explained. "The students should have the chance to share and talk and express themselves." 

Most Arab school principals whom we interviewed told us that they believed that their schools received the same budget for teaching and related expenses as Jewish schools. However, at the primary level, these funds are allocated by class, and, on average, classes in Jewish schools are smaller than those in Arab schools. Thus, for all funds allocated equally by class, each Arab child receives less on average than each Jewish child receives. Moreover, there are more teachers (of all kinds) per child in Jewish schools at every grade level. In that teachers themselves are a critical resource, Arab students at every level receive less, on average, because their classes are larger. 

Enrichment and Remedial Funding/Affirmative Action - 
The greatest differences in funding to Arab and Jewish schools lie in funding for enrichment and remedial programs. These programs are allocated on the basis of criteria that is weighted against Arab schools and implemented in ways that discriminate against them. Legal challenges to these practices have not been successful. 

Supplementary programs--both enrichment and remedial--form an integral part of everyday education in Israeli schools. "Because we have the money, we can do what we are doing," Judith Jona, the principal of an "very good" Jewish primary school, told Human Rights Watch when she described the school's innovative programs. Very little of this money comes from the municipality, which primarily pays for maintenance and utilities, she said. Most supplementary funding comes from the Ministry of Education. However, other government ministries fund particular programs that appear to benefit primarily Jewish education. For example, the Ministry of Housing builds kindergartens in new Jewish communities, the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption gives educational assistance to new immigrants, and the Ministry of Religious Affairs contributes to Jewish religious schools. Local authorities and parents also fund programs in some schools. 

The government concedes that Arab schools generally receive less government funding than Jewish schools do. In February 2001, it reported to the Committee on the Rights of the Child: 
"The gaps in government allocation are mainly a result of more limited allocation to enrichment and extracurricular activities such as libraries, programs for weaker students, cultural activities, and counseling and support services." 

Although the Ministry of Education does not release total expenditures by sector, the differences are evident in individual programs. For example, while enrichment for gifted children include both supplements to the regular curricula and special boarding schools, there are no boarding schools for gifted Arab students. Moreover, according to the government's report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, "associations and programs for gifted children" were only recently approved for Arab education. The principal of a primary school in the Triangle region explained to Human Rights Watch how difficult it was for him to get enrichment for talented students:  
"There is a boy in the school who is a genius in computers, and I asked the ministry to send him to a special school for Arabs in Israel. I waited for the reply. Every time I asked about it I was told that there wasn't any money and that he would have to wait. It was always the same. Now the boy graduated from here and is in the eighth grade in Haifa." 

Regarding remedial programs, a study by professors at Hebrew University found that Arab primary schools received 18 percent of the ministry's remedial education budget and that Arab intermediate schools received 19 percent, but that per student, Jewish students received five times the amount that Arab students received. 

Variable Criteria for Allocating Resources - 
Although supplementary programs play an important role in all schools, the Israeli government distributes considerable resources on the basis of need and employs various indices to measure that need, such as priority area classifications and the Ministry of Education's index of educational disadvantage. This is true not only for education funding but also for many other government benefits such as transfers to local governments for development and infrastructure, which benefit schools indirectly by freeing up additional municipal monies for education.  

Both the instruments purporting to measure need, as well as the implementation of need-based funding, heavily favor Jewish communities over Arab ones. Thus, despite their greatest need, Arabs are not receiving a share of these programs that is even proportionate to their representation in the population. 

The best available measurement of general need appears to be the Central Bureau of Statistic's socio-economic scale. Sociological studies have found that a locality's socio-economic ranking clearly affects its residents' access to educational credentials in Israel. The Central Bureau of Statistics ranks communities on the basis of socio-economic characteristics measured in the 1995 census and adapted in 1999 (the most recent adaptation at the time of writing). The communities are then divided into ten clusters, with one being the lowest and ten the highest. According to the scale, Arab communities are the poorest in Israel. In 1999, seventy-three out of seventy-five ranked Arab localities fell in the bottom four clusters, and no Arab localities were ranked in the top four clusters. Jewish communal localities--kibbutzim and moshavim--and unrecognized (Arab) villages are not ranked. Thus, even the best scale is not comprehensive and, indeed, excludes the poorest communities in Israel-the unrecognized villages. 

In any event, the government generally uses a different criteria to allocate education-related subsidies and tax benefits. For example, in areas the government classifies as "national priority areas," teachers receive an extra stipend for travel and living expenses, four-year tenure, and exemption from workers' compensation contributions. The Ministry of Education also subsidizes kindergarten tuition, and residents may be eligible for loans or grants for higher education. Priority areas with the highest level of classification are targets for implementation of the Long School Day Law, which funds additional informal teaching and extra-curricular activities to compensate for what wealthier parents and municipalities provide. The law has never been fully implemented. 

Historically, only Jewish localities were designated as priority areas. Although a few Arab localities have since been added to the list, most are at a level that does not qualify them to receive education benefits. In May 1998, Adalah (the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel), the Follow-Up Committee on Arab Affairs, and the Follow-Up Committee on Arab Education sued the government on the grounds that the current designation of priority areas discriminates against Arab towns and asked that clear criteria be set for selection. The case was still pending at the time of writing. 

In addition to criteria used throughout the government, such as national priority areas, the Ministry of Education has developed its own "index of educational disadvantage" that it uses to allocate resources to primary and intermediate schools to improve performance and decrease dropping out. The ministry applies two different standards to Arab and Jewish schools and ranks them separately. The Central Bureau of Statistics, in a 1994-1995 survey of primary and intermediate schools, explained: 
The index of educational disadvantage was prepared by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport for the purpose of differential allotment of resources to the schools, to advance weak populations. The index is determined by criteria which measure the degree of educational deprivation of each school relative to the other schools. Since the schools in different sectors [Jewish and Arab] differ from one another in regard to the significant causes of such deprivation, separate indices of educational disadvantage were determined for the different groups. 
In other words, rather than comparing all schools against a common standard, the ministry compares Arab schools with other Arab schools and Jewish schools with other Jewish schools, but does not compare Arab schools with Jewish schools. Schools are then divided into five groups, from one--the least disadvantaged--to five--the most disadvantaged.  

Table 2.6: Index of Educational Disadvantage-the Ministry of Education's Categorization of Primary and Intermediate Pupils and Schools 1994-1995 
Pupils 















Source: CBS, Survey of Education and Welfare Services 1994/1995: Primary and Intermediate Schools, Hebrew and Arab Education (Jerusalem: CBS, October 1997). 
As the above tables show, this index distributes both Jewish and Arab schools and Jewish and Arab pupils into quintiles: there are roughly the same number of schools and pupils at every level. This distribution shows that the need of pupils in Arab schools is being assessed in isolation from Jewish schools. The same index of educational disadvantage was still being employed in 2001. 

Given that the Arab schools by every measurement are more disadvantaged than Jewish schools, comparing the two sectors separately is a highly misleading indicator of the resources of Arab schools. Arab schools that rank at the top of the index may well fall at the middle or bottom when compared with Jewish schools. Therefore, an Arab school that would qualify for resources if compared with Jewish schools may receive less or nothing because other Arab schools are even worse off. Regardless of whether the ministry's index accurately measures need, Arab schools still get fewer resources than equally ranked Jewish schools. In the 1994-1995 school year, the Central Bureau of Statistics surveyed the recognized and official Arab and Jewish state primary and intermediate schools (with the exception of kibbutz schools) on the provision of education and welfare services, and found that Arab schools receive fewer services and facilities than Jewish schools in every one of the categories assessed: 
Table 2.7: Index of Educational Disadvantage: Provision of Services 1994-1995 
						













Financing the Psychological Counseling Service by the Ministry of Education -
	The budget of the Psychological Service for 1996 was 73.62 million NIS.  The majority of the budget is designated for the local authorities’ participation in funding the cost of employing psychologists.  The Ministry’s quota for psychologist positions was determined according to the number of students in educational institutions in each locality.  According to the quota, the number of these positions in the school year 1996-1997 in 246 local authorities should have reached 1,298.  It was decided that the Ministry would finance 64% of the standard average cost of a psychologist, and the balance would be imposed upon the local authorities.
	

It became evident that in reality the budget sufficed for financing 690 psychologists alone (at 64% of the standard cost).  Furthermore, considerable differences emerged between the local authorities in the magnitude of the disparity between the number of posts that were actually allocated and their number according to the quota.  On a weighted average, the Ministry participated in the financing of 59.8% of the required posts according to the quota.  The actual financing rate out of the desired financing, according to the standard ranges from 0% (in 23 localities) to 318%.  31 local authorities received funding at a rate exceeding 100% of that which is required according to the quota, whereas 40 authorities received less than 25% of what was required.
	
The gap between the required financing rate according to standard and the financing rate in practice is particularly wide in the Arab sector.  In the Arab sector, the Ministry financed only 35.1% on average of the required funding, as compared to 70.0% in the Jewish sector and 68.3% in mixed cities.  Only 4 (5.7%) out of 70 local authorities in the Arab sector received more than 100% of the standard, whereas 26 (37.1%) local authorities received less than 25% of the required financing.  In comparison, in the Jewish sector, 27 out of 165 authorities (16.4%) received financing of more than 100% of the required amount according to the standard, and 14 (8.5%) received less than 25% of the required sum. 

 In its response to the State Comptroller’s Office, the Ministry indicated that the main reason for the low rate of financing of psychologist positions in the Arab sector was the lack of professional personnel in this sector. The reason for the differences between the local authorities in the percentage of financing in practice as compared to the required percentage according to standard lies in the developments that have occurred in the past. 

 The sums which the Ministry allocates each year to the local authorities for participating in the financing of psychologists’ posts, are based on sums which were allocated the previous year, and there has been no new allocation of all positions among the local authorities in compliance with the standard that has been set.  The State Comptroller’s Office is of the opinion that because the Ministry’s budget does not facilitate participation in financing all positions for psychologists required in the local authorities according to the standard, the Ministry must formulate a new standard which complies with the funds at its disposal, and will also enable an egalitarian and just allocation of these funds.  The office representatives further explained that the reason for some of the differences between the sums that were allocated to the local authorities for financing posts for psychologists and those that they should have received according to the standard is the additional budget that was given to several local authorities due to their unique status, such as a high percentage of new immigrants who require special treatment, a high level of violence and security events.  Upon inspection, it was revealed that these justified additions account for only a small portion of the said differences.

Case Number 3 
This case deals with the special budget of the Ministry of Education for financing the commencement of the school year. From 1994, the Ministry transfers funds to the local authorities for the “beginning of the school year” budget item.  In 1996, the Ministry transferred 22 million NIS from this budget item to 44 local authorities.  The allocation sums ranged from 75,000 NIS to 3 million NIS. 

According to the Ministry’s internal criteria, the allocations from the said budget item were designated to solve unanticipated problems, which require an immediate solution in order to facilitate the commencement of the school year.  These problems include: the need to take in students from the outside, an unexpectedly large number of students; or the need to perform minor construction jobs and renovations required for security and safety reasons. On the date of the allocation approval, the Ministry sorts the requests according to three categories (groups): equipment, renovations, safety and security.  It should be noted that one of these allocation subjects is the sources in the regular budget sections of the Ministry.


The State Comptroller’s Office investigated the handling of the local authorities’ applications to receive assistance in commencing the 1995-1996 and 1996-1997 school years.  64 local authorities requested assistance in commencing the 1995-1996 school year, and 34 of their requested were approved; 66 local authorities requested assistance in commencing the 1996-1997 school year, and 44 of their requests were approved.


The objective of the allocations is, as stated, to solve problems “which require an immediate response in order to begin the school year”.  Therefore, it would have been expected that the submittal of requests and their handling would have been carried out close to the beginning of the school year (September 1st).  The inspection revealed that the Ministry approved eight requests, which were submitted two months after the beginning of the 1995-1996 and 1996-1997 school years. Hence, the sum allocated could not have served its original purpose. It may be further evidenced that the Ministry decided to provide three allocations from the “beginning of the school year” item, long before the school year began – in the months of December, February, and March of the previous school year.

In relation to the approval of requests, the State Comptroller’s Office examined the decision making process as it relates to the requests to receive assistance for the beginning of the 1995-1996 and 1996-1997 school years.  In July 1996, the Pedagogical Authority classified requests for the receipt of assistance for the beginning of the 1995-1996 school year into three groups according to priorities.  Apparently, the decisions of the Allocations Committee with regard to approving or rejecting requests were not made respective of these classifications.  It was also not evidenced that the Pedagogical Authority or the Budgets Committee ranked the requests for receiving assistance for the beginning of the school year 1996-1997, according to the fulfillment of the criteria set for receiving assistance.

The Ministry rejected the requests of 22 local authorities which requested assistance for the beginning of the 1996-1997 school year. The State Comptroller’s Office compared between these requests and the requests that were approved.  It emerged that the requests were similar both in terms of subjects and in terms of the requested sums.  The Pedagogical Authority sent a uniform reply to the local authorities whose requests were rejected: “The budget for assisting in the beginning of the 1996-1997 school year was relatively limited in previous years, and not all requests submitted could be met, therefore we were forced to considerably reduce the number of localities and the number of subjects that were approved for the budget”.

This answer indicates that requests were rejected due to lack of funding, and not because the local authorities which submitted them did not meet the criteria.  In the performance reports for 1995 and 1996 of the budget item “beginning of the school year” it appears that in those years, 14.14 million NIS were spent and 22.76 million NIS, respectively, for this purpose.  It emerges, therefore, that the argument that the budget that was earmarked for the beginning of the 1996-1997 school year was relatively limited, as compared to previous years, has no leg to stand on.

In respect to the promises made by the Managing Director, several documents were found seemingly attesting to the fact that the allocations from the “beginning of the school year” item, were provided in the wake of promises made by the Managing Director of the Ministry.  For example, in a letter to the Assistant Director of the Pedagogical Authority to the Senior Deputy Managing Director of the Administration Office dated October 31, 1994 it is written: “Seeing as in the regulation only 4 million NIS were allocated according to your announcement, I would appreciate it if you would see to it that the allocation in the regulation of the beginning of the school year (regulation no. 2605871) be increased by another 3 million NIS, in order to fulfill the Managing Director’s promises to the authorities”.  

The State Comptroller’s Office discovered documents attesting to over 20 occasions where the Managing Director promised to provide assistance to localities from the “beginning of the school year” budget item.  From the Ministry’s documents one cannot know if according to the standard he set, those same localities were eligible for assistance any more than other localities whose requests were rejected, since the Ministry did not rank the requesting localities according to their degree of need for assistance.

In relation to the performance reports, in the inspection, no reports on how many local authorities received allocations (including the balance) were found for the 1995 school year (Elavon, Katzrin, Tiberias, Mitzpe Ramon) nor on how many local authorities received allocation for 1996 (Maale Adumim, Kiryat Shemona, Carmiel, Modi’in Regional Council).  A significant portion of the implementation reports that were found were found to be inconsequential, and expenses were specified in round figures.  There were cases in which the implementation reports were sent shortly after the approval of the Allocations Committee.

The results indicate that it is feared that the allocation for the beginning of the school year that was provided to the local authorities were used by them to return expenses that were already paid and which would have been spent even if the special allocation for the beginning of the school year had not been provided.

Providing financial assistance to solve urgent problems which are liable to prevent the beginning of the school year is desired, however it is justified only in special cases, and not in 30% of the local authorities in one year.  The test showed that apparently, a significant portion of the funds were used to carry out jobs which were not required for providing a solution to unanticipated problems which require an immediate solution, in order to facilitate the commencement of the school year.  Furthermore, it emerged that there were shortcomings in the decision making process, in deciding whether to provide assistance, and it is feared that in the distribution of funds, priority was given to several local authorities.  The State Comptroller had warned in the past of giving priority to certain local authorities over others in providing government assistance, without explaining why this is justifiable.
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Chapter 3: Local Government - Its Definition and Characteristics

	This section shall discuss the nature and logic of local government in theory, to identify factors which contribute to the disparity between budgetary policy and its execution by the local government. Local government may be examined from different perspectives (Elazar and Kalcheim, 2001). In this chapter we will focus on the characteristics of the local authority, which portray it as being much more independent than what is reflected in legal-institutional or operational-formal documents.

The local authority often reflects the nature of a regime and the development of the State’s current public institutions. The term “local government” has many interpretations. There are some (Viscount, 1921; Herman, 1950) who regard it as a sum total of the powers in an area of operation which have been partly or wholly eliminated from the central government’s sphere of influence, and have been left to be exercised by the local authority through its representatives elected by the local population (Weiss, 1972). There are others (Chapman, 1953; Aktzin, 1967) who regard it as a non-authority, manipulated by a central government through its intermediaries within defined territorial areas of the State (Weiss, 1972). The word “municipality” (a body parallel to the local authority) is derived from the Latin word municipium which referred to a town subject to Rome, but governed by its own laws. This Latin word has its roots in two other Latin words: munia – meaning official duties or functions, and capere – meaning to take.

The legal-institutional or operational-formal documents are vital for the existence of the rule of law and proper administration, however, in reality they do not expose the complicated system of interrelations between the local authority and the government ministries, and therefore, cannot assist us in becoming acquainted with reality to the same extent as field results. It is clear that the distinction between local authorities is influenced by many factors, from the socio-economic composition of the population to the political leadership and its influence on the operation of the local authority.

The formal-institutional approach is oblivious to the wide range of situations which exist in the local authorities, and fails to take into account that many phenomena do not occur by the books, and recur in a considerable number of authorities, failing to comply with the formal scenario. This fundamentally static approach does not refer to the way in which the authorities operate according to a different standard, even when the institutional structure remains in tact (Dearlove, 1973).

A significant number of researchers and politicians received the misguided impression that the local government is at the mercy of the government ministry, due to the “optical” illusion of viewing the formal status of local government as a mirror of reality. This error is chiefly illustrated in that which concerns the interrelationship between the central government and the local government. This statement is true mainly regarding democratic countries in the west, which were shaped as modern sovereign countries, based on central government methods, while being established upon theories and management methods which were developed in the modern era. A by-product of the mentioned approach is that the status of the local authority is established on the one hand as an administrative unit in the periphery of state administration and on the other hand became isolated as a distinct political identity.

Although there are some outstanding differences between the structure of one local authority and another in democratic countries, one may identify different patterns insofar as relations between local and central government (Dunshire, 1981; Thrasher, 1981; Kalcheim, 1987; Ben-Elia, 1995, 9-11) are concerned. These patterns are divided into three categories: the central control model, the local autonomy model and the political system model, all of which will be described in detail in this section. 

A.  Central Control Model –
According to this pattern, the local government derives its authority to act by virtue of state law which is overseen by the central government. Furthermore, according to this model, a large portion of local government expenses are received in the form of grants, as well as Treasury participation and monetary transfers. In the case of this model, the State is conceived as a pyramid, with the  Government at its peak, while on its lower levels one finds the local government whose functions are to carry out the policy of the central government, and this in accordance with local conditions and under the supervision of government ministries. The same approach is cited in Hartley’s research (Local Government, 1976), according to which the local authority acts as a kind of executive agency of the centre. In other words, the local authority has no autonomy, but is subject to the directives issued by the central government.

In their research projects, Robson and Wizeman also referred to this subject, and emphasised that the dominant trend in England is to view the local authorities as agents of the central government (Robson, 1968, Wizeman, 1970). This situation has arisen for the following reasons:
	The government’s extensive participation in the authorities’ budget
	The central government’s desire to establish uniform services, in order to have sufficient grounds for close scrutiny of each and every local authority, and thereby erode their autonomy.

B.   Local Autonomy Model (or Local Self-Authority) – 

The characteristics of this model are as follows:
	Each local authority is a political unit, headed by a body elected by the public to whom it is responsible for its actions.
	The local population is in a better position than the central bodies whose activities are nation-wide, to know its own needs and how they may be fulfilled, especially since the centre by its very nature is more concerned uniformity than with relevance.
	Since the local government has been given the authority to collect taxes, it would be reasonable to propose that it replace government ministries in providing services, rather than remain subject to their authority.

Proponents of this approach (Kalcheim, 1980) too, while acknowledging the central responsibility of the State in matters of defence and national economy, do not demand full autonomy for the local government. They do however, demand a change of direction in the trend which is becoming stronger on the part of the centre and its bureaucratic procedures.

Hartley has written of a second approach to this subject, one which views the local government as an independent body with rights and duties. In other words, since there is a partnership between the two authorities, the local authority should be given more responsibility in determining policy, providing services and setting a minimal standard of service for its residents. (Local Government - 1976). The factors influencing the degree of autonomy in local government studies, may be classified into four groups (Dunshire, 1981; Thrasher, 1981; Ben-Elia, 1995):
National factors  - such as: ideological pluralism in the country facilitates more extensive local autonomy; placing the means of production at the disposal of the central government curbs this autonomy.
Demographic factors – such as: population size in the local authority; number of local authorities in the State.
Socio-economic factors such as: heterogeneity/homogeneity, Population, level of education and income, income composition of the local authority.
Political factors – such as: stability of the local leadership, involvement in the political-national sphere, activity of voluntary organisations.
The results of the studies attributing any factors to the degree of local autonomy are not universal, even if there is a positive correlation between a certain factor and the degree of dependence on the central government. The intensity of the correlation differs in each place. The existence of a dominant factor in one country and its absence or insignificance in another, contribute to the formulation of various estimates of local autonomy. However, this may be refuted by suggesting that all that has been stated regarding the autonomy of the local government in the State of Israel based on that which is written in the laws, regulations and other official documents, has no true validity in making accurate assessments on this subject.

The procedures and the guidelines of the government ministries that are in charge of these matters, particularly in light of their significant participation in the budgets of the local authorities, do indeed restrict the local authorities to some extent, however they still grant them leeway (for lack of choice, or voluntarily) to finance education and welfare services. 
C. Political System Model – 

Theoretically speaking, this model is linked to the “Marble Cake” model which refers to the relations between the federal and local government in the United States (Elazar and Kalcheim, 2001). Easton (Easton, 1971) said that ultimately all social life is interdependent and a result, that it is artificial to isolate any set of social relations from the whole for special attention. According to this model, the centre contains no single entity, but rather consists of a cluster of independent agencies and authorities, each of which operates in its own way to achieve its objectives. At the same time, the local authority too, consists of various independent units. The line which separates and joins the centre and any particular local authority is diversified, and is in fact a multi-channel communications network for the transfer of a wide range of messages.  The fact that different local authorities budget their resources for providing services in different ways and proportions, is evidence that he who “pays the piper” (the State) does not  always “call the tune”.

Local government does not always operate according to the relationship between the centre and the periphery. Local elections reflect only one aspect of local political life, seeing as that the local authority is linked by a system of relationships to associations and community institutions as well as to local and national parties. In this way, a system of connections with both the government and the opposition are formed. For this reason, this model is known as the “political system model.”

The framework of the models described in this section is based on a foundation comprised of two contradictory and conflicting concepts (Elazar and Kalcheim, 2001): The first states that since the local government has been elected by the public, it constitutes an independent political authority, one which is empowered to act as a governing authority in every way which concerns the lives of the residents within the area of its municipal jurisdiction. According to this basic concept, the local government is a basic cell of society, one which defines the status of a   citizen as far as the authority is concerned, and organises the citizens so as to provide for their needs in certain areas. On the other hand, according to the second concept, the local government is regarded as a local executive organisation which is intended to provide minimal services. Here the local authority is conceived as being subject to the control and influence of the central entities. In other words, this approach conceives the local government as a tool to be used by the State so that it may implement its plans for the public.

However, and notwithstanding the differing approaches of the models adopted by various countries, there is a considerable uniformity in the classification of the various types of services provided by the local authority to its residents. Viewing local government as a subservient puppet in the hands of the central government appears to be a simplistic and misleading perception in the 90’s and the dawn of the 21st century. The relationship and work distribution between the two levels of government is much more complex and multi-dimensional than what this prevalent approach leads us to believe.

It is reasonable to assume that if the central government had wished to establish its status, power and authority within a much more confining legal framework than that which actually exists, it would have done so by defining boundaries as to what is permissible and what is forbidden for local government. An example of this may be observed in Britain where the central government redefines the status and methods of operation of the local government as it sees fit, in a cyclic and one-sided fashion (Ben-Elia, 1995).

The central government in Israel, did not follow in the footsteps of British centralism, because it is incapable of doing so, from a structural point of view and not a systemic one. As mentioned, for lack of a clear constitutional setting, which defines the responsibility and authority of each governmental stratum, or alternatively, for lack of an historical 100 year old tradition, their governmental and functional status in practice derives from the development of the government of Israel since the establishment of the State and even prior to its establishment. This development underscores the unique status of the central government both as an initiating and shaping force as well as a fountainhead of resources. In the elitist political culture of Eastern-European tradition, the preferred status of the central government is considered normative and image-based, whereas phenomena of local autonomy are regarded with suspicion.

Research studies which have been conducted and have monitored the central-local government relationship in Israel in the first decades following the establishment of the State provide manifold examples of this (Weiss, 1972).  Consequently, a prevalent perception developed (the Dependence Model) which views local government as an executive agent representing the central government (Subordinate Government) and even as an underling almost completely at its mercy. This perception was reinforced by using the concept “sub-contractor”, which was designed to simply and directly characterise the status of local government in Israel, as an entity which performs a function on behalf of one governmental body, is subservient to it, must fulfil the tasks it has been assigned and is dependent upon the financial resources which the patron places at its disposal (Deri and Swartz, 1994: 9-10).

As opposed to the perception of predatory centralism, Kalcheim (1976) presented a theory that was almost the antithesis of the emphasis on maximum local autonomy, which may be referred to as “supervisional failure”. According to this theory, the central government in Israel does not succeed at, and in part is unprepared, to convert its political and administrative power into efficient control and supervision apparatus in order to fulfil its desires (policy and plans) on the local level. The dependence of the local government under such conditions does not materialise, since the central government has no tools to ensure the fulfilment of its desires and to restrict the autonomous activity of the local government.

Empirical research studies indicate that despite the significant differentiation that has surfaced in the scope of municipal activity over the past two decades, the degree to which the local government is examined has remained in the same time period – in a significant process of decline. (Freidberg, 1988, 1994). There has been less use of feedback mechanisms which monitor the activities of the local government. The weakening of these feedback mechanisms in local government provided, to some extent or another, a free hand which was much greater than what could be anticipated from the Dependence Model, which was actually transformed into positive local initiative and the adoption of “exceptional” methods of operation such as a cognisant and professed deficit policy.


























Chapter 4: Local Government in Israel-Historical Perspective

After the discussion about the nature and the logic of Local Government in theory, this section will describe the historical development of local government in Israel, and emphasise its nature, and this in order to identify those factors which influence full implementation by local authorities of the budgetary policy determined by the central government.

The seeds of Jewish local authority in Israel began to flower within the autonomous organisational frameworks which were created by the Jewish communities who immigrated to this country at the end of the 18th century and who performed public functions (Weiss, 1972) on a voluntary basis. These organisations constituted a kind of miniature “Knesset” (Israel Parliament) and were an inseparable part of the Jewish colony as a whole. At that time, Israel’s citizens did not fall under Western influence, and during the Ottoman period Israel’s towns were like any other Eastern towns, no more than “urbanised villages”. 

At the end of the 19th century following the increased trend towards centralisation in the Ottoman Empire, some municipal reforms were carried out. This resulted in the “Municipalities Law of 1877” which established two kinds of municipal frameworks:  the “Sehir” which related to towns of over 40,000 inhabitants, and the “Kasaba” which were smaller. This law did not affect the Jewish population who continued with their traditional organisations. By the end of the Ottoman period, there were 22 such municipalities in Israel.

The inception of the British Mandate in 1918 saw the beginning of renewed municipal legislative activity. The British regarded the local authority as a stage in preparing the population for independence on a national scale. The Mandatory Government promulgated the 1921 Ordinance thereby establishing the “Local Councils” which were municipal governing bodies on a lower level than the prevailing municipalities. During the mid-twenties four Jewish Local Councils were established: Rishon Le-Zion, Rehovoth, Petach Tikva and Tel-Aviv (Weiss, 1972) .

In 1934, a municipal ordinance was promulgated which completed the Mandatory legislation system. However this ordinance related to a single Jewish town (Tel Aviv), compared to 22 Arab and mixed population towns in existence, and although a democratic mechanism was put into effect for the Tel-Aviv elections, the Ordinance decreed that the Council Head and his Deputy be appointed by the High Commissioner.  Even the appointment of senior municipal officials required confirmation by the District Commissioners. The fiscal activities of the local authority as well as the passing of by-laws were subject to the approval of the Commissioner.

At that time, all principle decisions were made by government ministries, so that the local government had no real authority (Weiss, 1972). The Jewish population in the country regarded independent administration of its affairs as an important mechanism for achieving political, social and economic autonomy. For this reason it encouraged the establishment of local authorities, workers’ councils, Jewish settlement committees, secretariats and kibbutzim, etc. Among the political and civil groups at that time, the General Zionists and the Progressives succeeded in expanding their local influence in opposition to the nationalist Jewish institutions led by the heads of the workers’ parties.

Generally speaking, upon the establishment of the State, no changes were made in the organisational structure, or in the functions and powers of the local authorities. The only significant change made concerned the method of electing the authorities’ administrative bodies in true democratic spirit, by granting representation to all sectors of the population. As Rosen (Rosen, 1962) wrote:
“The policy of ‘municipalisation’ - the inclusion of each and every settlement, small as well as large, new as well as old, under the auspices of the law, has transformed the local authority into an axiom in the life of the State.”
The local authority is subject to the Ministry of the Interior who is empowered to implement Government policy with regard to every subject that concerns local government, and this by means of its district representatives.

From the Interior Ministry’s point of view, Israel is divided into six districts. The head of each district represents that Ministry alone, so that in practice, as far as policies in other fields are concerned, authority has passed to the appropriate ministry and its representatives. From the legal and organisational aspect, all municipalities in the country have equal status (Legal Instructions for Amendment of Local Authorities Laws - 1973). The local, elected government system and the residents of each authority elect the body whose function it is to administer their local affairs.

There are three kinds of local government in Israel: Municipalities, Local councils and regional councils. The difference between municipalities and local councils is linked to the level of development of the location, the size of its population, its economic sources and administrative capability. A regional council is a local council for a rural area, whose inhabitants have common interests, but where each settlement is too small to justify the existence of a separate local council for each and every one.

Municipal government in Israel has two forms: Municipalities and Local Councils, with the distinction between the two being ever more slight. The large local communities have complete municipal authority by law: however, according to English tradition of “ultra verus” (beyond authority), they are limited to the same authority vested in them by law, and in case of a conflict between them and the State, the municipal authority is delegated more constrictively. Small urban settlements have been granted the status of Local Councils, which confers them with authority similar to that of the municipalities. In several cases, the authority of Local Councils is even more extensive (Rosen, 1962: 153-159; Baker, 1968; Gat, 1976).

The kibbutzim and moshavim (collective settlements), an elite of the past, are still organised as collective societies with a municipal status of a Local Board by law. By virtue of this status, they are authorised to screen joining members, as the application for membership is subject to authorisation by members of the kibbutz or moshav. Every kibbutz and moshav is also a member of a Regional Council which provides municipal services to localities associated with it. The localities are represented on the Council according to their size, by representatives selected in the collective association (Martinez and Hoffman, 1981).

The local authorities in Israel operate in accordance with two items of Mandatory legislation and their various revisions: the Municipal Ordinance of 1934 (new version, 1968) and the Local Councils Ordinance of 1941. The Municipal Ordinance regulates the details of a municipality’s establishment and the organisation of its authorities, and every change requires the approval of the Knesset. The Local Councils Ordinance lays down a number of principle rules which are listed almost entirely without details, thus leaving its continued implementation in the hands of the Minister of the Interior.

The functions of a municipality are stated in two principle clauses of the Municipal Ordinance. 	The compulsory functions of the municipality are as follows:
“The Regulation of a public water supply, paving roads, sewerage, lighting, sanitation, building public parks and construction supervision. The execution of all measures required to protect the municipal area, as well as the maintenance of public health and security. The Mayor is entitled to establish and assist public institutions.” 

The following functions are not compulsory, but may be executed at the discretion of the municipality. The municipality may pass its own by-laws in order to enable it to properly carry out its functions as listed above. The Local Councils have the same authority, with the exception of the facts that the authority of the Minister of the Interior regarding municipal by-laws is vested with the Head of the District and that the Municipal Council has 5 – 21 members.

In reality, the functions of the Local Councils differ from the letter of the prevailing law. The services they provide are divided into two categories: Local services which deal with Functions arising from the instructions of which consist mainly of fulfilling the usual municipal functions (infrastructure, building, etc.) and government services in which the local authority functions as a sub-contractor for the government in providing those services for which it is responsible for providing in accordance with Knesset decisions. These include education and culture, health, welfare and religion.

Since the establishment of the State of Israel, the status of local government has undergone several transformations as a result of changes in Israel’s political system as well as in the State’s cultural, social and economic development as described below. Upon the founding of the State in 1948, local government moved away from the centre of the political arena. The State took responsibility for many public functions which, in the absence of central institutions, had formerly been performed by the local government. The political leadership was interested in holding positions and functions in the new State. In this way, opposition party members who were not satisfied with carrying out the duties of mere Knesset members, and members of kibbutzim who preferred to be active in the local arena, were all left behind. During the process of allocating functions between the central and local government, the political parties as well as the Histadrut (Federation of Trade Unions) intervened, each demanding their share, thereby further weakening local government autonomy (Elazar and Kalcheim, 1987).

The huge wave of immigration (1948 – 1953) altered Israel’s patterns of settlement.  The veteran settlements and kibbutzim who had held the most power and had protected local autonomy, become relatively less influential than other communities. On the other hand, development townships and immigrant settlements who had been weak, became important components of the local government system.It was the central government in Israel that initiated the establishment of new local authorities.

The number of Jewish settlements with municipal status increased from 36 in 1948 to 107 in 1968. The number of Regional Councils increased from 4 to 53 in 1985. The Arab, Druse and Circassian villages were also encouraged to establish their own, modern municipal government. In this way the road to political involvement was paved for thousands of non-Jewish inhabitants who had previously been confined by social traditions, and whose political power was held by a small, elite group. During the mid-fifties, local government sank to an unprecedented low in the political system. The veteran local authorities lost some of their original functions and were swallowed up by the national political party system in a way which resembled patterns of government determined in Jerusalem. The well-established kibbutzim and other agricultural settlements did not attract new immigrants, and as a result, their importance diminished in the local government system. 

The new immigrant townships which were established after the founding of the State were not as yet ripe for independent government, and in those cases where municipal status was achieved, key positions were held by representatives of the political parties who were brought in from the outside to run local affairs until such time as an appropriate local leadership could develop. During the late fifties, there was a change of direction towards co-operative or collaborative activity between the two governing authorities when the State took prime responsibility for initiating programs to determine budgetary policy, while the actual performance of services was gradually transferred to local government. This was not a case of co-operation between equals, but rather of co-operation between a superior and an inferior, a state of affairs which eventually became the norm. The local government system had to cultivate a staff of qualified personnel with administrative capabilities in order to provide the services the State had promised its citizens. At that point local government began to recruit and cultivate a new class of employees from all sectors of the Israeli population. 

Furthermore, contrary to local government in countries with heterogeneous populations, such as the United States, local government in Israel undertook to perform a broad range of functions in social and cultural spheres which differed greatly from the usual functions of local government. These functions included the provision of services on religious matters, as well as the organisation and management of orchestras, theatre groups and day-care centres.

The rise of the personality cult as an element in local elections also reflected the increased importance and power of the local political scene. Even during the 1973 elections, the local branches of political parties began to operate more independently, adopting an extreme attitude which rejected all attempts by the party centres to draw up lists of candidates or determine the nature of election propaganda. Until the elections of 1983, there had been a continuous decline in attempts by political party centres to become involved in drawing up lists of local candidates or editing election propaganda. During the 1983 elections themselves there was a certain degree of restraint in this regard, followed by a renewed involvement of national parties in a number of local authorities. 

In June 1949, The Minister of the Interior, Moshe Shapira, declared to members of the First Knesset:
 “We acknowledge the right of the local authorities to self-determination, and as long as the public good does not demand government involvement, we want to grant the local authorities absolute autonomy” (Deri and Swartz, 1994: 15).
 Forty-three years later, in its Declaration of Principles, the government headed by the late Itzhak Rabin, promised to granted local government less than “absolute autonomy” but more autonomy than it had.
 "The Government will apply itself to broadening the independence of local government and reducing its dependence on the central government. The government will act according to clear, fixed and equal criteria for the allocation of grants from the Ministry of the Interior and the Treasury to the local authorities, and will ensure that they are implemented.” (Clause 12.6 of the Government’s Policy Declaration of Principles, 1992).

From June 1949 until 1992, there was no significant change in the formal status of local government in Israel. Matters did not change even after that date. The Ministry of the Interior, which has overall responsibility for the functioning of the local authorities,  was without a full-time Minister for a year and a half (until February 1995), because Prime Minister Rabin held this portfolio, together with the portfolios of Defence and Religion. Since 1961, the status of local government and its relations with the central government has been examined by six different committees, three of which – the Zanbar Committee, the Kubersky Committee and the Hermlech Committee made recommendations which have constituted the framework for relations between the central and local government over the past two decades. A separate chapter will focus on the reports of these committees.

By the end of 1990, there were 239 local authorities in Israel, 44 of which were municipalities, 141 local councils and 54 regional councils. By 1996,  there were 248 local authorities, and by 1998, their number had increased to 265. According to the Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem with its population of over half a million is the largest local authority, and is followed by Tel Aviv, and Haifa. The local authorities in Israel are not cut from the same cloth, and differ from each other in many respects, such as size of a socio-economic class, geographic location (central vs. peripheral), population composition (Jewish and non-Jewish) and municipal status (municipalities and local councils as opposed to regional councils). When defining the purpose of local government, one cannot avoid comparing its decentralised authority with the concentration of authority in the central government system. For example, Menuhin (1980: 17) defines the purpose of the local government as follows:
 “If we wish to give the purpose of local authority a theoretical and functional definition, we may say that its purpose is to concern itself with the security as well as the material and spiritual welfare its residents, in accordance with the purposes of the State with regard to the social norms and values whereby the local community wishes to live. To attain this goal, especially the latter part, a measure of independence is required in order that the local authority may represent the interests of all and/or some of its residents, that these residents may receive benefits from the central government and/or from other sections of the community, and finally, that it may implement, in the most efficient way, a policy or any alternative means for acquiring and allocating such benefits.”

The organisational structure of local government with regard to the limited strength of its authority is a function of several factors having historical and geographical roots. 
 “In spite of its small size, Israel is known as a country where political power is concentrated to a great extent in its central, governmental and party institutions. Israel’s development has evolved out of ideological motives, and its political tradition has been inherited from Jewish and non-Jewish sources. All these factors have combined to produce this doctrine of centralisation…..and the resulting limited functional role of local government in Israel which is based on territorial recognition. Local government is sometimes described as the weakest element in the political system of the State. There is no doubt that in many ways, local government is subordinate to government and party centres…..”  (Elazar and Kalcheim, 1987: 3).

On the one hand, the limited area of the State of Israel, and on the other hand, its political centralisation, have not left much room for local government. The State has adopted the role of  “distributing agent” which has reinforced the government’s position as a focus of power in Israeli society (Eisenstadt, 1973), and caused the local authorities to be characterised as “sub-contractors”, dependent on the tasks it is allotted, and on the economic and governmental resources its patron places at their disposal (Deri and Swartz, 1994 : 9). Moreover, when the State was established and the Jewish population was divided into its characteristic, clear-cut and nucleus-periphery structure, when a large percentage of the population was concentrated in the towns located in the centre of the country, and when only a small percentage was dispersed among many agricultural settlements on the periphery, small townships established after the founding of the State became centres for providing services to the surrounding population (Shachar, 1973).

For conclusion, we have witnessed a strengthening of the territorial democratic process, as well as a strengthening of local government. Local communities seek and find a way to further their local interests by political means. This way is a vital need in a country such as Israel where politics rule every aspect of life. Like Western democracies,  Israel is marching towards a decentralisation of authority which enables local communities to design their political and social institutions.

As previously mentioned, from 1948 until the early sixties, due to the  prevailing trend towards centralisation which was inspired by the paternalistic approach of Ben-Gurion, the State took over functions which in pre-1948 times, had been carried out by local, voluntary or political bodies. The need for a local administration in a small centralised State, as well as the democratic values which the Israeli leadership stood for, gave rise to the development of local self-government among Jews and Arabs alike. From the mid-sixties onwards, the trend towards decentralisation gained momentum due to an upsurge in local political power. Nevertheless, this process did not find expression in any formal legislation, nor even in any administrative orders on which a large part of Israeli rule by law is founded. The result has been the creation of a gap between the official framework which is still structured as a pyramid, and the balance of power system which in practice prevails in Israel. However, not all developments moved in one direction. 

From 1978, although local power has increased, national political complexity has reached new heights. Since the direct local authority elections of 1978, a new political style has made its appearance in this country. In 1977, several heads of local authorities were elected to the Knesset, thanks to new opportunities which opened up before them with the rise of the Likud into power. During the elections of 1981, several more leaders came into prominence in the national arena. Some of them resigned from their local positions, while others preferred to combine their activities in the Knesset and in local government at one and the same time. After 1981, twenty-two Knesset Members held additional posts in local government, some of them as mayors of small towns. It would seem that nowadays, most of the dynamic political leadership in Israel flourishes in the local authorities.

 Local government in Israel whose patterns are still being shaped and crystallised, is perplexed by many problems. Those who are close to this subject will have no difficulty in enumerating the most important of these problems, namely, the relationship between the central and local government, the status of local government in the country, the political structure and its administrative arrangements, as well as the general and municipal legislation on which it is based, and from which it derives its authority. As stated, local government in Israel has been constructed, layer upon layer, from the period of Turkish rule, through the years of the British Mandate and the years of settlement until the establishment of the State. Its status is derived from a combination of Mandatory and Israeli legislation, although there is an increasing trend towards the introduction of Israeli legislation (Naor, 1978: 11).

Notwithstanding all the Government Committees that have been appointed to address the subject, the situation remains anomalous. On the one hand there is the dependence of the local authorities on the central government, while on the other, it is the local government which is responsible to the citizens who elected it – a state of affairs which has caused the local authorities to be regarded as a “local manager” rather than as a local government (Deri and Swartz, 1994). Subsequent to the above survey of the local authority in Israel, and in light of the reinforcement of the trend of decentralisation of the local authority – it may be asked how this development influences the range of municipal resources for financing education services.

Fostering the municipal school system receives top priority in the eyes of most heads of the local authorities in Israel and this is evidenced in the relative portion of the education budget in the total local authority budget. It may be assumed that the strong local authorities (from a socio-economic perspective) will invest more in local education services.


Chapter 5: Central-Local Government Relations in Israel

This section will describe the development of central-local government relations from the pre-State period to the present day, and this in order to understand and identify the elements which have caused the gap between the public policy determined by the central government, and the extent of its implementation by the local government. It should be emphasised at the outset that the mould of centralisation regarding central-local government relations in Israel was shaped during the period of the British Mandate, the said relations may be better understood if examined in the context of this historical background. In practice, we are talking about the Mandatory law for municipal areas which was frozen upon the founding of the State of Israel.

The development of political institutions in the Jewish areas of the country prior to their transformation to a State, was part of a process which took place parallel to the formation of the social system of the country as a whole. The fundamental factors stated below are characteristic of the development of the Israeli system: 
A. This process involved the creation of a non-sovereign political centre which to a considerable extent exercised authority by virtue of its control over resources   and their budgetary allocation. Ecological, social and economic separatism also facilitated the political separatism which typified the aspirations of the Jewish colony for a central political system having considerable autonomy. As the colony expanded, sub-centres arose where different social groups with different ideologies were formed and flourished without any internal conflict. In practice, the centre was a kind of coalition of sub-centres (Lissak and Gutman, 1977).
B. The colony’s nucleus grew in strength and authority, and this inter alia, because of its ability to raise resources outside the system. This enabled it to allocate more monies to, than it mobilised from the periphery (Lissak and Gutman, 1977). It should be emphasised that according to Shils (1961), the “centre” is an internal field in a social structure – the heart of the beliefs and symbols of that society. Moreover, the centre is the focal point where activities and functions are carried out by its personnel and institutions.

The centre is not an institutional, legal or geographical concept. It lies within the sphere of values defined according to a schism between members of a certain society with regard to their identification, their authority and the values they respect. The borderline between “centre and “periphery” is entirely theoretical, and differentiates between the area which has “more” and the area which has “less” of the same store of values (Gal-Nur, 1985). According to Shils (1961), the economic, religious, scientific and all other categories of the elite, are to be found in the centre. They require certain means in order to express, exercise and activate these values. The political centre is intended to provide such means.

The periphery of the political centre is part of the political system.  It is linked to the centre by means of a network of channels in accordance with the extent of the politicisation. At the periphery  can be found those who acknowledge the authority of the centre. The periphery is comprised of those whose share in the control over the political resources is relatively small compared to the share of those who occupy the centre or the sub-centres.

C. The social factor in the creation of the centre was an elite element with a futurist collective orientation, which strove for political power for the sake of attaining its political and social objectives. This elite reinforced its status in national institutions, expanded its spheres of activity, and exchanged material and normative values for resources of political power (Gal-Nur, 1985).

D. Mechanisms were created for settling political conflicts between social groups, social movements, ideological movements, political parties and pressure groups, and this without the tools and sanctions which are usually at the disposal of a sovereign society. The political centre succeeded in establishing itself thanks to the coalition structure, which was based on recognition of social and political pluralism and of the sub-centres that shaped it. A tolerant political climate was created in the organised colony. As the conflicts concerning the allocation of resources were solved, the centre concentrated on pragmatic problems and focused on the resolution of ideological problems in the political movement enclaves that were sub-centres of a kind (Gal-Nur, 1985). 

E. During the period of the Mandate, there was a tendency to cultivate local government as an alternative power to the Mandatory government. The Jewish colony in the country regarded self-rule of its affairs as an important device for attaining political, social and economic autonomy in anticipation of the achievement of its Zionist goals. To this end, the establishment of local authorities (municipalities, regional councils and local councils) as well as workers’ committees, Jewish settlement committees, kibbutz secretariats and the like was encouraged (Weiss, 1972).

F. The civilian groups in the political system of that time (the General Zionists and Progressives) increased their influence in local government in contrast to the unified national institutions headed by representatives of the workers’ parties (Weiss, 1972).

In conclusion, it may be said that during the British Mandate, the Jewish population cultivated the strength and power of the centre, a certain measure of autonomy was granted to local government (Horowitz and Lissak, 1977). Upon the establishment of the State, the waves of new immigrants who were mostly of Afro-Asian origin and who lacked Western political awareness, created many difficulties for the country’s leadership, who in their turn were required to resolve urgent technical issues and concentrate on the absorption of all the newcomers. The guidance, education and planning required to raise the level of the new settlements shaped the fundamental relationship between central and local government. Urban settlement was speeded up, and at the government’s instigation, new settlements were established. In time, the financial dependence of these settlements on the government increased to such an extent that the heads of the local authorities became intermediaries between the centre and the periphery.

The process of municipal urbanisation increased local authority dependence on the government, and at the same time, on the government’s coalition partners. Political parties became more influential through local government functionaries (particularly members of the local party branches). Furthermore, as evidence of a new pattern in central-local government relations, municipal departments began to align themselves with political parties (Weiss,1972).

As stated in the previous section, there is no doubt that the special, decisive and national conditions in the country at the time, required a centralised government to act as a guardian over every aspect of its citizen’s lives. This was also justified during the early decades of the State when infrastructures were being created for defence, economics, education, teaching and scientific research, the huge in-gathering of the exiles, nation-wide settlement and many other spheres (Kubersky, 1987). Only a centralised government was in a position to dictate the national priorities of a State in the making, and bear the heavy responsibility for the most fateful revolution in the history of the Jewish people. 

Naturally, political party considerations were also involved. While the hegemony of the central government leadership remained in the hands of the workers’ movement, that is in the hands of those who had led the struggle for rebirth and revival, local authority leadership at that time was in the hands of the “civilian” public. However, when in later years political alignment intensified between the leaders of  the central government and the mayors of Israel’s largest localities (Agron and Ish-Shalom in Jerusalem, Namir and Rabinowitz in Tel-Aviv, Abba Khoushy in Haifa, Rashish in Petach Tikva and Tuviah in Beersheba), not even this development managed to create any willingness  to define functions or share authority between the central and local government. At that time, most of the focal points of power in the State were held by the Labour camp which aspired to a maintain its authority for as long as possible (Government, the Zionist movement, the Histadrut and local government). These focal points willingly co-operated and collaborated, while the most important decisions were made by the party centre.

The Six-Day War caused the Israeli citizens to focus on problems concerning internal affairs and the quality of life. The Yom Kippur War resulted in a weakened consensus, as well as a gradual decline in the central government’s national authority. Protests were heard and doubts were voiced concerning the exclusive nature of this authority. Consequently, a new and entirely different national as well as local agenda appeared to be the order of the day. Local government became more heterogeneous as far as political leadership was concerned (Kubersky,1987). Citizens became more concerned about local and environmental problems. 

In 1975, this development brought about the passing of a law for direct elections of heads of local authorities; this gave them more power, and to a certain extent reduced their dependence on party apparatus and municipal departments. The head of a local authority who is directly elected is also granted regular executive authority, and in the Israel political system, is the only official who derives his public authority directly from his voters (until the shift to direct election of Prime Minister in 1996). Furthermore, lists of non-party local candidates participated in the elections, and as a result, those who were elected to office were better qualified. This in turn reduced to a certain extent the authority’s dependence on central government training. For all the reasons stated above, the status of the local authority in the eyes of the public was raised considerably, especially in the development towns.

At the end of the seventies, as well as in the eighties and nineties, local governments knew how to better define their problems (Kubersky, 1987), and some of their heads became Knesset members in addition to their local appointments (Moshe Katzav from Kiryat Malachi, Meir Shitreet from Yavne, Jacques Amir from Dimona, David Magen from Kiryat Gat, Ron Nachman from Ariel, Shaul Amor from Migdal Ha-Emek and Haj Yechi Rafik from Umm-el-Fahm). There was also a move in the opposite direction, when former Knesset members moved to local government (Ehud Olmert in Jerusalem and Ronnie Milo in Tel-Aviv).

Listed hereunder are some more facts pertinent to current central-local government relations in Israel:
a.  Local government in Israel has expanded since the founding of the State, both in size as well as in the range of its activities, while at one and the same time, the funding at its disposal has been reduced. During the early fifties, the financing for Israeli local government comprised 68% of its education budget. During the eighties, its portion was reduced to 35% (Turgovnik, 1987) only, and to 28% during the nineties (1990-1993) (Hecht, 1997).
b. Through its ministries, the government has established administrative, financial and political links with every town and settlement; these are operated by regional entities or directly through directives from the Director-General of the Ministry of the Interior and supervisory organisations such as regional committees (Hecht, 1997).
c. The local authority does not always function according to the model, “docile servant” model in the standard centralised system (Hecht, 1997). 
d. There is great potential in Israel for centralised intervention, especially by means of regulations (Hecht, 1997).
e. As far as implementation of policy is concerned, two levels of government are active in different subjects for different motives and because of various inclinations (Hecht, 1997). The results of such relations are manifested as expansion of freedom to determine policy on both a national and local level, continuous communication at various levels between local and central government institutions and continual changes in functions and fields of operation. Only in very rare cases does the central government act as an absolute hierarchy towards the local government. Sometimes the central government’s function is secondary as regards local affairs, but the relationship between the two authorities may be regarded as a sharing of the burden of responsibility.
f. The relationship between the two governments was influenced by political developments (Hecht, 1997) to the extent that as the strength of the political parties waned on a national scale, the strength of local government institutions increased. A significant example was reflected in the phenomenon of split elections, that is, votes were cast for two different political entities at one and the same time.

Voters in the elections of 1955, 1959, 1969 and 1973 cast their ballots on the same day for the Knesset as well as for the local authorities, voting according to the list of their choice for the former, and another list for the latter. This change in  local authority election procedures gave rise to a split procedure of a different kind in 1978, 1983 as well as in subsequent elections: Voters could support a certain list in the party ballot, and at the same time, choose the head of the authority from a separate list of candidates.

Notwithstanding the financial decline of local institutions, the process continues because it has become more flexible, resources are no longer located on the basis of party-political considerations, rules for budgetary allocations have been established and a strong, well-established local leadership has arisen. The only democratic-structural reform to have been carried out in Israel is that which has occurred at local government level (in the head of the local authority elections of 1975). The law permitting direct elections for Prime Minister was passed in the nineties.		
	
g. The formal legal framework represents, therefore, dependence upon the central government, but significantly, only with regard to the two most important fields of local authority activity – education and welfare. The law includes no detailed definition whatsoever concerning either the division of authority, or the procedures and directives of the two Ministries responsible. 

The revisions made in the Municipal Law (in Local Authorities laws until 1973), did not result in any significant changes in the legal framework which in practice remains vague, undefined and open to several interpretations. The central government in Israel enjoys obvious legal superiority in its relations with local government. In practice, the relations between the two authorities are not based on clearly-defined legal patterns, and may even be said to contain no small element of improvisation (Kalcheim, 1987).
h. In practice, central government does not exercise its control over every sector, so that there is no basis for the claim that local government initiative is limited as a result of such control (Kalcheim, 1987). In fact, it is well evident that the local authorities, both large and small, enjoy independence in almost every field of activity – executing projects, developing services, determining the salaries and pension scales of senior employees as well as financial administration. Nevertheless, this does not mean that their independence is entirely unrestricted, but rather that as far as their freedom of action in these areas is concerned, the local authorities are not hindered by central government controls (Kalcheim, 1987).
i. The revenue composition of the local authority budgets is cited by those who claim that the local authority is dependent on government resources for most of its income. There is no significant connection between over-dependence on the central government and the increase in non-independent income. 

For years, the greatest increase in income received from government sources has been in undesignated income which has exercised no restricting influence on the local authority (Kalcheim, 1987). Furthermore, the increase in designated income is no indication of dependence on the government. On the contrary, it indicates increased participation (for example, 80%-100%) in expenditure which over the previous decade had been very much lower, so that the local authority has had to bear a much heavier financial burden (Kalcheim, 1987).
j. The central and local government are neither similar nor monolithic units. The division of the central government into ministries and other governmental entities represent, in addition to organisational divisions, a wide range of political and economic interests which aspire to control and influence State resources. The local authority has the capability to divert this trend in Government ministries to other directions, to oppose it or to utilise it for the common interest.

Local government is also heterogeneous, and local authorities differ from one other with regard to economic, cultural and especially social resources. Moreover, in the political context, it is the heads of local authorities in particular who influence relations with the central government.  There is no doubt that it is the personality of each local authority mayor, and his connections with the governing coalition that have a considerable effect on the nature of relations with the central government. Professor Shevach Weiss claims that it is the local functionary’s activities in the corridors of the central government that one way or another influence the development of his constituency (Kalcheim, 1987).
k. The government ministries work in an environment that encourages improvisation, and this in turn encourages municipal officials to exert pressure and influence central government policy concerning the periphery. In other words, the local authority conducts its battles in the central government arena for the benefit of local interests (Kalcheim, 1987).
l. Since the day-to-day, even the “face-to-face” interaction between local government and central government officialdom, including meetings between mayors and senior officials is limited, local functionaries submit their wants to officials who are lower in the hierarchy, and who are closer to the daily functions and conduct of local authority affairs, such as the Regional Director at the Ministry of the Interior. In practice, all the power and control over the fate of the local authorities is concentrated in the hands of such officials (Kalcheim, 1987).
m. Co-operation between central and local government constituted the background for the following three proposals put forward with regard to public policy (Turgovnik, 1987):
1) Metropolitan reforms that would include amalgamation of all the services and power structures of every large urban area in Israel.
2) The level of government assistance to local authorities for social welfare would be defined as 75% of the cost of services provided under government auspices or with its approval, and as 50% or more in the sphere of education. The intention was to replace political considerations and bargaining over budgetary resources with a new policy regarding allocation of income.
3) Government committees were appointed whose function was to re-define government (central and local) relations from a constituent and financial point  of view (the Witkin Committee in 1961, the Kubersky Committee in 1975, the Zanbar Committee in 1976, the Hermlech Committee in  1991, the Swery Committee in 1993 and the Efrati Committee in 1996).

Only a small portion of the above committee proposals was implemented. Efforts towards structural changes are still under discussion, although several minor changes have been made. In the wake of the Zanbar Committee’s demand for the establishment of criteria and clearly-defined standards regarding government budget allocations to important population centres, every such centre receives its education and welfare budget nowadays based on clear criteria, namely the number of residents and the economic situation of the area. The Ministry of the Interior also provides an equal allocation to all local authorities in order to ensure a minimum level of services. 
n.  “The key to the financial problems of local government in Israel depends on whether and how a significant increase in the independent income of local authorities may be achieved. A larger revenue from independent sources is a pre-condition for efficient management of the authorities’ finances, for advocating the importance of the link between revenue and expenditure, for exercising a positive approach to all residents, and above all, for reinforcing the autonomous and political foundation of local authority in Israel” (Reuveni, 1987). 
o. Municipal administration in Israel is a satellite of government administration. Some of the most outstanding characteristics of government administrative culture have been copied by the municipalities. There are however, several administrative aspects of the municipal system which differ considerably from those of the government (Reuveni, 1987).

The level of professional specialisation in local government, especially in a medium-sized or small authority is generally lower than that found in government ministries, due to the fact that every authority conducts a wide range of activities, and that its organisation is based on geographic rather than  professional considerations. Second, Contrary to the government ministry or its representatives in the field, the local authority is part of the community, and its relations with its residents are not specific, but cover a wide and varied range of formal and informal activities. Thirdly, The local authority has much more flexibility in all matters regarding response to the demands and needs of the population, and by and large, its administrative patterns are not as deeply entrenched as those of the government. 

Additional aspects are that there is a greater measure of proximity between the political and administrative processes within the municipal system than between those within the government and Contrary to government administration, local government has no effective, central control apparatus such as the General Comptroller, Budget Division, or the Civil Service Commissioner. In addition, From the economic point of view, the local authority lies halfway between a budgeted, centralised public economy such as a government ministry, and the closed economy of a private enterprise such as a government corporation which has to subsidise part of its income and at the same time manage its affairs, at least partly, on a commercial basis.
	
 p. The decentralisation process taking place with regard to various areas of governmental powers and authority is gradually altering the historic relationship between central and local government in Israel (Ben-Elia and Canaani, 1996). This decentralisation is not the result of a formal, tested policy or careful consideration, but is basically a natural trend which takes place when the central government system becomes weaker at the same time as political strategy and professional administration at local authority level becomes stronger. The said weakening of the central government is reflected in its growing reluctance to handle local affairs. 

Due to its social, economic and geo-political complexity, Israel can no longer be governed from the centre – or “from above”. It is not surprising therefore, that the ability of government entities to provide an effective response to typical local government needs and problems, has diminished. While the aforementioned trend continues, it is clear that local authority is now becoming far more capable of handling local topics effectively, and that action at local level has received public legitimacy as a result of direct mayoral elections. The relative isolation of the central government has an economic aspect. The unrestrained local needs resulting from demographic expansion, the demands for improved services together with urban development have brought heavy pressure to bear on the relevant government ministries.

The process of decentralisation enables the central government to transfer some of these budgetary pressures to the local authorities, and demand that they tap their own sources and increase their participation in the financing of services and development. 

To summarise this section: There are positive indications regarding the reinforced  status of local government in recent years, and this notwithstanding the lack of a master plan or a declared national program (Kubersky, 1987), they are detailed here:





This resulted in a decrease in the extent of central government participation in local authority budget financing.

The neighbourhood rehabilitation project served to highlight the increase in independent effort, responsibility, initiative and the will to contribute as well as to change from passivity to activity.

In all the economic recovery programs which were effected over the years in this country, the local authorities were called upon to contribute to the national effort. As a result, some of their services were curtailed, and administrative staff was reduced.

Professor Yehezkiel Dror has stated, inter alia as follows, “When practically the only area where improved governing capability prevails in Israel is the local authority - as proven by the successful changeover to direct mayoral elections, we are witnessing a promising leadership force and a considerable increase in public initiative” (Kubersky, 1987). Additionally, he views local government as a more suitable framework for handling crucial problems such as: human relations, including those between religious and secular and Jews and Arabs; immigration absorption; cultural quality of life; values and reinforcing democracy by experiencing it in a framework in which the individual can make an impact.

As far as determining the dividing line between the respective powers of central and local government and the means for doing so is concerned, the issue of the division of these powers has not as yet been resolved.   The shaping of a firm policy regarding decentralisation is impeded by various political and personal factors in the system, as well as by the existence of an extensive network of informal relationships which generally prevail in any small country. The lack of any form of separation between local and national politics has also contributed to this state of affairs.
Over the years since the founding of the State, the two government strata (central and local government) have become interdependent to the extent that neither is able to realise their respective objectives without the other.  The expanding autonomy of the local government enables the local authorities to make demands which the central government is hard put to refuse. This is particularly true regarding those services which the central government is supposed to provide, the chief of which are education, welfare, health and religion, and is even more obvious with regard to compulsory services (such as formal education). Under the circumstances, the central government finds it difficult to establish a balanced policy which would ensure efficient allocation of budgetary resources, and at the same time effectively meet national needs as well as the principles of social justice in the widest sense. 











Chapter 6: Central-Local Government Relations in the Field of Education

This section will review relations between central and local government with regard to education from the pre-State period to the present day, and this in order to better understand the causes of the rift in educational budget policy. For a deeper understanding of the relationship between central and local government on the subject of education, it is necessary to become acquainted with the historical facts behind the establishment of the school system in Israel.

Hebrew education in Israel, in all its ramifications, is an organic entity which has grown side by side with the country’s national, political and social development. This section will provide a summary review of local, government and private education, as well as details of relations between the various authorities which have dealt with the subject from the first flowering of Hebrew education up to the 1980’s.

Milestones in Determining Control
A.  Until the 1913-1914 “Language War” –  
Although a limited school system did exist during the Ottoman period, the Jews preferred to send their children to institutions which were run by the Jewish community, and which engaged teachers whose salaries were paid by the parents themselves. The Jewish community also subsidised school fees for children from poor families, and engaged inspectors to supervise the work of the teachers and follow the pupils’ achievements (Sharfstein, 1965). Modern schools at that time were few and far between, and were supported by charitable organisations which were motivated by humane, social and sometimes political, but seldom national-Zionist considerations.

The few bodies which were motivated by nationalist-Zionist considerations (Azariahu, 1929) included co-operative settlement committees such as “Hovevi Zion”, J.K.A., the Aid Society as well as the local authorities. One of the largest and oldest networks was that of “Kol Israel Haverim” (All Israel Brotherhood), whose first school opened in 1870. Its schools were located in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, Safad and Tiberias. “Hovevei Zion” (Lovers of Zion) in Odessa, ran a girls’ school in Jaffa, while the “Agudat Achim” (Union of Brothers) in England opened a school in Jerusalem. “B’nai-Brith” established kindergartens in Jerusalem, Jaffa and Haifa, while the German organisation “Ezra” (Aid) ran an extensive network of schools and kindergartens in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Safad, Haifa and Tiberias. 

In the agricultural settlements, there were 22 schools (which absorbed 1488 pupils, 85% of the total number of pupils enrolled at local schools in these locations), and which were divided between the following four authorities: 13 schools were under the authority of  P.I.C.A. officials, 7 schools were under the authority of the “Hovevei Zion” Committee in Odessa, 1 school in Rehovoth was run by “Ezra” and 1 school in Rishon Le-Zion was run by the “Bnei Hamoshava” organisation. Each of the mentioned authorities ran their schools in accordance with their own particular educational policies, which were based on their respective points of view, programs and conditions. 

 B.  The Period of Zionist Federation Control – 
After the victory in the “language war” in 1914, a central body for the administration of Hebrew Schools was established for the first time in the history of Hebrew education in this country. The “Education Committee” established in 1914,  included representatives of the Zionist Federation in the Land of Israel, the “Hovevei Zion” Committee and the Teachers’ Federation. This Committee supervised almost all the Hebrew schools with the exception of those operated by P.I.C.A. (which joined only in 1921),  and the institutions founded by the earliest settlers who refused to effect changes or accept the Committee’s authority. 
In 1918, a “Representatives’ Committee” of the Zionist Federation arrived in the country in order to centralise and co-ordinate Jewish national activity. This Committee’s main objective was to centralise and assume administrative control over education (Azariyahu, 1929). The Education Committee was reorganised as a legislative institution for educational affairs, and as an advisory body for public pedagogic issues, while an Education Department was established to function as its executive branch.

In 1920, official regulations were promulgated which granted the Education Committee full responsibility for educational affairs in the country, from the building of schools, to budgeting, formulating teaching programs and appointing teachers. Nevertheless, this did not prevent a number of settlements from taking certain educational matters into their own hands, such as the involvement of parents and local councils in pedagogic meetings (Hayoun, 1953). By 1928, the Zionist Federation’s Education Department controlled 114 kindergartens with a total of 4,136 children, as well as 97 primary schools with a total enrolment of 11,987 pupils (Hed Hahinuch - Education Echo, 1927).

The institutions controlled by the Education Department were divided into the four budgetary categories (Shachar, 1926): Institutions whose budget came under the full responsibility of the Education Department, Institutions which were partly supported by the Education Department, while the remaining expenses were covered by school fees or raised from other sources, Institutions located in the P.I.C.A. settlements whose expenses were not borne by the Education Department (but whose expenditures and income were administered by the Department. They were also supported to a certain extent by the P.I.C.A. organisation, and the balance was covered by the settlements themselves) and Institutions which were wholly independent financially, but whose internal operation was administered by the Department which also supervised their activities with the owners’ approval.
	
The Zionist Federation’s education budgets which generally originated abroad, were adversely affected by the Second World War, and as a result, the Education Department had to revise and indeed cut back the status of educational institutions regarding budgetary support. Needless to say, this caused a reversion to the establishment of philanthropic schools. “Agudat Israel” took advantage of this situation by opening Yiddish-speaking religious elementary schools in Tel Aviv, Haifa and Petach Tikva. 

In 1922, the Mandatory Government, for the first time, agreed to provide modest budgetary support based on the number of Jewish pupils.In 1927, the Mandatory Government recognised the Jewish educational institutions as public schools, and as a result, Government budgetary participation increased. The increase in the Education Committee budget was achieved thanks to the increased participation in educational expenses by organised communities, particularly the Tel-Aviv Municipality (Azariahu, 1929). 

With regard to the 1926 general education budget of the Education Department, the Jewish colony participated in 42% of expenses. The Zionist Federation contributed 52%, while the Mandatory Government and P.I.C.A. contributed 6% (Azariahu, 1929). The Jewish Agency proposed that the said authority be transferred to local government as its alternative should it not be possible to transfer education to the National Committee. The Jewish Agency also promised the local authorities certain financial and economic powers, which they would be requested to exercise at a later date. The local authorities had not previously requested educational control, but in the light of these new developments, they took advantage of the situation to receive more authority in that particular area.

The attitude of the Mayor of Tel-Aviv at that time, Y. Rokach, typified the approach of the local authorities:
 “For years, we have been excluded from exercising any influence over educational matters, in spite of our considerable participation in the maintenance of our schools. Now we are expected to demand certain rights for ourselves” (Shilhav, 1972).

In Shilhav’s opinion, there were more significant reasons behind the desire to obtain more authority in the sphere of education – reasons which were linked to the political structure of the colony at the time, when the right-wing parties feared that the majority prevailing in the Federation of Trade Unions and the National Committee would influence the balance of power (Shilhav, 1972). The research conducted by Shilhav shows that the decision to transfer education was mainly political-communal, rather than organisational-educational, let alone communal-educational. It is clear that this decision influenced the trend towards further decentralisation of the school system, and created a new division of authority between central and local entities in the area of education.

C. The Period of National Committee Control –
The Mandatory Government allotted Jewish education a budget amounting to less than 20% of real expenditure in that sphere. Tel Aviv and the large settlements began to charge school fees and cover educational expenses themselves. Tel Aviv even imposed a 7.5% educational levy on rent payments (Sharfstein, 1965). When education was transferred to the National Committee, a struggle for actual control arose between all the bodies involved: The Jewish Agency, the National Committee, the local authorities, the Teachers’ Federation – it was a battle of aims and objectives (Shilhav, 1972). 

The three main political movements, General, Workers and “Mizrachi” which represented different ideologies, constituted three parallel, and for the most part, autonomous systems which exercised absolute control over all educational activity in the schools they operated (Riger, 1940).  The General movement’s power base prevailed chiefly in the oldest towns and settlements, and while at first the Worker’s movement dominated the kibbutzim and agricultural settlements, it spread later to the towns. The “Mizrachi” movement carried out its activities in various locations throughout the country. The Education Department of the National Committee was involved in raising and allocating budgets. The majority of primary schools belonged to municipalities, communities, co-operative settlement committees, kibbutz secretariats and agricultural settlements. It was the settlements which initiated the establishment of schools, and which provided the resources for their operation.

In the early forties, and upon the recommendation of the Mandatory Government, an agreement was reached with regard to teacher categories.  According to this agreement which defined relations between the central educational executive and the local Jewish authorities, teacher categories were eliminated and all teachers received equal rights. The National Committee was recognised as the supervisor of educational control with responsibility for teachers, while the local authorities were designated as employers of the teachers in all the primary schools operated by them.

Consequently, the central government financed the teachers in consultation with the local authorities who determined their salaries and working conditions, while the local authorities paid their salaries (Aloufi, 1944). In 1942, the Director of the National Committee’s Education Department, Dr. Mossinson drew up the Law of Decentralisation which stated as follows: “The National Committee retains full control over education, while each separate school belongs to the local authority. However, the said control is divided between the National Committee and the local authorities in such a way that educational and administrative control is held by the former, and budgetary control by the latter”. However, the local authorities were not content with this state of affairs, and demanded involvement in purely educational areas. At this point, and in this condition, the school system, with all its problems was transferred to the Government of Israel upon the establishment of the State.

D. The School System from the Establishment of the State until Today – 
Upon its establishment the State of Israel decided to take responsibility for education. In August 1948, the Government appointed a special ministerial committee which replaced the National Committee as official owners of the school system as well as of the school system Executive Committee. The latter was put in charge of current educational affairs, and had the same authority and functions as those previously held by the National Committee.In accordance with the decision of the above ministerial committee, the budgetary relations between the government and the local authorities remained unchanged.

On 10th March 1949, the Education and Culture Committee headed by Zalman Shazar was appointed. The first significant change to be made after the transition period included compulsory education for the 5-14 age-group – the 1949 Education Law. This law required the Government, in conjunction with the local authorities, to operate free primary schools. In practice, the law gives the Minister of Education freedom of action to divide responsibility between the Government and the local authorities (the decentralisation or centralisation method).

 The Ministry of Education opted for centralisation by cancelling the allocation of government educational budget to the local authorities, and taking all local educational taxes collected. Furthermore, all teachers working in the official schools became government employees who received their salaries from the Ministry of Education. The local authorities did not oppose this move, since in the light of the large wave of immigration, they were not over-anxious to undertake any additional burdens or responsibilities which were far beyond their capabilities (Bentwich, 1960). The Second Israel Government fell because of the crisis over educational streaming.

The State Education Law of 1953 cancelled the dividing of primary schools and kindergartens into streams, and since 1954, there have been two categories of primary institutions in the school system: government, and government/ religious (Ackerman, Karmon and Zucker, 1985). The administrative and pedagogic powers previously held by the streams were transferred to the Ministry of Education. Executive functions were divided between the Ministry and the six Regional Bureaus, representing the six administrative regions into which the State was divided. The functions of planning, development and research were concentrated with the Ministry, while the Bureaus’ functions included implementation, inspection, headcount and manpower.

In 1951 the Ministry of Education decided that all educational institutions would be regarded as “maintained” for the first two years, and after that as “budgeted”.  The further the settlement progressed from the organisational and economic standpoint, the greater the burden it would have to bear for the maintenance of its institutions. The Compulsory Education Law of 1949 required the State to provide elementary school education, but secondary school education was excluded from this legal obligation. As the local authorities became stronger and more established, so did their responsibility and obligation towards secondary school education increase. Notwithstanding the fact that with the passing of time, the financial dependence of the local authorities on the central government grew, and that the standing of the governing hierarchy in Israel shrank, the influence of the central government on educational policy increased.

Nowadays, there is a considerable degree of disparity between the formal arrangements and the actual powers of the local authorities which have gradually expanded, and which have not always gained recognition or legitimacy. The local authorities have a great deal of freedom to move with regard to the services they develop in the field of education, both with regard to the “standard” as well as the “extra” services,  the scope of which and the extent of their involvement they themselves define. The distinction between policy and implementation, between economic-procedural and educational aspects does not stand up under the test of reality.

Among the factors which contributed towards the increased influence of the local authority on the determination of educational policy, the role of the educational reform which went into effect at the end of the sixties should be particularly emphasised. The said reform forced the Ministry of Education to compromise with regard to the division of functions, and to grant the local authorities additional powers and benefits in order to gain their support.  Unexpectedly, the reform also resulted in further decentralisation as well as an increase in the power and influence of the local authorities. The planning unit of the Ministry of Education transferred many of its powers to the local authorities which became a source of pressure from various interest groups.

The absence of legislation and clear regulations for defining functions and the division of power between the central and local authorities in the area of education and culture, left the door open for the exercise of pressure and extraneous judgement, as well as for opportunities to make “ad hoc” arrangements or agreements that were subsequently difficult to revoke (Ackerman, Karmon and Zucker, 1985).  Without a uniform government policy towards the local authorities, the various Ministries cannot properly co-ordinate their activities, a state of affairs which gives pressure groups virtually a free hand to lobby for the purpose of obtaining resources as well as power. In the light of their importance to the religious parties, education and culture are of prime significance when negotiating coalition agreements within the local authorities.

The relationship between the central and local government with regard to education is based on two principles (Naor, Menuhin, Witkin and Satopa, 1978): first, that The belief in the possibility to separate the economic and procedural aspects of the system from its educational aspects and second, that The local authorities should operate chiefly as an executive body rather than one that determines policy.
	
Based on these assumptions, it was established that the local authority, together with the government, would be responsible for the erection and maintenance of educational institution buildings, the registration of pupils and determination of registration areas, the transfer of pupils from one institution to another, as well as the provision of the “standard” and “extra” services approved by the Minister of Education. 

“Standard” services include the provision of health services and first aid, supplementary  classes for new immigrants, professional advice, preventive treatment by social workers and psycho-hygiene advice. “Extra” services include insurance for pupils, extra lessons, educational-psychological advice and dental care. The authorities are entitled to charge fees for these services in accordance with a tariff determined by the Minister of Education.

When the responsibility for questions of planning, designating areas of registration, establishing junior high-schools, merging schools and tackling local strikes organised by parents was transferred to the local authorities, a considerable burden was lifted from shoulders of the Ministry of Education, while the standing of the  authorities was greatly reinforced by having been granted some of the centre’s powers, and this notwithstanding the fact that a policy of decentralisation was neither known nor considered.

In the aftermath of the Six-Day War, development in the field of education gathered momentum. Junior high schools as well as comprehensive schools were established and vocational education increased, all of which endowed the local authorities with more resources and influence. Another contributing element was the fact that the sons and daughters of the first generation of immigrants from non-Western countries had meanwhile matured and had begun to fill important functions in local government, as a result of which they had become aware of their political strength and how to use it. In the development towns, demands and expectations of the school system increased as this second generation began to realise its potential for rallying political support.

E. School system administration - between centralisation and decentralisation) –
 (Ben-Elia and Canaani, 1996).
Insofar as current administration is concerned, the Israeli school system operates as a conglomerate of various elements – the Ministry of Education, local government, the various school systems with their pupils and employees, professional organisations, public and political institutions as well as the general public (Ben-Dror, 1989). The Ministry functions both as a headquarters and as an executive branch. This functional mingling hampers the Ministry as far as determining a clear and consistent policy is concerned, both with regard to education as well as physical development.

The preponderance of decision-making elements, of both formal and concealed spheres of influence and interested parties, tend to cloud the process of determining the educational policy in Israel (Elboim-Dror, 1985), and hinder the efficient and effective administration of the system. The formulation of an overall policy often clashes with the responsibility for day-to-day tasks owing to the many and varied conflicts of interest active in and around the Ministry (Ben-Dror, 1989). As well, the existence of different educational sectors, such as government and government-religious, and the opposing concepts of their various organisational interests, do not facilitate the formation of compulsory government policy which could be generally applied. Furthermore, the pluralism which prevails in the various sectors, and the addition of new, unofficial  sectors, such as the ultra-Orthodox, exacerbate an already unsatisfactory state of affairs.

Notwithstanding the authority and vital resources that the Ministry of Education controls, it has difficulty in enforcing its policy (Ben-Elia and Cnaani, 1996), either because of its inability to contend with other elements which also participate in the school system, such as the local authorities and the parents, or because of manifest organisational and procedural incompetence. The Ministry’s failure to implement the reform is a striking example of its inability to enforce its own declared policy. Thirty years after the appropriate law was passed (Ben-Elia and Cnaani, 1996), there are not a few pupils in the 7th to 9th grades who have still to be included in the reform framework (according to the Central Bureau of Statistics, this involves about 38% of the relevant pupil population in 1995).  Further examples of the Ministry of Education’s inability to enforce its authority include the establishment of special frameworks, either on an ideological basis (“friendly” schools, open schools, democratic schools, nature study schools, art schools etc.) or on a local basis.

Although such examples may be regarded as reflections of the school system’s increased democratisation, or as recognition of the parents’ right to formulate the children’s framework of study, they also reflect a surrender to the pressures exerted by interested parties, not to mention a rise in segregative pluralism. The Ministry’s centralism with regard to its administration of the school system provides a hint as to the range of needs and problems with which it has to contend.

According to Caspi (1994: 20),
 “…the situation depicted is one where on the one hand, the Ministry of Education has almost no control over the centrifugal elements which operate for the purpose of promoting self-serving initiatives, while on the other, it is not always capable of providing an appropriate response insofar as an effective operative policy and the allocation of resources are concerned. The unavoidable result of this state of affairs is the decentralisation of power and its transfer to the local authorities and the schools."
Until now, the Ministry of Education has avoided formulating a policy on educational autonomy for local government. The Ministry tries to circumvent the local authorities by granting autonomy directly to the schools. The lack of a policy which would encourage the granting of autonomy to the local authorities is paradoxical in the light of their relative strength.

A telling illustration of the above-mentioned strength may be observed in the Ministry’s cautious policy of non-involvement in the affairs of the large local authorities. The only example of a school system which is administered by a joint municipal/Ministry organisation may be found in Jerusalem. Other large municipalities administer their school systems autonomously, notwithstanding the fact that their methods do not always meet with the Ministry’s approval. For example, although the Tel Aviv Municipality has been operating an independent school system for many years, the Ministry has been powerless to prevent its implementation. A similar situation, although not quite as extreme, prevails in Haifa, Holon, Ramat Gan, Herzlia and other large municipalities. Nevertheless, these trends towards autonomy do not diminish the local authorities’ dependence on the Education Ministry’s budgets for building or renovating educational institutions, or for other purposes (Ben-Elia and Cnaani, 1996).

The authorities’ educational autonomy has been creatively cultivated and indeed reinforced thanks to their educational revenues, as well as their involvement in projects, and programs, and their investments in teaching materials and installations. These initiatives saved the school system from death by degrees, a process which began in the 70’s and 80’s when educational budgets were cut back, when no reforms were carried out, and when the level of educational services in Israel sank to an all-time low.   If not for the intervention of the local authorities, it is highly doubtful whether the said initiatives would have materialised (Caspi, 1994).

Contrary to the Ministry’s Pedagogic Division (the Pedagogic Secretariat and Executive) which refrained from recognising local government autonomy in its function as an education authority, the Ministry’s Budgeting Division granted approval for the development of educational institutions by the Development Executive, and this by means of promoting the formulation of local, multi-year master-programs, including the appointment of local steering committees for the planning and renovation of educational institutions, committees with educational foresight which would encourage creative thinking.

According to the research conducted by Professor Dan Inbar and Dr. Maia Hoshen on the subject of decentralisation (June 1997), directors of the local authorities’ education departments expressed their opposition to accepting the idea that a “higher authority”  -  a central source of power  -  would make decisions concerning a graded allocation of authority, and were unwilling to allow the centre to determine their degree of compliance with regard to the development of autonomy. They were not prepared to agree that it would be up to a central committee to establish objective criteria for determining how their powers were to be allocated. Over and above their strong desire for autonomy, the directors of education departments differ in their degree of willingness to undertake executive and education authority, to take responsibility for the results of education, to confront the Ministry of Education and struggle for the powers to achieve local autonomy (Inbar and Hoshen, 1997).

To conclude, the legal structure, the realities of the current situation and the flimsy organisational regulations encourage the exercise of pressure for gain of influence and resources by circumventing those criteria which have been duly considered and established as part and parcel of the central government’s educational policy (Ben-Elia and Cnaani, 1996). Economic development and the state of the economy are linked closely and directly to educational policy, a fact clearly expressed in the educational budget, and in the prevalence of coercive forces and competition within the system which quantitatively and financially affect goals and values. The budget is affected by the rate of economic growth and development and by the competition between various sectors for more resources. The political power of the Minister of Education, as well as the attitudes and values of the senior political and educational administration levels, exerts a tremendous influence over the entire decision-making process.

The amendments which are made in the education budget reflect the variety of factors, influences and struggles which prevail in and around the school system. For many years, the school system enjoyed generous, ever-increasing budgetary allocations, and total expenditure on education was second only to that of the defence establishment. The development of educational services was an accepted aim in the opinion of all sections of the population, and regarded as an absolute value, deeply rooted in Jewish tradition. Education was regarded as the means for achieving economic development, for protecting the technological and scientific level required for national defence, as well as for achieving social integration and immigrant absorption. Ideological and political elements dictated the allocation of budgetary resources for education, as reflected by the development of a system for higher education in the 60’s, and by the decision to pass the Secondary School Education Law of 1978. Personal factors, chiefly the personalities of the Ministers of Education and Finance and the relations between them, played no small a role in the increased allocation of resources for educational services.





















Today, the budget for education is still struggling for its share of government expenditure, one third of which is earmarked for repayment of debts, one third for defence, while the remaining third must provide for all other national needs and objectives.

The school system has various sources of financing:
The State Budget  -  this includes the budget for the Ministry of Education and Culture, as well as special educational budgets on behalf of other Ministries, including assistance from the Ministry of the Interior for direct financing  of the local authorities’ educational institutions. The government’s share of the total amount at the disposal of the school system is 70%. The appropriate Cabinet approvals must also be approved by the Knesset and are legally binding.









Ownership and Public Organisation Budgets (ORT, Amal - two vocational-technological schools networks, The National Organisation of Religious Women etc.) as well as budgets from non-profit institutions - Some of the money from the latter is received from fund-raising activities in Israel or abroad. The most prominent of these are the “Mifal Hapais” (National Lottery), banks, The Education Fund, The Rashi Fund and donations organised abroad by the Jewish Agency. 

The “Family” Budget - Notwithstanding the fact that nowadays the system is for the most part financed by the State, and that no school fees are paid for the education of children from the age of 5 until the end of the 12th grade, the State does not cover related expenses for important activities (such as extra lessons, the cultural package, teaching materials and equipment, field trips, extra-curricular hobby groups and activities, parties and textbooks). Partial financing for infants from the age of 0-4 is partially covered by graded fees and partly by the State and public institutions. University education is subject to the Payment of tuition fees. At the end of 1998, the Government and the Knesset decided to pass a law granting free education for children from the age of 3. Since the total cost would amount to 750 million NIS, it was proposed to stretch the implementation of the law over a period of 10 years, so that its benefits would apply to a further 10% of the population each year. 

In conclusion, we may point out several factors which have shaped the interrelationship between central and local government in the field of education, with the ramifications evidenced in the budgeting policy of the municipal school system:

1. The lack of a governmental concept during the pre-State period and relations between the Mandatory Government and the local political system at that time-

Due to the lack of a basic governmental concept and a central educational authority capable of bearing full responsibility for Hebrew education, a suitable groundwork was laid for the intensified trend towards a decentralised school system - in other words, towards stronger local educational authorities. Horowitz and Lisk (Horowitz and Lissak, 1977) are convinced that to a large extent, the Jewish population itself rejected educational assistance from the Mandatory Government in favour of an opportunity for introducing Zionist indoctrination into Jewish education in the country (Lissak and Gutman 1977). The existence of the Mandate demanded a unified standpoint, hence the aforementioned rejection which resulted in more powerful local authorities (Kubersky, 1972). 

The large municipalities were under the control of political entities whose composition differed from that of the central government. This fact reinforced the trend towards decentralisation of the school system. Apart from some general public interest and organisational differences, there were no fundamental differences of opinion with regard to essential educational problems. During the early years of the State, when patterns were being moulded for the division of power between the Ministry of Education and the local educational authorities, and when the political composition of the local authorities differed from that of the government. The central government was a Labour movement hegemony, while the local authorities, particularly in their bastions of strength, were in the hands of the right-wing. This situation intensified the trend towards centralisation of the Ministry of Education, and according to Weiss, diminished the measure of autonomy and independent force held by local government (Kubersky, 1972).

2. Educational legislation -
The educational constitution of the “Israel Knesset” in August 1929, was the fruit of a compromise between several elements: the National Committee, the Jewish Agency, the various political movements, the local authorities and the government. Under these circumstances, agreements which were reached through compromise rather than through a consensus, constitute the basis for the demands which are made by the different factions within the system, demands that intensify whenever a change in the status of these factions appears imminent (Kubersky, 1987).

The Mandatory Government’s Education Ordinance of 1933 – the limited authority of the Israel Knesset gave local authorities the opportunity to attain more autonomy and to negotiate directly with regard to government support for the schools within the authorities’ areas of jurisdiction. The State of Israel has promulgated two educational laws which deal with compulsory educational institutions: the Compulsory Education Law of 1949 and the State Education Law of 1953.

Because the aforementioned laws, as well as all the supplementary regulations, address the issue of education in general terms, they leave room for different interpretations. These in their turn give rise to various actions and agreements by and between central and local government with regard to their interrelationship, mainly insofar as sharing the financial burden and the administration of the school system are concerned. The lack of a legal definition for their partnership becomes evident when one looks at the financial arrangements in the school system. These show that as far as the sharing of the financial burden between the two authorities is concerned, the law establishes the principle of the partnership only, but fails to stipulate the terms whereby the financial burden itself is to be shared. Nor do any such terms appear in any subsequent regulation.

This absence of a legal definition obliges the two authorities to collaborate closely, at least in the area of administration, in order to co-ordinate their joint activities. The preponderance of regulations initiated by the central government, compared to the relatively small number of laws on the subject of education, and the considerable weight these regulations carry, compared to the general nature of their terms that are intended to bolster the laws’ authority, are signs of the centralisation which characterises the administrative and supervisory pattern of the Israeli school system. The legal structure and the flimsy organisational regulations encourage the use of pressure to attain influence and resources by circumventing the duly considered and established criteria for an educational policy at local government level.

3.  Budgetary factors -
From its very outset, the Hebrew school system has depended on external sources. After the First World War, when these sources were reduced considerably, the education department of the National Committee was dependent upon the Jewish Agency, the Mandatory Government and on the local authorities. Since the education department’s dependence on the local authorities was extensive, decentralisation of its authority increased. Upon the establishment of the State, the large waves of immigration and the promulgation of the Compulsory Education Law compelled the central government to transfer some of the budgetary burden to the veteran local authorities, while the Ministry of Education undertook to support the new settlements (Azariyahu, 1929; Shilhav, 1972).
Since that time, the education budget has been influenced by the pace of the State’s growth and economic development, the rivalry between the various sectors, the increase in resources, the political strength of the Minister of Education, as well as by the attitudes and values of the Ministry’s senior political and administrative officials.

For many years, the school system was the recipient of generous, ever-increasing budgets, so that government expenditure on education was second only to that of the defence establishment. Ideological and political factors dictated budgetary allocations for education.  From 1972 education’s share in the State budget began to decrease, up until 1991 (from 7.8% to 6.1%), and saw a renewed increase from 1992, 6.6% to 9.6% in 1997, to 9.8% in 1999 and 9.5% in 2000 (Ministry of Education, 2000). Of the total resources at the disposal of the school system, the government contributes 70%, while the local authorities’ contribution towards national educational expenditure amounted to 13% in 1984 and 8% in 1994 and 10% in 1996-1997 (Ministry of Education, 1998 b).

4.  Organisational-educational factors -
During the British Mandate, the Jewish population in the country jealously guarded its independence in sensitive areas pertaining to Zionist ideology, especially insofar as education was concerned. Since the services and budgets which were provided to the Jewish settlements by the Mandatory Government, failed to meet their expectations or their needs, the Jewish population had no recourse but act independently and seek additional resources. Long-established municipalities such as Tel Aviv were directly involved in making organisational and educational decisions, and as a result, their standing became more firmly entrenched.

When the State was established, the Government decided to centralise and assume responsibility for education, and formulated a comprehensive organisational and operational policy which called for uniform methods and supervision. This policy arose from the government’s decision to achieve certain objectives, including the establishment of a uniform teaching program as a pre-condition for the creation of the national-cultural unity so necessary in a developing country which had undertaken to absorb many thousands of new immigrants. The chief proponent of this idea was David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first Prime Minister, who strongly opposed the existence of semi-autonomous elements with political inclinations in the field of education (Bentwich, 1960; Ackerman, Karmon and Zucker, 1985). The religious population too, which regarded itself as the guardian of religious education, considered the centralisation of power with the central government as a guarantee that the principle of equality between the different educational trends would be protected.

During the first years of Statehood, the relationship between central and local government with regard to education, was based on the beliefs  (Naor, Witkin and Satopa, 1978) that it was possible to separate the economic and administrative aspects of the system from its educational aspects and that the local authorities should act as operational rather than policy-making entities.

The Yom Kippur War (1973) (Hochman, 1998) caused a social upheaval in Israel society when the public realised that the judgement of what had been regarded as an all-powerful government could be at fault. This was the first step towards a change in the governing party. In practice, a full term was to pass before the public “digested” the significance of the events and, for the first time in the history of the State, voted (in 1977) the chief opposition party into power.  This political upheaval was indeed, “the tip of the iceberg” and the forerunner of a comprehensive change in social concept, which was to be accompanied by more public involvement in matters concerning their welfare. The level of education rose to new, hitherto unanticipated heights. ‘Twelve years’ education” became the minimum threshold for the majority of Israel’s citizens. The opening of universities and colleges resulted in a situation where a “Bachelor’s” or “Master’s” degree came to be considered as the minimum requirements for employment in the public sector.

The implications of a high level of education were not lost as far as parental involvement was concerned; it was evident that the level of education of some of the parents was equal to, or even exceeded that of their children’s teachers and the principals of the schools where they were enrolled. It was only natural that such parents would express opinions, advise, recommend, and no less important, criticise and voice demands for change (Hochman, 1998).  Furthermore, since parents are occasionally requested to provide assistance of one kind or another to educational institutions (computer system set up or laboratories etc.), parents are now to be found in the very heart of the educational industry, frequently with the blessing of the system.

The involvement of the public and their desire to influence their way of life, rather than be influenced by the dictates of others, is a trend that is expressed by a willingness to increase the number of teaching hours in enrichment programs and appropriate funds. Concurrently, the rise in the standard of living in the country resulted in the fact that people were no longer willing to be content with existing conditions, and constantly strove for a better quality of life, not only at work and at home, but also in the school system.

In the light of these developments, the role of the educator as a significant factor and an example to be emulated was no longer accepted without question, and the educator’s status underwent a gradual process of erosion. A vicious cycle which still prevails came into being, manifesting itself in the low rewards to be gained in the field of education, and the resignation of male educators (especially from the primary and junior high-school systems). This is due in part to their inability to be the sole or chief provider of the family income, the large influx of women into all areas of the system, including administration, the poor image of the teaching profession and the lack of appreciation for their efforts (Hochman, 1998).

It was not by chance that in 1995, teachers launched a massive campaign to improve their image under the slogan “A good teacher is a teacher for life”.  This was part of a long process initiated by others in the system, not only to improve the teachers’ image, but also to achieve better salaries and higher academic qualifications for teaching personnel. The crisis in the system was the outcome of a government policy which advocated and carried out continual cuts in educational budgets, cuts which led to overcrowded classrooms as well as reduced hours of instruction and fewer services. The exception to this trend was to be found in the priorities laid down by the government of the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of blessed memory.

Professor Amnon Rubinstein, the Minister of Education in Yitzhak Rabin’s Cabinet, and the Ministry Director, Dr. Samson Shoshani, equalised the education budget with the defence budget. The school day was extended, and a comprehensive computerisation program was begun (Machar 98 – Computerisation of the School System). However, as stated, this period was an exception to the rule, and if we track State Budgets over a period of years, the typical trend has been towards cuts in education on the one hand, and on the other, increased payments by parents and the development of alternative educational services. 

These trends which gave rise to phenomena such as “grey-market education”, were such that they created other phenomena, including the unprecedented proliferation of parental involvement. This involvement began when “those who paid the piper” demanded to “call the tune” over and beyond the after-school hobby groups and other informal activities. Parents wanted to increase their involvement in the educational content and character of the school, as well as in the committee for professional appointments. At the same time, parents began to demand the right to choose their children’s educational framework, and also to demand the establishment of special and non-regional schools, either because of genuine ideology, or in order to circumvent what no person dared to say aloud, namely, integration (Hochman, 1998).

At the same time, and as an outcome of direct mayoral elections, as well as the public’s involvement in all aspects of daily life, parents learned to claim their rights to active citizenship, and did not even hesitate to retain legal advice. Consequently, the courts recognised the right of the parents to become involved and to demand special solutions for specific populations, rather than mere “lip-service” responses addressed to the population in general. As Justice Kastner so eloquently put:
“To play a part in children’s education is the responsibility of both the parents and the public……it is incumbent upon the parents to know the spirit of their children, to understand what would be to their greater benefit, and to act in accordance with those needs……..they should aim to give their children the best education, as well as understand and ask for what their children require….the representative of the local authority is expected to act, not only for the good of the general public, but also to provide for each and every individual child whose needs and interests should be highly regarded….” (High Court of Justice decision 72/152)

The citizens of Israel who for the most part were “products” of its school system and who held democratic beliefs, demanded that the heads of local authorities will provide a level of education commensurate with these beliefs, and began to approach them about various problems which, in their opinion had arisen, and which did not always conform with the dichotomous division described herein. For example, parents claimed that the teaching material was poor and inadequate, that the study courses constituted “grey-market” education, and when they did not see eye to eye with some aspect or another in the school, rather than approach the inspector they addressed their complaints to the head of the local authority, the Regional Director and even the Minister of Education and Culture (Hochman, 1998).

The demand for educational services has become a crucial factor in family life. The choice of location for the family home is influenced by two principle factors – the location of the family breadwinner’s place of employment, and immediately after that, the standard of education in the area. Such intensive pressures have stimulated the heads of local authorities to become aware of, and take into consideration, a comprehensive educational concept (Dery and Swartz 1994; Hecht, 1997). 

One of the results of this development has been the appointment of professional administrators for educational authorities and branches, rather than political appointments of friends or relations, and this as part of a pragmatic, and sometimes even an ideological approach. However, this does not suffice - the local authorities’ demands for decentralisation of powers to the periphery have escalated, along with their expressed willingness to be full partners, and more; to constitute a significant and influential factor in the planning and implementation of the educational policy in their respective areas.

5. The Administrative Capacity of Local Government Today – 

Contrary to the pre-State period when the standing of local government was strengthened, after the founding of the State and the intensified trend towards centralisation in the school system, matters changed. Local authorities which had organised themselves in the new settlements, cultivated the population which because of its concern with problems of absorption and earning a living in a new country, had not been able to bear additional anxiety about educational services. The guardianship of the central government extended over all spheres of life, since in the early days of Statehood, only a centralised government was capable of dictating national priorities. Naturally, political considerations with a party background were also involved. While the central government hegemony was held by the Labour movement, local government leadership was held by the “civilian” population.

During the two decades after the establishment of the State, local government lacked suitably qualified manpower. There were protests about political appointments (Bentwich, 1960). As stated in the previous section, during the 70’s, 80’s and 90’s, local authorities were in a better position to define their problems in the light of the direct mayoral elections. “The local authority is in the most advantageous position to fulfil this function, since it is the integrative vessel into which all local problems are poured, and since it is headed by a person whose powers are derived from the personal vote of its citizens….” (Kubersky, 1987). 

The lack of Ministry of Education control over centrifugal elements which act to realise various initiatives, together with its diminished capability to respond and determine an effective policy for the budgeting of resources, give rise to the unavoidable transfer of power from the centre to the local authorities and the schools. The local authorities’ educational autonomy has been creatively cultivated by the upgrading of their educational personnel, the increase in educational revenue, the initiation of projects, programs and investments in teaching aids and facilities.

6 . The impact of the local authorities on the level of education in their 
    localities through resource allocation – 

As mentioned in this chapter, the government responsibility for education in the State of Israel is in the hands of the Ministry of Education, as set by law. The local authority was to a great extent considered as the entity in charge mainly of ensuring physical conditions for the existence of the school systems in the locality. Over the years, the Ministry of Education centralised the authority and developed a uniform school system. The Ministry of Education, and not the local authorities, established educational policy, such as for instance – integration, the division into sections, allotments, etc. However, the social changes in Israel led to the emergence of transition in the educational policy, including the guarded transfer of authority from the Ministry of Education to the local authorities. In Jerusalem, for example, a joint administrative body of the Ministry of Education and the municipality was established and is directed by the municipality.

The scientific and the technological development obliged the schools to develop systems and purchase equipment, including computers, far beyond what the official budgets can offer. One of the solutions is turning to parents or public donors, or to apply to the local authority to allocate additional internal resources beyond the Ministry of Education budgets, whereby the school is exposed to external forces.

In recent years, there has been increased recognition in Israeli society of the significance of pluralism in education and the right of parents to be involved and influence content (Hochman, 1998). There has also been increased understanding of the needs of “Special Education”, special frameworks have been developed for children with various learning disabilities and the psychological service has been expanded. The economic development in Israeli society has also brought about the expansion of higher learning frameworks and the establishment of professional and academic colleges.







Chapter 7: Central-Local Government Relations in the Field of Education - Legal Aspects

This section will review the relations between central and local government in the field of education, with particular emphasis on the legislative drawbacks which influence the gap in implementing educational policy.

Both central and local governments in Israel work in the field of education in accordance with laws, regulations, administrative directives and voluntary arrangements (this as laid down by the former Legal Advisor to the Ministry of Education). These ad hoc arrangements which were not safeguarded by any legislation, were made in the past and continued as anachronisms until new forces pressured for changes, as stated by the Deputy Director of the Ministry of Education and member of the Zanbar Committee.  The said Committee examined this statement and established new criteria for determining the financial arrangements between the central and local governments. 

The main laws dealing with the school system in Israel are as follows: The Education Ordinance in the Land of Israel of 1933, the Compulsory Education Law of 1949 and the State Education Law of 1953 and the Special Education Law, 1988. This section will summarise the educational laws and regulations insofar as they concern the task distribution between central and local government with regard to educational financing of the local authority.  

General – 
1. The existence, operation and funding of the school system is the responsibility of the central and local government together. Their separate roles are determined by different education laws, ordinances and orders they issue, as well as agreements between the local and central government, procedures and instructions, provided through circular letters and messages. 


2. Article 7 of the Compulsory Education Law of 1949 states the following:
	“The state is responsible to provide free compulsory education under this law.
	According to this law formal education institutions for free education are intended for children and adolescents living in the jurisdiction of a certain local education authority, the responsibility will be of the state and the certain local authority together. The minister, consulting with the Minister of Interior and the Knesset Education and Culture Committee, will determine, in an order issued in the gazettes, regarding each school year for each local education authority, the share of state participation and the local education authority participation in maintaining the formal education institutions that provide compulsory education for children and adolescents living within the jurisdiction of that particular local education authority…”

According to compulsory education law (1949), the state is responsible for providing free compulsory education. However, it was determined that maintaining the official education institutions providing free compulsory education according to the law is the joint responsibility of the state and the local education authority that have an education institution within its jurisdiction. The participation rate allocation between the state and the local education authority regarding the maintenance of the official education institutions will be determined in an order for the entire school year, by the Education Minister consulting with the Minister of Internal affairs and the Knesset education committee. 

3.  A local education authority (“local education authority” is the local authority, where a local authority exists) may levy a tax on its residents, for education needs, in a fashion stated by law. According to the Compulsory Education Law, the Education and Culture Minister (hereafter: “the minister”) is allowed to, consulting with the Minister of Interior, in a published order, to grant a recognised board, or a person he appointed as a local education authority, the authority to levy a tax on the residents of a local education authority jurisdiction area, and collect the tax to cover expenses related to carrying out the duties that local education authority has by law. The ordinance further states that if the authority did not collect the above mentioned tax in order to maintain the schools within its jurisdiction, the minister may levy and enforce its payment, as if it were a tax paid to the state’s Treasury (articles 13 and 14 of the Education Ordinance 1933). 

4. A local education authority has educational jurisdiction and duties, according to instructions determined by different laws and ordinances and provisions they issue. These orders are determined, among others, in the Education Order (new version), 1978, Compulsory Education Law, 1949, State Education Law, 1953, and Special Education Law, 1988, as well as in different ordinances and orders they issue. I will now specify the essence of these instructions.

	According to the Education Ordinance 1933, a local education authority has to form a board or boards for education matters in its jurisdiction, and it is responsible for opening new schools and completely or partially maintain the schools within its jurisdiction, with the exception of communal schools and private schools. The school system activity in the local authority is focused on providing organisational, budgetary and administrative support and infrastructure to the education institutions in the authority, mostly to the formal facilities- kindergartens, elementary and high schools. This activity is based on the education ordinances, 1933, which state that as per the principal’s request and according to the instructions of regulation 63, the local education authority will fulfil the following regarding every public school in its area: 
a) Provide, by purchasing, leasing or any other manner, a land for school buildings and play-grounds;
b)  Rent, construct and reform school buildings;
c)  Maintain play-grounds;
d)  Take care of the required water supply without pay;
e)  Provide for sanitary and hygiene facilities;
f) Allocate poverty-stricken students a sufficient number of places, in the opinion of the principal, without paying tuition;
g) Provide free books, instruments, and materials the principal determined, to poor students;
h) Provide each location with equipment and furniture to schools according to specification approved by the principal;
i) Provide a teaching staff whose number and abilities are satisfying according to the principal;
j) Pay the salaries of all teachers who are not government officials with pensions;
k) Pay the Treasury for every teacher who is not a government official with pension rights, pension participation fees determined by the principal.

 According to the Compulsory Education Law (1949), compulsory education will apply to every child and every adolescent 14 or 15 years old. The parents must register their children and adolescents at the local authority within the jurisdiction in which they reside. As far as 6 year olds and up are concerned, they may also be registered in an educational institution and make sure that the child studies regularly in a recognised educational institution. A person to whom the Compulsory Education Law applies, as well as an adolescent aged 16 or 17 (unless he graduated according to the 12th grade curriculum) and whoever completed only an 11th grade curriculum by the age of 18 - are entitled to free education in a formal educational institution. 

The state is responsible to provide free education according to this law. Maintaining official institutions for free compulsory education according to this law for children and adolescents living within the jurisdiction of a certain local education authority, will be the joint responsibility of the state and the local education authority (Compulsory Education Law, 1949). A person entitled to free education according to the Compulsory Education Law will be insured for personal injuries by the local education authority within its jurisdiction is the education institution that person attends. The minister will determine the payments collected from the insured for the insurance.

	The minister is entitled to obligate, in an order, a local education authority, or several local education authorities together, to open and maintain formal compulsory education institutions. Detailed instructions regarding such orders are found in the compulsory education ordinances (issuing injunctions for opening and maintaining institutions), 1952. The registration arrangements and dates, as well as the jurisdiction and duties of the local authority in these matters, are determined by the Compulsory and State Education Regulations, 1959. An education authority must keep records of all the children and adolescents in compulsory education ages that are in its jurisdiction (Article 12 of the Compulsory Education Law).

	Regarding payments that can be collected from the parents of the students, article 6(d) of the Compulsory Education Law states, that whoever is entitled to free education shall not be required to pay registration fees or any other payment for the education in a formal education institution or for education in a different educational institution for which the state pays. However, with the permission of the minister the local authority may collect payments and return expenses, in rates determined by the minister, for the supply he receives and for services received in addition to services the minister defined as standard services. The minister’s permission and determining the rate of payments and returned expenses require the authorisation of the Knesset Education and Culture Committee. The standard services as per article 6(d) mentioned above are found in the Compulsory Education Regulations (standard services), 1950.

Provision of standard and extra services:
On the basis of Article 6d, the Compulsory Teaching Regulations (Standard Services) – 1951 were promulgated. These regulations listed the following standard services under the said Law: 
a.  Supplementary lessons for new immigrants.
b. Reading rooms.
c. The hygiene services which include-  Routine and special preliminary examinations, examinations for the prevention of infectious diseases, dental examinations, Treatment of infectious skin and eye diseases, Preventive injections and inoculations, General health education, First aid at the educational institution, Maintenance of a health card filing system, House calls related to health and hygiene, and advice to parents regarding their children’s hygiene and Sanitary inspection of the educational institution.
d. Psychological counselling.
e. Preventive treatment by social workers to prevent absences and         dropouts and encourage regular attendance.
 f. Professional counselling.
The Law does not specifically oblige the school to provide the above services, but the legislators did establish that charges may be levied for certain services, while the rest should be provided free of charge. Hence, the function of the local authority is to provide both standard and supplementary services. The common denominator between these two kinds of service is the fact that their supply is dependent upon the sole and independent discretion of the local authority. As stated, the local authority may not request payment for standard services, although this is permissible in the case of extra services, provided that these payments and the amounts charged receive the prior approval of the Minister.

A 1961 memorandum from the Director General to local authorities and primary schools stated as follows: “Listed hereunder are the services approved by the Minister of Education as extra services which the local authorities are entitled to include in the Extra Services Fee for the 1961 school year:
	a.   	Health services (in addition to the compulsory services).
      b.   	Pupil insurance.
	c.   	Educational-psychological counselling and choice of subjects.
	d.   	Psycho-hygienic treatment.
	e.   	Provision of textbooks.
	f.     	Provision of exercise books and writing utensils.
	g.   	Providing art supplies.
	h.   	Dental check ups and treatment.
i.    	Supplementary education.
	
At this point we are witnessing the fact that the local education authority may, if it so desires, encroach even partially, upon fundamental areas of the school system, and this by providing extra services such as supplementary education, psychological counselling, educational counselling, as well as the prevention of absences and dropouts  and the encouragement of regular attendance.

To summarise the aforesaid, the Law grants the local authority independent discretion to decide whether it wishes to involve itself in a fundamental area of education through the provision of additional services.

     In regards to supplying equipment to working youngsters, “Every local education authority shall supply, free of charge, textbooks, exercise books, writing utensils and any other necessary study equipment, to every youngster who is a pupil of an official educational institution for working youngsters within its jurisdiction” (Compulsory Law, 1949). The legislators have hereby expressed their concern so as to ensure the orderly education of every child and youngster, especially those who work. The obligation to utilise its own resources in order to provide such children and youngsters with all the necessary teaching materials free of charge, lies with the local authority. The legislator assumes that working youngsters are underprivileged.

      In regards to transportation for pupils (Compulsory Law, 1949, Article 7), the wording of the law on this subject is vague. The regulations state that “the local education authority is entitled to determine the larger areas within its sphere of judicial responsibility, on condition that appropriate transportation is available for pupils living on the outskirts of such areas or that the local education authority makes such transportation available”. Moreover, “should the authority’s jurisdiction include locations which lack roads or highways or appropriate means of transportation, or should any roads be impassable, the local education authority is entitled to determine smaller areas in order to facilitate transportation and avoid breakdowns”.

Therefore, the obligation for the existence of transportation lies with the local authority. The first paragraph states that the local authority should ensure that appropriate transportation is “available”, but does not specifically state that the authority should provide such transport. Since the question of financing is not mentioned, it is difficult to understand the precise nature of the authority’s obligation in this matter. A partial clarification appears in the memorandum dated 19.9.55 from the Director General of the Ministry of Education which states that should the local authority require a pupil to study outside the area….at a distance of more than two kilometres from his home, that pupil should receive free transportation. Since the regulation which stipulates that the authority should ensure the availability of transportation refers to areas larger than those recognised in the regulations, it may be said that the Ministry of Education instructions represent a supplement rather than an interpretation.

      In regards to the Safe Transportation for Disabled Children , According to the Safe Transportation for Disabled Children Law, 1994, its rules and regulations, a local authority where a disabled child lives, who cannot travel independently and requires transportation, shall ensure transportation to and from the education institution the child attends, during the school year and according to the class schedule in the education institution. A local authority transporting five or more disabled children in one vehicle will be responsible to transport them in a safe vehicle according to the type of disability or limitation. A local authority which has to transport less than five disabled children, will communicate with an adjacent local authority for joint transportation in a safe vehicle. If an adjacent authority does not need to transport disabled children, the local authority will be allowed to transport the disabled child in a vehicle that is not a safe vehicle, including a bus or a taxi, as long as the way the child is seated or prostrate in the stated vehicle will not endanger the health or safety of the disabled child.

In regards to Special education, Similar to the compulsory education law, the special education law, 1988, states that the state is responsible for providing special education, which includes, by law, systematic teaching, learning and treatment provided for the special child. However, the maintenance of the special education facilities according to this law in the jurisdiction of a local education authority will be the joint responsibility of the state 	and the local education authority. According to the special education law, a special needs child is entitled to special education in his area of residence. If such an institution is not found in his area of residence, the local education authority is responsible to provide special education to the child in a proper institution, as close as possible to his area of residence, even if the institution if found in the jurisdiction of a different local authority.

A local education authority that sent a special needs child to a special education institution found within the jurisdiction of a different local education authority, will be jointly responsible for the living expenses of that institution regarding the child it sent. The minister 	shall determined in an order the participation rates of the sending 	authority (refer in this issue to the compulsory education order (participation in an institution living expenses), 1978). For this matter a local education authority shall be considered a sending authority even if the special needs child stays out of its jurisdiction in a day-care as it is defined in the Day-Cares Regulation law, 1965.

The minister may require that a local education authority of several local education authorities together, will establish and maintain an education institution of special needs children living in the jurisdiction of that local education authority or local education authorities (Special Education Law, 1988). As stated, the method of participation of the central government in the local authority education budget is not covered in any law or regulation, a state of affairs which enables it to regulate the allocation of financial resources in accordance with priorities which it itself determines. 

	Professor Kleinberger (Kleinberger, 1969) contends that “the lack of equal participation has also been proven with regard to task distribution.” In practice, the local authority deals with five cardinal aspects of the school system:
1. The construction of school buildings (the law has not granted the local authority the right to decide regarding details of official institutions, for the maintenance of which the authority and the central government are jointly responsible). The implementation of this Article places a financial burden on the shoulders of the local authority.
2. Maintaining a system of kindergartens, including the employment of kindergarten teachers and their assistants.
3. Maintaining a system of auxiliary manpower for primary schools (such as secretaries, janitors, cleaning staff and teaching assistants).
4. Maintaining secondary school institutions, as well as their executive, teaching and assistant personnel.
5. Maintaining a system of auxiliary personnel to provide services to all educational institutions in the authority’s area of responsibility, such as psychology services, security and safety services, supervision of regular school attendance, organisation of extra lessons for weak pupils, dental treatment, health services, and transportation of pupils to and from school.
The Ministry of Education determines the policy for education, as well as for all else that transpires on school premises, including the hiring of principals, teachers, kindergarten teachers and supervision of their work.

To summarise, with regard to the entire aspect of legislation which is supposed to regularise central-local government relations in the area of education budget financing, the following conclusions have been reached:

	The legislators have established that responsibility for the maintenance of schools is the joint responsibility of the two governmental authorities, but have refrained from providing legal criteria as to how this burden is to be shared. Since issues concerning participation of the central government in the local authority education budget have not been legally defined, they are open to negotiation, and are consequently also subject to political pressure, the use of personal connections and deviations from acceptable administrative norms
 	
The outcome of unequal participation is an ill-defined division of labour. In practice, the local authority carries out technical-administrative tasks (such as the establishment and maintenance of schools, transportation for pupils), and the operation of a system of auxiliary services for all the educational institutions (psychological-counselling services, dental and health care, extra lessons). At the same time, the Ministry of Education is occupied with planning and determining educational policy as well as teaching programs, and in hiring inspectors, principals and teachers in each and every school within the area of the local authority. 

	The local authority is subject to the direct control of the Ministry of the Interior, but in practice, it implements the policy of the Ministry of Education, even though this Ministry has legal backing for compelling the local authority to do so. 
  	
As far as the budget is concerned, the Compulsory Education Regulation of 1953 (sub-Article 5) states that the Minister of Education has the power to instruct the local authority with regard to the allocation of funds from its budget, while the Minister of Interior is certified to authorise the general budget framework of the local authority. In addition, article 7(b) states “that the minister, consulting with the Minister of Interior, shall determine in an order issued in the gazettes, regarding every school year and for every local education authority, the state’s participation share and that of the local education authority…”. In the fifties and at the outset of the sixties, such orders were given to the local Arab education authorities. The local education authorities in the Jewish sector were not given such orders. The non-issue of these orders constitutes only part of the obscure policy of the Ministry of Education in budgeting the municipal school system, and prevents the disclosure of all the education budgets of the local authorities department and the prior knowledge of the municipal financing volumes for education services for each local authority in Israel.

	The lacunae left by the legislators with regard to the principle of “participation” between the two governing entities, have given rise to a situation where the central government may regulate the allocation of the resources at its disposal in accordance with its own pre-determined priorities. The Ministry of Education concludes agreements with the local authority regarding its participation in the financing of education provided within the local authority area (kindergartens, elementary and secondary schooling and special services). The lacunae induce a non-uniform distribution of resources to the local authorities by  the Ministry of Education. This may be manifested primarily in special budgets that the Ministry transfers to local authorities (for pedagogical initiatives, assistance for pupils in need and for other purposes). Inadequate legislation is one of the main causes of the breach between Ministry of Education budgeting policy and the extent to which it is implemented by the local authorities. It is reasonable to assume that this gap incurs inequality in the overall public budgeting of educational services within the jurisdiction of the local authorities, and consequently, to inequality in the level of education between those authorities as well.
                     


Chapter 8:  Local Authority Budget

The composition of the local authority budget in general, and its education budget in particular, as well as its methods of financing, could help us to understand the factors which give rise to the difficulties entailed in implementing educational policy. This section will focus on these subjects. In practice, the local authority budget which includes a forecast of revenue and expenditure, constitutes a financing program for the execution of local authority functions during a period of one fiscal year, that is, from 1st January until 31st December of that year (Hecht, 1987).

The primary function of the budget is to establish the scope of all the activities to be carried out by the local authority administration during that same fiscal year. Its secondary function is to ensure that all the funds required in order to meet the authority’s stated objectives will be available. In order to draw up its budget, the local authority must calculate its anticipated expenses, as well as its residents’ financial capability to meet such expenses.

Local authority budgets are known to exert a considerable influence on the rate of inflation or on anti-inflationary measures, and also constitute a prime factor in the stabilisation of currency rates. The local authority budget is the framework for all the authority’s activities during the fiscal year, and in principle, no deviation from this framework is permitted. In other words, the authority may not spend more than the amounts approved in the budget for any specific item of expenditure. Nevertheless, the authority may increase its revenue over and above those items designated as revenue in the approved budget, and this by increasing its collection of receivables, or by finding alternative sources of income.

The cardinal procedures for determining measures which require expenditure, are derived from the approved local authority budget. The budget must be submitted in a systematic way, in accordance with a known format which remains unchanged from year to year, and which is identical to that of every other local authority budget. For this purpose, regulations concerning the local authority budget format have been laid down to which all local authorities are obliged to adhere.

The regulations concerning the preparation of local authority budgets as promulgated in 1970, state that the regular budget should include a “forecast of payments due to be settled during the same year, as well as of monies to be allocated to special funds during the same year (Article 1), while the special budget is designed for “one-time measures” (Article 15). On the face of it, the differentiation between the regular and the special budgets lie in the nature of the expense itself, so that current expenses, including loans, which have to be paid during the year, fall within the regular budget category. On the other hand, one-time payments which are generally investments for future development, fall within the special budget.

Within the framework of the regular budget, expenses are divided into the following groups (Hecht, 1987):
	General administration - expenses, which are intended for running the Local Council and carrying out its executive and general administrative functions, (the Authority Secretary, its Legal Advisor, its management of human resources, public relations, authority assets and internal auditing), as well as those of its financial administration (treasurer, budget control, tax collection, accounting and cash management). General expenses which cannot be specifically classified, are defined according to the services they cover.
	Local services -  this group includes expenses for all the services provided within the authority’s locality and its immediate surroundings at a level which is determined by the council, such as sanitary services (street cleaning, garbage collection and disposal, sewage collection and disposal, veterinary services and implementation of by-laws).
  	State services -  which include community and individual services provided in accordance with laws and regulations, and whose minimum level is determined by the local authority. In this group are to be found education and culture, social welfare, health and participation in religious affairs.
	Projects and other expenses - This group includes services which are financed wholly by revenues received from the sale of specific services, each of which constitutes a closed economy, such as water supply, slaughter houses, sports stadiums, as well as various building, property and commercial projects.

Expenses from the special budget are divided in accordance with the purpose of each expenditure. Almost all development expenses fall within the local services and projects group. Only on rare occasions does an expense fall within the general administration group (to construct a building to house the Local Authorities Council, or the purchase of storerooms or an automation system).

Regular Budget Income
The composition of local authority revenue is determined in accordance with the customary division of the revenue source.
Independent Income -
This includes all revenue items which are collected directly by the authority such as general property tax, utilities, sewage disposal, various other levies and taxes, school fees, use of municipal property and so on). In the past, the local authority also collected other property taxes, a business tax, an entertainment as well as a welfare and recreation levy.

Transferred Income - 
This is income which the authority receives according to law from monies collected by government and transferred in accordance with monies collected within the local authority, or with a formula stated in a law or regulation, such as property taxes, betterment tax, purchase tax, motor vehicle fees and revenue from the welfare and recreation levy. These items appear in full in the State Budget as transferred income
Participation of Government Ministries - 
This includes participation of designated Ministries in the financing of certain government services. The participating Ministries are: Ministry of Education and Culture, Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, Ministry of Health and Ministry of the Interior. The said participation also includes a grant which is not designated as a specific expense.
Loans - 
Generally speaking, these amounts do not originate from the State Budget but are received from banks in the form of Government Debentures. The division into groups is essentially technical, and is based on the way the monies are transferred to the local authority. There is however, a significant aspect to the said division in that the more independent sources available to a local authority, the more that authority is likely to receive government acquiescence to a more suitable and a less closely-scrutinised method of transfer.

Of considerable importance to the topic of this research work is government participation, which is dependent on ever-changing formulae, and which is not always to the satisfaction of the single local authority, or even of local government as a whole. The reason for this is that some government participation is dependent on the discretion of various functional levels in its ministries, instead of being safeguarded by known and established regulations. Existing data shows that over a period of many years, loans have constituted the principle source of financing, not only for development budgets, but also for independent income. 

Balancing Grant of the Ministry of Interior - The balancing grant which is transferred by the Ministry of the Interior varies from one local authority to another since it is based on the difference between the independent and standard revenue of each and every authority and its expenditure, or “services package”. The standard independent revenue is also based on objective criteria compatible with the size of the authority and its economic and social strength.

The standard “services package” is a decisive factor in determining the amount granted by the Ministry of the Interior. The amount of the grant is determined in such a way as to enable the authority to finance a reasonable system of services from the total amount of funds at its disposal without causing a budget deficit. At the same time, every local authority is free to decide the scope and composition of the services it wishes to provide, since it is under no obligation to provide all the components of the “services package”. Should the local authority have sources from taxation over and above its quota, it is free to use its surplus income as it sees fit. On the other hand, a slow tax assessment and collection system or reluctance on the part of the authority to over-burden its residents financially, will prevent it from providing services to the extent required (in accordance with the pre-determined objective criteria). 

The close and mutual connection between the level of revenue, the level of efficiency and the level of services constitutes one of the most important basic principles of the “services package” approach.
The grant formula is as follows:
 
M I  =   S I    -   P I 

Where:
M I = Amount of grant to a given local authority
S I = Well-regulated expenses, i.e. “services package” at reasonable prices. 
P I = “Desired” income, i.e. realisation of local authority potential income.
It should be emphasised that the “services package” is not uniform or national, but is transferred to each local authority in an amount which is calculated in accordance with its particular standing as well as with its own specific and characteristic structural factors.


8.1 Participation of designated Government Ministries (Hecht, 1987).

As stated, the general grant which is transferred by the Ministry of the Interior to most local authorities is placed at their disposal without any indication as to which expense it is intended to cover. The reason for this is that the grant is intended to complement the local authorities’ tax revenue, particularly in the case of those authorities whose collection potential is low, and in order to ensure that such authorities will have the resources to provide an acceptable “services package”. Apart from this grant, government ministries release additional amounts in accordance with various formulae for the financing of certain services.

The Ministry of Education and Culture as well as the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare provide the greater part of government ministry participation, since the matters for which these ministries are responsible are national in nature, and linked to national policy. Consequently, most of this financing is provided by the central government. In 1993, the amount of the general government grant to local authorities was 1,339 million NIS (13% of the local authority revenues) which were transferred solely to some local authorities and to the other government ministries. The participation of the above ministries has remained virtually unchanged over the years – 60% for Education and Culture, 30% for Social Welfare and the remainder for various other purposes. It is emphasised that participation of the designated ministries in the financing of local authority education budgets has increased over the years, but has been less than the general budget.

In 1993, the government participated in the financing of local authorities’ education budgets, social services, fire-fighting, health and other services, in the amount of  3,000 million NIS, the principle portion of which was transferred to the local authorities by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (1,820,000 NIS which represented 17% of income). Data for the year 1996 was as follows (Israel Treasury booklets, 1996 & 1997): 
	 The general grant totalled 2,995,000 NIS.
	Participation of designated ministries totalled 4,858,000 NIS.
	Participation of the Ministry of Education totalled 3,149,000 NIS. 

Data for the year 1997 was as follows:
	The general grant totalled 3,312,000 NIS.
	 Participation of designated ministries totalled 5,247.000 NIS.
	Participation of the Ministry of Education totalled 3,761,000 NIS.

8.2 	Participation of the Ministry of Education in Financing Education Services in the Local Authority

Nowadays, the principal functions of the local authorities in compulsory education institutions are the construction, maintenance and operation of schools, the supply of furniture and equipment, the provision of secretarial and other services including laboratories, libraries and a complementary school system. In order to finance a part of these activities, the Ministry of Education contributes a grant to cover the standard expenditure for janitors’ secretaries’ and assistant kindergarten teachers’ salaries. This arrangement was concluded in 1967 in order to facilitate the financing of local authority budgets, and to affect a response to the contention which was voiced from time to time that the central government is obliged to provide full financing for government services.

The Ministry of Education budgets are transferred to the local authorities in various ways: The Ministry of Education budgets the local authorities through the collective payment system (according to Annual Report No. 48 of the State Comptroller, 1998). The collective payment system was designed to combine the payments of each of the department units concerned and transfer them to the local authorities on the same and fixed date. In 1997 payments were transferred from 113 budget sections.

The Ministry also transfers payments through an inspection system – a computerised accounting system of all government ministries. The payments are made from 142 budget items (such as: pupil transportation, security officers, after school programs and support in comprehensive schools). In reality, the ministry departments continue to transfer many payments via other channels. Due to the multitude of sections from which the budget is allocated to the local authorities and the large number of departments involved, a situation has ensued in which the allocation sum per student is unequal among the localities. The wide distribution and the budget allocation method confer an advantage upon those who demonstrate resourcefulness in unearthing budgetary sources or those who are affiliated with those possessing information.

      8.2.1	Payment Classification (Ministry of Education, 1999b).

According to the agreement between the Ministry of Education and the local government these payments are automatically set according to various standards, such as: the number of pupils, number of classes, class level and course of study, and are to be provided according to established criteria. Most of the payments in this group were earmarked for financing wage expenditure for teaching staff and teaching assistants in schools. The following are examples taken from 1999:

a. Educational Institution Security Officer
The number of Security Officers approved by the local authority is determined by the schools. The Ministry’s participation is 75% of the cost of each position.
b. 	Psychological counselling services
The psychologists are employed by the local authority. The Ministry participates in one-twelfth of the total monthly cost.  The quota is determined by the Ministry of Education, while the local authority may employ psychologists beyond the Ministry’s quota. The Ministry transfers 64% of the cost of its approved quota of psychologists to the local authority. Each month the Ministry transfers 1/12 of its share of the approved annual cost.
c. Kindergartens 
Compulsory Kindergartens operate under the Education Law and its regulations, with the financial and operational responsibility shared between the Ministry of Education and the local authority. The Ministry pays the salaries of the kindergarten teachers who are government employees, and transfers to the local authority the salaries of the kindergarten teachers’ assistants in accordance with the average grade, an arrangement based on its agreement with the local government. Ministry participation covers salary expenses, while operational expenses are covered by local authority where the kindergartens are located.

The number of compulsory kindergartens is determined by the number of children in accordance with a standard of 33 children per kindergarten teacher in those authorities which do not receive a grant, and 31 children in those authorities which receive a grant, and this also taking into account those kindergartens which have received approval to convert to special kindergartens, or to fill the quota.

Pre-compulsory Kindergartens (ages 3-4) - 
The Ministry of Education participates in expenses for maintaining the kindergartens in accordance with the difference between school fees paid by the parents to the authority and the cost of maintaining the kindergarten. Participation for standard kindergartens is 75% of the difference between the full school fee and the amount paid by the parents, at the discount scale according to the monthly fee adjustment. With regard to towns located close to hostile international borders which are included in the national priority list, parents are exempt from paying school fees. The Ministry covers the full calculated expense. In neighbourhoods and towns included in a rehabilitation program, the Ministry pays 90% of the fee for 4-year olds, while the parents pay only 10%. The same applies to settlements included in National Priority List “A” only. In Project Renewal neighbourhoods, the Ministry covers a 50% discount for 3-year olds.
 
At the end of 1998, the Knesset passed a Free Compulsory Education Law for children from the age of 3 years, but this Law will be implemented in stages over a period of 10 years.

Primary Education - 
a. Regular Attendance Officer - 
The Ministry of Education contributes 75% of the cost of this position, and it is the Ministry which determines the quota. The local authorities foot the cost of any security officer exceeding the quota.
b.  Janitors -
The janitors are local authority employees. The Ministry allocates funds in accordance with the following criteria: Jewish and Druse sectors- Grades 1 to 6 - 1 janitor is employed for every 4.44 classes. Jewish, Arab and Druse sectors- Grades 7-9 - 1 janitor is employed for every 6.15 classes.
c. Secretaries - 
The secretaries are local authority employees, and the Ministry allocates funds on the basis of one secretary for every 14 classes. The Ministry covers the full cost of each salary. In elementary schools where school administration activity is carried out in accordance with Ministry criteria, funds are allocated to the appropriate authority on the basis of one secretary for every 13 classes.
d.  Special education assistants -
These assistants are employees of the local authority, and the Ministry 




a. Laboratory Technicians -
The Ministry contributes in cases where a Junior High School operates a Nature Study laboratory. The quota for laboratory technicians is determined according to the number of hours allocated for the school’s weekly Nature Study lessons, and in accordance with following formula is agreed by the parties:
Total number of hours
-------------------------------    = number of Technicians approved       42.5 hours per week

b. Librarians  
The quota for working hours in the library and study rooms is determined in accordance with the number of classes in the school (rather than with the quota of teaching hours).
 c.  Academic studies 
The budget for academic studies is determined according to the cost per pupil, and in accordance with two variables which are the most common level of seniority and the Level of the class in which the pupil studies.

d. Technological studies - 
The budget for secondary high-school technological studies is determined according to the cost per pupil, which in turn is determined by four variables which are the Most common level of seniority, the Grade of the class in which the pupil studies, Track of study and the Course of study. 
	.
e.  Comprehensive Schools - 
The method of budget allocation for comprehensive schools includes the parameters which are the minimal support provided to large maintained schools and maximum support for small maintained schools (50% maximum support), The percentage of support also includes pedagogic achievements and Institutions where enrolment is less than 120 pupils (assuming that there are 20 pupils per class out of two classes at the 9th, 10th and 12th grade level), receive the same maintenance percentage as that calculated for an institution with 120 pupils. The calculation is made monthly and adjusted to the data in the school fee system.
		
         f. Special services –
        such as heating according to daily tally of heating costs, Arabic and French lessons, “personal undertaking” (Youth Community Service), coaching of gifted pupils etc., are financed in accordance with a special agreement between the Ministry of Education and the local government. The State Comptroller indicated in Inspection Report No. 48 (1998) that the Ministry of Education does not always strictly maintain this payment distribution according to the number of job slots.

The reasons for the discrepancies between the local authorities in the share of actual financing as opposed to the required proportion according to the quota, stems from the budget’s unconformity with the updated requirements according to the quota. The amounts that the Ministry of Education allocates to the local authorities every year for financing psychologist positions are based on sums that were allocated the previous year, and there is no renewed allocation of all positions in the local authorities in accordance with the set quota. 

The State Comptroller asserts that because the Ministry of Education’s budget does not allow for participation in financing all psychologist positions required in the local authorities according to the quota, the Ministry must formulate a new quota that will correspond with the funds at its disposal and will also facilitate an egalitarian and just appropriation of these monies. Insofar as regular attendance officers are concerned, the Ministry does not renew the position every year in accordance with the criteria, and the current distribution reflects allotments that were provided in the past. The State Comptroller’s office was informed that local authorities requesting a supplement in positions to be financed by the Ministry, are for the most part given a negative response due to lack of funds.

8.2.2		Special Payments (State Comptroller, 1998).
The special payments refer to three main types:
	1. Funding of pedagogical initiatives and programs (such as: community school programs).
     2. Funding assistance programs for deprived populations such as: an outreach program for involvement in education, the educational welfare program, and the programs for the promotion of weak youth populations.
3.   Funding of other objectives, such as: beginning the school year. 

The special payments are provided only to some local authorities, but most are seemingly entitled to receive them. These payments are transferred via 27 branches of the collective payment system and through 52 items of the inspection system. There are great differences in the number of items from which the payments are allotted to the local authorities and they range from 1 (Savion) to 40 (Jerusalem), while on average each local authority received payments from 10.9 items in 1996.

In addition to the special payments transferred to the local authorities via the two aforesaid systems, the Ministry directly offers payments to primary schools and junior high schools for teaching hours for operation pedagogical initiatives and programs. These payments are only provided to some schools when all are presumably entitled to receive them. In the 1996-1997 school year the Ministry of Education transferred 296.37 million NIS for teaching hours for operation pedagogical programs and initiatives (“other hours”) through 75 hour packages (with the exception of the special needs and special education hours package). The total sum of these payments that the Ministry transferred to the local authorities and the schools amounted to 561.37 million NIS.

The appropriation of special payments is executed by managers of the Ministry departments, professional superintendents, and by general supervisors in the Ministry’s districts. The decision as to which local authorities and schools will receive these payments and how much of the incomes will be allocated to each one are make according to the following considerations: the degree of dependency, the degree of “maturity” and the leadership qualities of their managers, and not according to clear and visible criteria, and there is no one in charge of a just distribution of all the special payments granted to the local authority and the school. Consequently, there are local authorities and schools which receive many special payments and there are those which do not receive these types of payments.
The following are several examples of the educational programs for which the Ministry of Education transfers special payments to the local authorities: 
	Pedagogical initiatives and programs – 
        The Ministry supports diverse pedagogical initiatives and programs implemented by the educational institutions, such as: community school programs, designated to assist primary schools in improving their educational endeavour by involving parents, the community and the extra-school institutions in the activity that they conduct. In the 1996-1997 school year, a program was implemented in 353 (18.2%) schools out of 1997 primary schools in official education programs. The average investment in each school was 70,500 NIS. The assistance included: additional teaching hours, centralising activity, training principals and teachers in supplementary study programs. The community school administration (operating through the community centres) does not take its own initiative to expand the group of schools participating in the program, and a school interested in joining must apply of its own initiative. This example of community schools illustrates that the pedagogical initiatives and programs that may be suitable for many school are implemented only in some of them.
	

        Assisting Deprived Populations – 
        The Ministry has implemented a compensatory policy regarding deprived populations. This policy is designed mainly to advance scholastic achievements, prevent school drop-outs, increase the number of those receiving matriculation certificates and narrow the social gaps. The Ministry has developed a school special needs index, according to which the funds designated for special needs are distributed among the schools. The Jewish and Arab sectors have separate special needs indices, the bases of which slightly differ. In the 1996-1997 school year, the Ministry allotted 90,987 special needs hours in accordance with the special needs index, which is the equivalent of 315 million NIS.

The special needs index was formulated in the Ministry of Education (“The School System as Reflected in Localities” Report, 1997b). The special needs index is a tool which serves as a basis for a differential distribution of special needs resources among schools in the Jewish sector (both in primary education and in junior high schools). This index may also be used as a tool to rank localities, mainly according to socio-economic status of schools in these localities.

The Ministry of Education formulated a locality special needs index referring to primary education and a locality special needs index referring to junior high school. The two cannot be compared, since each index relates to different schools. The special needs index in the Jewish sector, both in primary education and in junior high school, is based on 5 components which are: The Percentage of low income families, The Percentage of parents with a low level of  education, The Percentage of large families, the Percentage of new immigrants and the Peripheral location of the locality.
  
Localities with a low index score are well established, and localities with a high index score are underprivileged. The average number of hours per 1000 pupils is 76 in primary education (in the Jewish sector); the average number of hours ranges from 0 hours (for example in Givatayim or Savion) and 212 hours (at the “Tamar” regional council and the “Azata” regional council). An average of 150 hours are given per 1000 pupils in junior high school. The average number of hours ranges from 0 hours (in Kochav Yair) to 669 hours (in Kiryat Shemona and Yerucham). The special needs index in the non-Jewish sector, both in the primary and the high school education, is based on 6 components which are: The Percentage of low income families, The Percentage of parents with a low level of education, The Percentage of large families, the Percentage of families residing in “unrecognised” towns (impromptu    settlements that are not recognised by the Ministry of Interior and hence lack the basic services), School in a mixed locality and School in a small locality.

The index’s national average is 150. We cannot compare between the localities in the non-Jewish sector and those in the Jewish sector, because of the disparate special needs indices in these sectors. The average hours per 1000 pupils is 63 hours in primary education (in the Jewish sector) and it ranges from 31 hours in Jath to 106 hours in the “Zvulun” regional council. It should be indicated that the total number of special needs hours per 1,000 pupils in the non-Jewish sector (meaning 228 hours in primary education and in junior high school together) is similar to the total number of hours in the Jewish sector. However, the distribution differs: in the non-Jewish sector, in comparison with the Jewish sector, fewer hours are allocated for primary education and more hours are provided for junior high school.

In addition to the special needs hours, the Ministry of Education funds many programs that are designed to assist pupils in need.  The following is a list of 10 main programs and their distribution among the local authorities (State Comptroller, 1998):
1)	Outreach program – 73 municipalities.
2)	Educational welfare program – 102 municipalities.
3)	30 locality program – 33 municipalities.
4)	Neighbourhood rehabilitation program – 51 municipalities.
5)	Support for comprehensive schools – 26 					municipalities.
6)	After school programs – 176 municipalities.
7)	Activities with detached youth – 119 municipalities.
8)	Comprehensive youth services – 186 						municipalities.
9)	After school kindergartens – 36 municipalities.
10)	Increasing continuation in secondary education – 19 municipalities.

The Ministry assists underprivileged populations in two additional ways: full funding of transportation in localities that are government supported and applying the Compulsory Education Law to the pre-compulsory kindergartens in the lower echelons (in terms of socio-economic level), until the law is applied to all the localities in Israel in a few years. According to the State Comptroller’s report (No. 48) the average sum of payments per pupil in 216 localities that received aid from at least none program was 274 NIS. However, there are great differences between the sum that each locality received. Thirty local authorities (15 Jewish and 15 Arab) received less than 25 NIS per pupil whereas 9 local authorities (all Jewish) received more than 1000 NIS per pupil.  

The evidence shows that the allocations of sums earmarked for assisting underprivileged pupils is not egalitarian (State Comptroller, 1998). Some of the underprivileged localities receive only limited assistance, and some receive great assistance. The Ministry of Education tends to allocate funds to localities that have a professional infrastructure to treat detached youth or youth at risk, and that operate services for the advancement of youth.

Other Payments - 
These payments refer to objectives such as: “Opening the School Year”, “The War Against Drugs”, “Musical Education”, “The Jewish Heritage Month”. The State Comptroller did not find an explanation in his inspections for the method of allocation for each one of the aforesaid sections. Providing financial assistance to solve urgent problems that are liable to prevent the opening of the school year is desirable, however it is justified only in special cases, and not for 30% of the local authorities in one year. The State Comptroller’s audit raised the issue of some of the monies seemingly being used for carrying out work that was not required to solve unanticipated problems, which require an immediate answer, in order to enable the opening of the school year. He also found flaws in the decision-making method regarding assistance provided and raised suspicions that priority was given to several local authorities in the distribution of aid.

8.3 	Earnings and Payments in the Field of Education in the Local Authorities

Using a file from the Ministry of Interior, the State Comptroller’s office (Report No. 48), examined the earnings and payments in the field of education of 235 local authorities for 1995. The average percentage of payments from earnings in the field of education was 184%, however there are large differences between the local authorities in the percentage of payments from earnings and the disparity ranges from 73% (in Bukata) to 537% (in Beitar Elite). Half of the local authorities spent more than 165% of their earnings in the field of education.

To conclude – the State Comptroller’s inspection revealed that there are great differences between the local authorities in the special budget sums that they receive from the Ministry of Education – for pedagogical initiatives, assisting pupils in need and for other purposes. There are two reasons why this occur. First, the distribution of the earmarked funds for various programs is always implemented according to uniform, relevant and egalitarian criteria and second, The decision to provide assistance to a locality as part of this or another program do not take into account the total sum of special payments transferred to it and every unit or supervisor takes an interest only in sums in his jurisdiction.

The local authorities themselves fund a significant portion of the national expenditure on education services, however, there are great differences between them in the financing volume of these services. The Tel Aviv municipality, for example, invests tens of millions of shekels in reinforcing studies, welfare activities and in comprehensive services, whereas the local authorities such as Kiryat Ata and Dvoria, hardly finance these services at all. The large differences between the local authorities in the overall public funding of education services leads to a situation in which the scope and level of the services provided to the child in one locality are very different from those offered in another locality.

 The school system is the main tool through which the child may be granted equal opportunity to advance according to his ability. But in the current situation, the principle of equal opportunity is severely damaged and there is no proper compensation for pupils from underprivileged populations. There is no justification for a child from one locality to receive fewer education services than a child in another locality, only because the locality in which he resides receives a small amount of special funds or invests little of its money in education. It may be assumed that the higher financial investment in education will bear greater educational fruits (higher scholastic achievements). I presume that this research (in the empirical section) focusing on the 1997 budget will support this trend through questionnaires and interviews and will raise the need for providing operative proposals to alter the situation.

It should be noted that despite the great progress regarding reporting as compared in the past, and the combining of main education sections in one or two reports (likewise welfare sections) – the local authority cannot use these aggregates in full. The budget statistics arrive subsequent to the beginning of the year – therefore they serve as tools for preparing a budget as required, and only in cases of emergency can they serve as a bookkeeping reference. The conformity between books of the local authority and the government ministry is not customary, hence the directive of the accountant to the municipalities that each sum that arrives until the end of the month of March subsequent to the completion of the previous year and marked for this year – shall be registered as such.

The portion of government ministry participation, as well as the allocation formulae remain on the agenda since clear principles were not determined for the nature of the participation; whether due to the fact that they are state services, or due to the need for financially assisting the authorities or due to the policy to promote certain subjects and regions. As stated, the Hermelech Committee, which was supposed to set clear rules regarding this matter, did indeed submit a report, but some of its recommendations were not actually implemented.







6) 	Educational welfare and rehabilitation	1.6%
7) 	Meals and summer camps 		0.5%
8) 	Additional services				10.7%

According to the Local Authorities Council (Israeli Local Government Centre, 1999), some of the Hermelech conclusions were implemented, for example: improvement in the secondary schooling tuition budget and an index reform in kindergartens. The remaining budgetary gaps remained as is.
Notwithstanding the committee’s recommendation that the Ministry of Education should fund several budget items for 100% of their cost, they have remained under-budgeted; the following are a few examples:
Assistants	70% of full time position
Psychological service	64% of full time position
Regular attendance officers	75% of full time position
Security officers	75% of full time position
Public libraries	75% of full time position
Pupil transportation	50% of full time position
Pre-compulsory kindergartens	75% of full time position

Each such section induces a financial gap which falls directly upon the local authorities’ budget.




Regular attendance officers	5 	 6.3




Rent for study rooms	1550	190

At the time these lines were written (February 1999), local government was still awaiting a Ministry of Education response to its request to close the budgetary gaps, but as yet there has been no prospect of change.

In conclusion, it may be said that the Ministry of Education’s local authority budgeting policy impairs and contradicts the principle of equal opportunity in education for the children of Israel. This policy leads to local government’s under budgeting education, Inequality in the Ministry of Education’s local authority education budgeting and Gaps in the local authorities’ education budgets, which reflect their socio-economic capacity. It is reasonable to assume that strong localities will know how to raise more funds from the Ministry of Education and will also invest more in educational input.











       

Chapter 9: Local Authority Financing

For many years, the issue of local government financing has been depicted as one fraught with constant crises (Hecht, 1987).  Not infrequently, it has become necessary to revise local authority budgets or to execute a consolidation, in other words, a program for reducing the authorities’ budgetary and cash-flow deficits. Current data (Hecht, 1997) shows that not all local authorities are in similar situations, and that there are considerable differences between them. This pattern has repeated itself during periods of both economic stability and instability. That is to say, the authorities’ budgetary and cash flow situations are not necessarily the result of external economic factors. 

In many instances, local authority budget and cash-flow administration is incompetent for one reason or another, such as misguided decisions regarding the scope of the budget versus available resources, insufficient attention paid to the maintenance of the budget framework, or insufficient and inefficient collection of receivables. From time to time, complaints are heard from local authorities regarding the lack of sufficient tools to manage their budgets. Subsequent discussions as to how this situation may be remedied include suggestions for improving the acquisition of resources and their transfer from the government (Hecht, 1987, Inbar and Hoshen, 1997). Some of these discussions are held by public committees which are appointed for this purpose.

During the past 39 years, six such committees have been appointed, each named after their respective chairmen: the Witkin, Kubersky, Zanbar, Hermlech, Swery and Efrati Committees (Elazar and Kalcheim, 2001):
1. The Witkin Committee was appointed in 1961 by the Minister of the Interior to examine local authority taxation procedures, was headed by Supreme Court Judge, Dr. A. Witkin. The Committee was entrusted with the task of preparing recommendations for an appropriate system of tax collection by local authorities, and express their opinions with regard to the financial administration of these bodies. As far as budgets and expenses were concerned, the Committee recommended that the local authorities lighten the not inconsiderable burden of their debts, and establish certain standards as a basis for “a government policy in the field of government services, the financing of which would be shared between the government and the local authorities.” 

The Committee also recommended programs, rules and limitations for arranging development budget matters, as well as loans with suitable repayment terms. its final recommendation was that the Ministry of the Interior supervise local authority activities to ensure that they operate within the limitations of the Committee’s recommendations. The Witkin Committee recommendations were not fully implemented, but were used as a basis for some of the measures which were undertaken during the 60’s.

2. The Kubersky Committee was appointed in 1975 in the wake of an understanding between the Ministers of the Interior and Finance, to the effect that it would be advisable to re-examine the local authorities’ financial system which had become destabilised because of a rapid rise in the rate of inflation. The Committee was headed by the former Director-General of the Ministry of the Interior.  The Committee’s recommendations which were submitted in 1975, dealt with the establishment of general principles regarding the function of a budgetary system and the acquisition of resources by the local authorities It was suggested that prior to the beginning of each fiscal year, representatives of the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Finance and the Local Government Council would meet to discuss the formulation of principles for a balanced budget during the coming year. It was also decided that comprehensive information would be conveyed to all the local authorities concerning income and forecast expenditure, insofar as these were contingent upon the central government.
The ordinary budget would include inter alia, the participation of government ministries in the financing of government services, and this in the amount of 75% for compulsory services and 50% for optional services, on the basis of standards to be accompanied by reasonable cost calculations for each service provided in accordance with the established standard. Additional resources would be provided by means of a general grant and transferred income. Monies would be transferred to the local authorities at regular intervals throughout the year, while the appropriate report need be submitted only once a year. 

With regard to development, it was decided that each local authority would draw up a multi-year development program from which annual development budgets would derive, and this in accordance with each authority’s possibilities. Government ministries would contribute towards, and make available non-linked loans for projects, the installation of which will be financed in an amount sufficient to cover their full cost. The Committee suggested that the “local authorities refrain from seeking financing in the free market.” Instead, the government would arrange a credit line from the State Budget for municipal development, and this would be allocated by the Ministry of the Interior in accordance with pre-determined criteria. 

 The Kubersky Committee recommendations were validated by Government decision in 1976, and some were even put into effect. The credit line for local authority development was implemented in 1977. Government ministries, chiefly the Ministry of Education, formulated the “package” of government services, while the Ministry of Labour went over to a uniform financing allocation of 75% of expenses. As well, various departments of the Ministry of Education changed the basis of their financing in accordance with the Committee’s recommendations. In 1978, the Ministers of Finance and the Interior appointed a Committee of experts from both Ministries, together with the Local Government Council in order to discuss and examine common financial issues between the central and local government. This Committee prepared relevant data, and its decisions were submitted, either as agreed recommendations, or as problems to be resolved at a higher level.

3. The Zanbar Government Committee for Local Authority Affairs - headed by the former Governor of the Bank of Israel; was appointed in 1975 to examine the then-prevailing local authority system and submit recommendations as to possible improvements. The Committee submitted its recommendations to the Government in 1981, but they were approved only in 1985. The Committee determined budgetary and monetary principles for financing the following regular budget items: independent income, transfers, government ministries, transferred income and the Ministry of the Interior grant. The Committee also established a foundation for government participation according to clear and known rules, as well as for the general grant on the basis of the “services package”. The Committee recommended a different format for the budget: The regular budget would be combined with services, while the development budget would be for the purchase of development works. A capital budget would be established to bridge between these two budgets and deal with the repayment of loans, the acquisition of loans, financing deficits and so on.

The above are but a few of the many recommendations made by this Committee concerning the relationship between the central and local government. These recommendations were not accepted as viable until the summer of 1984, prior to which, only a few in the area of finance were implemented. It should be emphasised that at that time, severe inflation ran rampant to such an extent that a budget and an acceptable accounting system became a necessity. In 1984-1985, the budget was revised every three months, and this after some delay and in accordance with developments. In the wake of repeated cuts in resources and budgets, as well as the cessation of government participation, the local authorities faced not only a serious situation where they found it difficult to carry out current functions, but also a very uncertain future.

4. The Hermlech Committee (Hecht, 1997)   was composed of an inter-ministerial team from the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Planning and Economy, together with representatives from the Centre for Local Government and the Regional Councils. In 1991, the Committee was requested to examine the division of functions and the financial burden between the Government and the local authorities concerning educational and social services. Its recommendations were submitted in October 1992.

	The Committee concluded that the division of functions was correct in that it is the Government which should determine policy as well as supervise, while responsibility for execution of functions should be borne by the local authorities or “other entities to be established” in accordance with Committee recommendations. The Committee also calculated the burden borne by the local authorities which remained without coverage. The Committee recommended that consideration be given to the privatisation of educational services. It also recommended the establishment of joint “educational administrations” where the local authority and the Ministry of Education would provide educational services which until then had been provided solely by the Ministry. 

The Committee also designed a “services package” which would be fully financed by the local authorities, in order to obviate the need for the submission of reports and transfer of funds in an unrealistic or dilatory fashion. In any case, it was recommended that the Ministry would continue its inspection as before. The Committee recommended sharing the provision of services, and calculated the amounts which the local authorities would be entitled to receive as consideration for their full financing of services for which the government is responsible. Also determined, were procedures concerning the making of decisions, the transfer of funds and the prevention of deviations.
As far as social welfare was concerned, the Committee recommended the establishment of 25 regional social authorities which would provide highly professional social services to be financed by the Government. In practice, all the Committee’s financial recommendations were implemented in full, including those concerning amounts which were lacking for financing certain Government services, but the organisational recommendations were not implemented. Moreover, Government Ministry participation in the financing of social services was not increased.

5. The Swery Committee - This Committee which comprised experts, economists and auditors from academic circles, from the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Finance, the Jerusalem Municipality, was requested to recommend criteria for the allocation of the general grant and for the authorisation of credit to local authorities. Its recommendations were submitted in August 1993. In its recommendations, the Committee, in considering a more liberal approach with regard to the local authorities, requested “a greater degree of freedom for the local authorities in determining their level of  revenue, their level of expenditure and the composition of their budgets within a pre-determined framework.” At the same time, the central authority would guarantee that a minimum level of services would be provided to residents of each and every local authority. 

The general grant which each authority was to receive would be calculated in accordance with: “a minimum budget expenditure” based on the national “per capita expenditure”, multiplied by the number of residents in a given authority, plus additional sums based on a social-economic index for authorities located in priority areas, and for regional councils. The tax revenue of the local authority potential would also be calculated, as well as its other independent revenues and the designated ministries’ participation. The general rates and taxes potential would be determined by taking into account the social-economic status of the residents as well as commercial revenue. Determination of the “services package” and the revenue potential would not restrict the local authority - should it succeed in acquiring more resources, it would be entitled to spend more.
The proposed credit arrangements would include the possibility for each authority to obtain credit not to exceed 84% of its potential revenue. It would not be necessary to obtain approval for the purpose of the credit, but the local authority would be required to take into account repayment of the principal each year, and this in such a way as to avoid any deviation from the approved framework.

The Committee also recommended ways and means of ensuring the stability of the system, as well as measures to be taken to avoid deviations and enable those authorities where the threat of financial crises prevails, to return to an even keel.

6.  The Efrati Committee - The Efrati Committee was appointed on December 5th, 1996 and was supposed to examine the central-local government relationship, a program to handle the deficits created in the local authorities’ budgets and a manner of allocating the grant until the year 2000. it was also suppose to examine the 1997 budget of the Ministry of the Interior and the Education and Welfare Ministries, from the consequences of the budget and incomes of the local authority and to examine the health tax issue. In addition it had to look for required activities that will balance the present budgetary activity of the expenses and incomes of the local authority and for ways of controlling and regulating local authorities and their budgets.

The committee was expected to complete its duties by June 30th, 1996 and submit its recommendations by January 31st, 1997. Educational services occupy a cardinal position in local authority budgets. There are some authorities whose education budget constitutes over 50% of its total budget. An important part of negotiations between local authorities and the central government is devoted to addressing problems which arise from the heavy financial burden borne by the local authority budgets as a result of this particular item of expenditure. Educational services nowadays constitute a part of “state services”.

To summarise this section, it may be concluded that the attempt to lay a firm foundation for local authority economy commenced with the establishment of the State. The recommendations made by the committees continuously emphasised the need to grant local authorities independence. These recommendations were adopted by the governments in office at the time. The Government Committees cited in this section whose members included some of the country’s most distinguished public figures and experts, attempted to draft new principles for the system of taxation, for the allocation of the general grant and determination of its scope, for the arrangements concerning reports and the transfer of designated ministry contributions, for the drawing up of budgets and for the adherence to measures for ensuring that financial crises would be avoided. The approach of the Ministry of Treasury and the Ministry of the Interior did not change drastically. They view the local government as an outsider who is not mature enough to manage his own affairs responsibly and efficiently (Hecht, 1997).

Although some changes were effected over the years, it should be emphasised that only a few of these changes were the outcome of Committee recommendations. The financial changes that were effected arose from economic situations, such as the 1967 recession which resulted in the revoking of the property tax, or from the need to solve problems concerning the balancing of local authority budgets and the reduction of deficits.






Chapter 10: Theoretical background for understanding financial aspects of central-local government relations

In the previous sections we proposed a theoretical research model and we examined the interrelationship between the central and local governments from the pre-State period to the present day, with particular emphasis on the issue of education. This background is important in order for us to understand the significance of the education budget in the framework of the relationship between central and local government. The education budget an issue of great interest to social scientists, as well as the subject of much research. Political scientists claim that it is a tool for the resolution of conflicts within and between political parties, as well as between political parties and other interested groups (Widavsky, 1964).  A historical examination of the subject reveals that the education budget has been used as a bargaining chip both in Israel (Don-Yehiye, 1974) and abroad (Campbell and Mazzoni, 1971), on a national as well as a local level (Meltsner, 1971).

The purpose of this research is to examine, using the theoretical model and the description in the previous chapters of the central-local government relationship, and in reviewing the relevant professional literature and examining concrete evidence, the factors which influence the disparity between public policy determined by the central government and the extent to which it is executed by the local government.

Central and local government in Israel are neither similar nor monolithic entities. The division of the central government into ministries and other governmental bodies represents, apart from an organisational division, a wide range of political and economic interests which control or aim to control State resources. It is within the power of the local authority to re-direct or oppose one trend or another on the part of government ministries, or even utilise any such trend to their mutual advantage. Local government too is heterogeneous, and local authorities differ one from the other. There are social and cultural differences, as well as differences with regard to economic resources, and this in addition to the differences which prevail between the heads of each authority whose political and personal standing colours their respective relations with the central government.

There is no doubt that the personality of a head of a local authority and his connections with the ruling coalition parties do influence to a certain extent his relationship with the central government. Nevertheless, Weiss(1972)said that the country’s central government uses the power of its historical rights and formidable financial strength to dictate how local government should operate. If we accept this assumption, we should also ask two questions:
a.  What is the theoretical basis for the dependence of the periphery on the centre?
b. What are the implications of this dependence with regard to formulating budgetary policy and its implementation, in general and with regard to education in particular?

The theoretical model proposed in the first chapter indicates the discrepancies between the formal aspect and the realistic aspect in the interrelationship between the two government strata, and provides possible answers to the above questions which will be reviewed in the course of the research. Professional literature cites the three cardinal approaches (Elazar, 1972) with regard to the financial aspects of the central-local government relationship.

	The first approach claims that in order to provide uniform services to the Israeli public, the local authority should carry out the policy laid down by the central government, and this because the centre acts for the good of the public as a whole, contrary to the local authority, whose narrow, particularistic perception results in the implementation of the education budget in accordance with its own programs.Granting the local authorities autonomy in the determination of educational policy might very well give rise to more inequality between financially sound local authorities and those whose financial position is not so secure. The second approach contends that since there is no difference between national and local goals as far as the various kinds of services are concerned, the central government should support the programs and decisions laid down by local government and finance them accordingly. The third approach claims that every local authority has the right to maintain its individuality, and make decisions as it sees fit. Furthermore, the central government should provide assistance to local government on the basis of per-project subsidies.

All the above-mentioned approaches constitute part of a moral debate over two conflicting sets of values - the provision of services on the basis of equality, or the freedom of each and every local authority, in its capacity as a duly elected and representative body, to determine the needs of its residents and the level of services they receive (Humes & Martin, 1969). Contrary to this ideological argument, Aldrich contends that the relationship between central and local government is based on the principle of supplying needs (Aldrich, 1976). Rhodes claims that the dependence of the local authority on central government grants, does not necessarily erode its authority (Rhodes, 1980).

In his “Exchange Theory”, Salisbury emphasises that “exchange” behaviour is typical of the world of economics with its large organisations and political interests. Since organisations represent their customers and continued survival is their prime interest, they must ensure that their customers are satisfied. In the same way, both governmental authorities are obliged to base their relations on the principle of exchange (Salisbury, 1970).

All the aforementioned approaches give rise to the question: what happens when one party is dependent on satisfying the needs of the other? For example, if local government resources are low and it has no alternative sources or property, it will be dependent on the central government. On the other hand, if local government is less dependent on central government resources and has alternative resources for satisfying its needs, it will have more autonomy with regard to determining and implementing policies (Weiss, 1973). In other words, the criterion for determining the extent of local authority autonomy is the extent of the authority’s dependence on the central government (Elazar, 1970). This thesis bears further investigation. Furthermore, the greater the said dependence, the greater the likelihood that the gap between policy and implementation would diminish.

In the opinion of Blau, should the dependence be one-sided, the local authority would probably adopt a more balanced approach by seeking alternative sources of financing, and thereby expand its autonomy with regard to determining policy and deciding how to implement it (Blau, 1964). Contrary to Blau, Sharpf is convinced that the local authority is interested in creating a mutual dependence, in order that the central government would also be dependent on the local government, and thereby ensure that the services for which according to law the central government is responsible, are indeed provided. The subject of education is a prime example of a negotiating chip which could be utilised by a local authority to neutralise the central government’s bargaining power, and this by threatening to cancel or even refrain from providing educational services (Sharpf, 1978). In Kotter’s opinion, both authorities need each other and their dependence is mutual. The central government wants to ensure that its policies are fully implemented, while the local government needs financial resources. This interdependence greatly reduces the possibility of a one-sided dependence (Kotter, 1977). 

Van Meter and Van Horn, two researchers from Holland (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975), and Smith, a researcher from New Zealand (1973) have addressed the implications of the said dependence with regard to the gap between policy and the extent of its implementation. The Dutch researchers claim that policy implementation is not necessarily linked to the interdependence between the two entities, but to three other factors:	First, the extent of the parties’ agreement as to the aims of the policy, that is, whether the policy-making entity and the implementing entity are of 	the same mind in this regard. second, The sum total of resources placed by the central government at the disposal of the body which is to implement its policy and third, The degree of efficiency invested in supervising and ensuring policy implementation. This is not necessarily contingent upon the extent of the periphery’s dependence on the centre.
      
	According to Smith, the gap between policy and implementation arises under three conditions. The first condition is the Shortage of manpower to execute the said implementation. The second condition is of Inefficient supervision, as well as  disagreement between the parties regarding policy objectives and the third is of Differing concepts with regard to the actual needs of the local authority which not only give rise to inter-organisational conflicts, but also increase the probability that a gap between policy and implementation will develop.

In the opinion of Gideon Doron, several elements of duress and restriction prevail in the process of policy implementation (Doron, 1986):
a. Ignoring a circumstantial link between achieving the objective and implementing the policy.  
b.  Disregard of a circumstantial link.
c.  Conscious disregard of the cost of policy implementation.
     d.  Unconscious disregard of the cost of policy implementation.
           e. A lack of understanding by the implementing party of the policy-makers’ intentions.
           f. The lapse of time between the establishment of policies and their implementation.
     g. The link between the policy tryout and its actual implementation.
    h. Lack of flexibility in policy implementation due to previous obligations.
    i.  The tendency to analyse on a worst-case basis.
    j.  Co-ordination problems encountered with regard to implementation.
         k.  Shortage of personnel with suitable qualifications and capabilities for proper execution.

In the opinion of Jones, a successful policy implementation by the local authority is dependent on three activities (Jones, 1986): Elucidation of the policy’s aims and intent, The use of appropriate communication tools to explain the policy’s 	aims and Co-operation on the part of the local authority and the existence of an organisational environment, including resources, materials and authority in the hands of relevant personnel, who would take the initiative and make every effort to ensure successful implementation.

In conclusion, the diverse theoretical background which has been reviewed in this chapter shows that the gap between policy and implementation is the result of the following:
a. A lack of agreement on objectives. 
b. Differing concepts (intentions) concerning the needs of the body for 	which the policy is intended.
c. The lack of sufficient and appropriate resources, both human and financial, for implementing the policy and/or overlooking its cost.
           d. Inadequate co-ordination, by the policy-making level with the implementing entity, as well as a lack of efficient control and supervision
e. Lack of flexibility in policy implementation due to previous 	commitments. 
           f. The lapse of time between the establishment of policies and their implementation.






Chapter 11:The Theoretical Model for Research Study

This chapter summarizes the literary overview from the previous chapters by creating a theoretical research model.  This chapter designs the Israeli model based on the three models relating to the central-local government relationship reviewed in Chapter 3, coupled with the Israeli "surplus value" deriving from the overview of the additional chapters in this section.
                             
Active professional involvement in the municipal system in general and in education in particular, the theoretical literature (particularly the three models described in chapter 3), and the historical development of central-local government relations in Israel, and of course an analytical observation of the current relationship of the two government strata, lead me to the following model which may serve as a framework for understanding the government budgeting policy for the municipal school system. The model combines elements from each one of the three theoretical models mentioned above: the Central Control Model, the Local Autonomy Model and the Political System Model.

The Central Control Model characterises the formal aspect of the interrelationship between the central government and the local government in Israel, as it is reflected in the laws, regulations and procedures and which typified in practice the initial years following the establishment of the State. In reality, the government’s capacity to enforce local government policy is restricted, however, its share in financing local government’s expenses remains significant (although currently less than in the past). The following features of the Local Autonomy Model constitute part of the research model:
     a) Each local authority is an elected political unit which must answer to its electorate.
     b) The local authority is more aware of the needs of its residents than the government.  
     c) The local authority has the authority to collect taxes. However, contrary to what has been stated in this model, this fact still does not allow it to provide complete services without any particular sub ordinance to the government. The features of the Political System Model which are relevant to the research model are:
a) The central government is comprised of a cluster of independent agencies.
b) The local authorities are different and separate units.
      c) Inequality in resources and in the range of services provided to residents attest to the fact that the central government is not always the determining factor.
     d) The link between the two government strata includes a multi-channel communication network conveying various messages.	 
A combination of all the relevant features of the three models leads us to the following principles of the theoretical research model:
a) Officially, the two government strata are built like a pyramid.
 b) In practice, both operate within the framework of a strategic partnership based on interdependence.
 c) 	 The central government finds it difficult to enforce its policy on the local government.
 d) 	 The central government still finances a significant share of the local government’s expenses.
 e) 	 The local government operates as an elected political unit which is well familiar with the needs of its residents and is responsible for meeting these needs. It consists of different and separate units, which in practice generate inequality in the extent of resources and services provided to the public.
  f) 	 The local authority has the authority to collect taxes and provide services, yet it is still subject to the directives of the government.




h)  	The link between the two government strata entails a multi-channel communication network, which includes specific informal agreements in local activity.





Contrary to the approach which views local government as a body controlled by the central government, the other one believes that the relative power of local government today creates a balance of power, which makes both strata strategic partners, in light of the circumstances alone. This partnership relies on interdependence, according to which the central government does not have the capacity to execute its policy in significant and critical spheres without assistance from the local government (just as in education and welfare), even if this concerns its passive consent, just as the local government is incapable of avoiding assistance from the centre (Ben-Elia, 1995). This interdependence dictates contingent autonomies, according to which each party is free to make decisions. The central government and the local government depend on each other.

According to this approach, the local autonomy’s space is confined by constraints that the central government places and contemporaneously, the central government loses its freedom in face of the activity of the local government. This phenomenon is based on perceiving the relationship between the two government strata as a web of multi-focal and multi-dimensional networks, contrary to the approach which considers the said relationship to be a vertical governmental hierarchy (according to the Central Control Model).

The range of activities in which the local authority participates creates an extensive interface with the central government in all its components. This interface operates in a complex system of rules, regulations and inter-governmental settlements which lack a common denominator that is all encompassing and integrative and it is also the source of frequent friction which the inter-governmental activity generates in a state of interdependence. However, it must be specifically pointed out that the uniqueness of the complicated relationship between the two government strata not only lies in the problematic character of the formal interface, but rather in the significant role informal factors play in shaping the local government’s relative autonomy.
The activity on the local level is based on many agreements in local activity, which were obtained based on specific understandings (personal, professional and political) or coalitions of self-evident interests. The congested network of personal relations between state incumbents and local incumbents (both on a political and professional level), party and movement affiliations, as well as professional interests, create intersecting points, whereby agreements are obtained and transactions are executed with bilateral support. This network of relationships is unstable. It creates a wide range of opportunities and convenient forums for promoting common interests. This relationship is liable to be deficient in terms of public policy, for a number of reasons (Ben-Elia,1995):  Lack of clarity and inconsistency in government policy, Insufficient uniform criteria for budgeting local government, The formal legal system- which establishes the interrelationship between the two government strata- is deficient from the point of view of unequal job definitions among the two (including the distribution of financing between them), Ineffective supervision and control processes, Disparity in the execution of government policy by local government and a Differentiated capacity of many local authorities to take advantage of the free hand they have, in the wake of the trend towards decentralisation and the reinforcement of sub-national government levels, particularly at the local government level. In addition, The model creates conditions in which inequality prevails in the input of the local authorities (including government input), and of course in production as well, in terms of the level and range of services.

The current research objective is also to examine whether the model, as it operates in the Israeli reality, indeed induces all or some of the above deficiencies.

The central government in Israel has been characterised for years by the lack of clarity and inconsistency in government policy (Ben-Elia, 1995). In other words, according to the above model, the government determines a policy, which is the product of negotiations and compromise between the various parties (Ministry of Education, local government, various school systems, professional organisations, political and public institutions, and the public at large), and is not always unequivocal. Likewise, the central government does not always persist with the decisions it makes in view of outside pressures (see the recurring phenomenon of changing the degree of assistance provided to local authorities due to pressures – individual and collective – on its part, and or changes in the municipal education budgeting sections in compliance with pressures exerted from time to time by the local authorities and the incomplete implementation of the reform in the school system).

 The lack of sufficient uniform and transparent criteria in the field of resource allocation has generated inequality among various authorities and municipal sectors (Ben-Elia, 1995). This phenomenon has been leading the local government for years to exert pressure on the central government – to increase resources in various fields, including the field of education and to increase the transparency of the criteria in their allocations to the local authorities. 

The legal system does not unequivocally define the task distribution among the two government strata. It is reasonable to assume that there will be implications for the inequality in government budgeting of the municipal school system. According to the law (Basic Law on Government, 2001) it is the right of government ministries in Israel to intervene in many fields in which the local authority deals. This is how one may receive the impression that it is as though the central entities were barricading the local authority and restraining its freedom of movement. However, relative to the abundance of written provisions, in reality the types of supervision are limited and sparse. It is no exaggeration to say that in order to operate supervision by the letter of the law, there would be a need for an additional thousand employees and it would be unrealistic to expect this to occur in the near future (Ben-Elia, 1995; Elazar and Kalcheim, 2001).

This want of supervision is clearly reflected in the inspection findings of the State Comptroller which relate to the ongoing supervisory tasks of the government ministries over the local authorities in the period of three decades from the sixties until the early nineties (Elazar and Kalcheim, 2001: 49).  The above model creates the conditions for the disparity in the execution of government policy by the local government due to obscure policy and the inefficient tools for implementation by the local authorities (such as: under-budgeting, different timetables, lack of confidence between them, different perception of needs, lack of transparent criteria for financing, inequality in input of local authorities, exploiting informal connection between the two government strata to solve problems on the local level, etc.).

The tenth section in the theoretical model refers to the conceptual framework of the research, deriving from the review of the theoretical literature. This section reflects the basis for the entire empirical research. In reality, it bases the government policy for municipal education system budgeting on the mutual and differential influence of four main factors: the legal system including all the laws purporting to explain the aforesaid policy (including emphasis on its shortcomings), the historical background from pre-statehood until today, which is to provide the background for understanding the present reality, the interrelationship between the central government and local government from a political and professional point of view, a relationship which is to provide answers and an explanation to the research questions, and finally the socio-economic status of the local authorities which is to provide a possible explanation for the differences in educational input (education budgets) and as a result education output as well (scholastic achievements).

The model constitutes a convenient foundation for the local authorities to abuse their socio-economic power and/or their political and professional ties in order to obtain more government input and thereby arrive at production levels which are reflected in the level and range of services provided to the public. This situation generates inequality between the local authorities in providing services to the public including education services upon which I will expand in this study (Ben-Elia, 1995).





























Chapter 12:    The    Research  Rationale

The State of Israel is considered, at least officially, to be a centralist state in terms of the relationship between the central government and the local government.  It is assumed that this centralistic approach will also be manifested in the local authorities' processes of implementing government policy and particularly in the financing of the municipal education system (the research context). Upon reviewing the professional literature, a different and complicated picture emerges, refuting the centralistic status to a certain degree.

The foundations of the relationship between the central government and the local government today, were based upon a pre-State ruling infrastructure which reinforced the local and municipal autonomy in order to enable the Jewish settlement in the territories of the Land of Israel not to be too dependent (resource-wise) upon the Ottoman or the British government, and to enable the proper function of the autonomous Jewish education system. The legal system which is designated to coordinate the relationship between the two government strata in the financing of the municipal education system is ambivalent and ambiguous, and it is liable to have an impact on the formation of gaps in budgeting.

The relationship between the central government and the local government as far as education is concerned cannot be severed from the political, economic and social reality of the State of Israel. The theoretical literature regards these two government strata as strategic partners which are interdependent in fulfilling their tasks in general and in education in particular.  The Ministry of Education must have the local authority carry out its policy and the local government requires the resources that are allocated by the Ministry of Education to finance the local education system.  Similarly, the Ministry of Education requires the proper tools to implement its policy (such as: the proper budget, enforcement, timetable, feedback, control and evaluation).  If these tools are inappropriate or utilized in part only, this may lead to gaps in the implementation of the budgeting policy.

Subsequent to the personal elections for the local authority heads (dating from 1975), it is plausible that the intervention of the local authority head and/or the person holding the education portfolio on its behalf, may lead to the expansion of the gaps in budgeting in order to allow for more education-related services for residents and to justify their election to the position.  An additional assumption is that the allocation of more resources to education related services in various settlements and the intentional formation of budgetary deficits may influence the increase in didactic accomplishments since these resources may improve study processes (by recruiting good teachers, providing reinforcement for students, reducing the number of students in each class and being equipped with improved didactic materials) and as a result, scholastic achievements will be improved. The external and internal supervision and control processes are meant to prevent or reduce the formation of budgetary gaps, however in the strong authorities these processes may have less of an influence since these authorities are less dependent upon government resources.

The current lack of trust and differences in perception between these two government strata, with both being elected by the public, may influence the formation of a gap in budget and its magnitude. The size of the local authority, its composition, municipal status and socio-economic status may have an impact on the formation of budget gaps between the local authorities.  Large and strong authorities will be, as stated, less dependent upon the Ministry of Education and will be prepared to consciously enter budgetary deficits in education.  The Arab local authorities, which are generally in the lower clusters in terms of socio-economic status, will not allow themselves to enter large deficits, due to poor self-resources  and their dependence upon Ministry of Education resources.

In the literary review of the second section of the theoretical model which characterizes, in the opinion of the researcher, the Israeli reality in terms of the relationship between the central government and the local government in Israel. The theoretical model encompasses the broader context of the research which consists of the relationship between the central government and the local government in general.  The limited context (section 10) refers to the policy of the Education Ministry in the budgeting of the local education system and its actual implementation by the local authorities. 




















PART III: RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research focuses upon the influence of central-local government relations on education budgets in the local authorities in Israel. The main research question is: “In a centralist system as exists in Israel in the year 1997, can the government’s school system budgeting policy be inconsistent with its implementation by the local authorities?” It provides appropriate boundaries around the research: the education budget of the local authority in general, and on the Ministry of Education's policy regarding budgeting of the municipal education system in 1997 in particular. The research related to the entire State of Israel.


The subsidiary questions that derive from the main question are:

1. 	Does the Education Ministry’s budget policy create gaps between local 	authorities in the level of education services?

2.	Do gaps in the level of education services serve as an impetus for some of the local authorities to invest more of their budget in education?

3. 	Does the differences in the level of education services actually affect 	educational results (scholastic achievements)?
	
These questions define the parameters for the research and provide major areas in which hypotheses may be developed. The research objectives are to examine what conditions give rise to such a gap and what reasons are behind the magnitude of the gap. The research will provide answers to the above questions by identifying relevant factors from a budgetary, local, and national perspective.


This Part includes the following chapters:
13.      Research Paradigms and Research Methods





16.3    Operative Model
17. 	Research Methodology                                                                                                                   
17.1    The Sample
17.2    Instrumentation and Data Collection
17.2.1 Questionnaires
17.2.2  Interviews
17.2.3  Archival Documents
17.3   Triangulation
17.4   The Ethical Perspective of the Research
17.5   Research Authencity

In order to obtain information on the government budgeting policy for the local school system and numerical data on the extent of the budget gaps (between the policy of the Ministry of Education and its implementation by the local authorities), several sources were required: professional literature, questionnaires and interviews.  The purpose of the collation was to reinforce the data in order to reach conclusions, which mirror reality.   

The research questions were derived from the researcher  long-standing familiarity with and innate curiosity regarding the research topic, as well as a review of the professional literature. The research questions focused principally on whether there is a gap in implementation of budgetary policy and what the possible reasons are for the existence of this gap. The research questions led him to use relevant Paradigms and Methods and to make possible assumptions, to serve as a basis for the research hypotheses. These assumptions were intended to provide a possible direction regarding answers to the research questions (i.e. whether there is a gap in implementation of the budgetary policy and what the possible reasons are for the existence of this gap).

I deemed it appropriate to examine the possibility of grouping the basic assumptions in a number of categories; four categories were thus formed, together constituting the conceptual framework of the research. The categories include the legal framework, the political and professional framework, the historical background of the country, and the socio-economic level of the local authorities. The researcher proceeded from this stage to develop hypotheses based on the conceptual framework. For example, the first hypothesis is based on the political framework, the legal framework and the historical background. The same is true of the second hypothesis. The third hypothesis is based on the socio-economic level of the local authority. The fourth hypothesis is based on the legal framework, political framework, the historical background and the socio-economic status of the local authority. The same is true of the fifth hypothesis.

The next stage will discuss the translation of the hypotheses into independent and dependent variables which may be processed and analysed. At this stage, the operative model of the research will be presented; this model was designed to graphically illustrate the relevant statistical connections that will be reviewed.  The last chapter in this section of the thesis (the research methodology) will describe the construction process of the research tools and their implementation in the research process.  This chapter will discuss the data collection methods employed in this research.  The following is the flow chart of the research operative model formulation process. 

A flow diagram shown on next page, as figure 13.1  portrays the logical sequence of activities.



























                                                                
The diagram is, as previously mentioned, a product of a methodical thought process.  The definition of the (independent and dependent) variables for the operative formulation enables the inspection of the statistical relations between them by means of the SPSS program.  

                                 

Chapter 13: Research Paradigms and Research Methods.

The research encompasses Israeli reality in general and the relationship between the central government and the local government in terms of funding of the municipal education system. The research focuses on this reality including complicated data such as budgetary data as well as people's interpretations of these data, the analysis of the political and professional reality and interpretations of this reality. Therefore, the research question calls for the use of relevant paradigms through which data and criticism may be collected.  

The relevant paradigms of the current research are a combination of a positivistic paradigm and a phenomenological paradigm.The positivistic paradigm – was adopted by behavioural science inquirers according to the model of the natural sciences.  According to this paradigm, the research objective is to provide causal and appropriate explanations and to predict future behaviour based on the study of behaviour observed at present.  This is a method based mainly on empirical-quantitative research methods. 

In comparison, the phenomenological paradigm views the research objective as understanding phenomena, while referring holistically to  latent diversified aspects of human behavior in its environmental context, and to the totality of interactions typifying it.  It is mainly based on research methods labeled as qualitative, naturalistic, interpretative, or phenomenological.  Both  Paradigms  enable a combination of the quantitative method and the qualitative method in the data collection process.  Providing answers to the research questions required numerical data, however it was also necessary to express personal and sector-related standpoints that reflected on philosophies, interests, etc.

The main question that has been raised by the researchers, Smith, Heshusius(1986)  and Cronbach(1975)  and which is very relevant to this research (as will be described further on) regards the combination of methodologies.  Is it possible to combine qualitative and quantitative methods in one research?  Can one obtain the advantages that are embodied in each one of the methods and create a synthesis between them? Other researchers (Goetz & Le Compte, 1984; Scriven, 1972) recommend using two different methodologies.

In general, the tendency towards integration is justified in order to reinforce the internal and external validity of the research.  Such that for example, many closed questionnaires, which are accepted as a research tool in the quantitative approach, are accompanied by open-ended interviews which characterise the qualitative approach, with the objective of expanding upon and delving deeper into the answers of the subjects.









Chapter 14: General Assumptions

The research will explain the dimensions of the budget gap in implementing educational policy by local authorities. The following eleven assumptions emerged from my reading and my professional knowledge. They represent, in total, my theoretical background to the way in which this research was designed.

The following specifies the basic assumptions constituting the infrastructure for formulating the hypotheses for the research questions.

1. Inadequate legislation with regard to the division of authority between central and local government.  For example: notwithstanding the legislators’ decision that responsibility for the maintenance of schools would be shared between the said two governmental branches, they have neglected to define criteria as to how the said responsibility and authority are to be divided.Ambiguous legislation may incur a different interpretation inferred by the two government strata,and as a result may generate a gap in policy implementation.

2. Differing operational perspectives:  Both governmental branches have different operational perspectives with regard to their respective functions, even when these are functions defined by law.  For example: It is not clear whether local educational needs are to be determined by the heads of the local authority or by those of the Ministry of Education.  Disparity in concept of needs may be evident in the disparity in education budgets (education budget deficit).  The stronger the locality in terms of socio-economic status, the more involved the local residents and the local authority are and this will be manifested in the larger budget deficit. It is assumed that the differences in operational perspectives may lead to disparity.

3.  Lack of confidence between the centre and the periphery, where the central government lacks confidence in the local authorities’ ability to determine their    needs and allocate their budgets accordingly.  The conflicting concepts of both governments with regard to the actual needs of the local authorities and concerning the criteria whereby the resources are to be allocated to the local authorities.
This state of affairs could contribute to a situation where each governmental authority would operate as it sees fit, so that the gap between policy and implementation would continue to widen.

4. Inefficient supervision apparatus It may be assumed that the local authorities’ supervision over its own activities as well as the central government’s supervision of these same activities are not as efficient as they should be.  Their shortcomings could be the result of the imprecise division of authority between the government ministries (Interior and of Education), and the lack of basic accepted control procedures.
  
It may reasonably be assumed that the tighter the external and internal supervision and control processes are on local authority education expenses, the lower the budgetary deficit in education will be.  Based on two main characteristics cited in the theoretical model, firstly, that the central authority and the local authority operate within a strategic partnership based on reciprocity and secondly, that the central authority encounters difficulty in enforcing its policy on the local authority, it may be assumed that in actuality the supervision and control processes will not be sufficiently effective and this will also be manifest in the deficit volumes in the education budget in the local authorities.  It is plausible that the smaller local authorities will be more dependent on the Ministry of Education budgets – the supervision and control processes will be more effective and as a result the education budget deficit in these authorities will be lower in contrast to the larger authorities (which are usually municipalities). 

5.  Dependence on resources, i.e. the extent of the dependence of the party which must implement the policy upon the resources disbursed by the party which has determined the policy.  If the local authority has great needs and scarce resources, it is most likely that it will implement the policy determined by the central government and vice versa.

An authority that does not have alternative recruitment sources or profit-                           yielding assets depends on the central government.  Whereas, the lower the   dependency on resource influx from the central government, and the more alternatives there are for recruiting sources to meet the various needs, the more expansive the local authority’s autonomy will be in formulating and implementing policy.In other words: the criteria for determining the extent of autonomy of the local authority is the degree of the central government’s dependence on the central government.  The following diagram will illustrate Aldrich’s hypothesis: (Aldrich, 1976) 
                               
Table 14.1:Aldrich’s hypothesis

Availability of alternative resources	Need for resources
	High	Low
                     High	Low and mutualDependence	No dependence
                      Low 	High, one-sidedDependence	Low dependence

In Blau’s (Blau, 1964) opinion, the local authority would attempt to counter-balance its one-sided dependence by seeking alternative financial sources, or by drawing up a budget based on a number of other sources, and in this way, increase its autonomy with regard to determining and successfully implementing its policies. This raises certain questions which need to be considered and answered:

	Would it be correct to state that the more prosperous the municipal area, the lower its dependence would be on the central government?  
	Moreover, would a municipal area with a large concentration of enterprises owned by the local authority be more powerful?  
	Is there a connection between the internal revenue of the authority and the extent of its dependence? 
	Is there a link between the socio-economic status of the locality and its ability to generate this gap or another in implementing policy? 
	Is it true that the stronger the locality the wider the gap? 

It is reasonable to assume that in strong localities more will be invested in educational input, and consequently, there will be a gap in the level of education services between strong localities and the weak localities.

6. The historical background of the local authority (since the Ottoman Empire and during the British Mandate and particularly since the Direct Mayoral Election Law of 1975) reinforce its position, at least on the informal level, before the central government. It is believed that reinforced status of the local authority will allow it to deviate from government policy and generate a gap in budgetary policy implementation.


7. Central-local government relations in Israel is an inseparable part of the political, social, and economic reality in the State of Israel. The theoretical model views both government strata as strategic partners (by virtue of the circumstances).  This partnership relies on interdependence according to which the central government is incapable of executing its policy in crucial spheres without assistance from the local government (particularly in the field of education), just as local government cannot evade assistance from the centre, and this apparently has implications on the local authority’s budgetary dependency on the central government, on determining municipal education budget policy and on possible gaps in implementing the policy.

8. Tools for achieving policy aims – are there suitable tools (budget, enforcement, time tables, adapting the organizational structure, division of authority in the organization, feedback and evaluation) for implementing the policy, which display commitment on the part of the policy makers to achieve their defined objectives.  If the tools are unsuitable or are not used       partially or in their entirety, it is reasonable to assume that this will have bearings on the gap in policy implementation.

9. The increasing tendency of the local authorities’ residents to view the  local authority as a main entity that must handle all the educational issues within the authority’s jurisdiction, causes the mayor of the local educational authority  and/or the holder of the education portfolio to be more involved in education budget management.  These elected  representatives will do all in their power to justify their election and will  make a special effort to succeed in education and infrastructure, in procuring equipment and mainly in increasing the scholastic achievement level within the authority.  Therefore, they will consciously be prepared to journey into budgetary deficits in education (based on the theoretical model which indicates that the local authority operates as an elected politica unit that comprehends its residents’ needs and is responsible to  (them).

10.  Presumably, one may associate the educational input volume with the educational by-products (i.e. Scholastic and educational achievements). The more budgetary capacity the local authority possesses (and the  higher its awareness of the importance of education) the more it will invest in the range of educational services in the locality, whereby more educational output will be obtained. There may be many more factors involved in the link between educational input (financial resources) and scholastic output (scholastic achievements), however this research does not purport to investigate these factors, but rather to examine whether there is a statistical link between them or not.  The examination of the above factors constitutes the basis for an additional research in this field.






























Chapter 15: The Conceptual Framework

These eleven assumptions can be grouped within four separate categories:
1) The Legal Framework – this aspect refers to the laws and amendments that define the central-local authority relations with regard to financing the local education system.

2) The historical background – this aspect refers to the historical background prior to the establishment of the state, up until today, that has influenced the two government strata and shaped them.

3)  The socio-economic status of local authorities – this aspect refers to the characteristics of the local authority from the point of view of its size, ethnic composition, socio-economic strength and municipal status.

4) The political-professional relations – this category refers to the characteristics of the professional and political relationship between the two government strata.

These categories represent theoretical perspectives on my research topic and are the conceptual framework through the way in which they collectively interrelate. This is shown in Figure15: 1: Conceptual Framework, where each assumption is shown against its respective category, (see next page).

The conceptual framework enabled the emergence of the central themes in the form of questions – in a questionnaire and in-depth interview.  In this sense, the conceptual framework was a guiding framework providing direction; this was not just "plunging in" without any preparation, nor was it embarking on an adventure without any previous knowledge - by virtue of the subject-related knowledge accumulated and by virtue of the theoretical knowledge compiled.

















The research shall review the impact of the above four categories on the formation of a budgetary gap and the resulting effect on scholastic achievements. This conceptual framework provides a theoretical focus upon the research area, and a background from which to derive performance indicators for the purpose of measurement.  In this way theory can be tested and 'fact' can be ascertained within the design of the research.

To do this I decided to plan the research in two stages, where Stage 1 represented a broad examination of the research area through reading relevant documents from which questions were derived for testing in the public domain.  The outcome from this stage enabled me in Stage 2 of my research, to meet key informants whose evidence supplemented that which had appeared in Stage 1. Thus, evidence from these two Stages extended my understanding of the research topic, and enabled me to answer the research questions. The two stages enabled me to answer the research hypotheses in the chapter on the research findings analysis. The findings analysis encompassed sustaining or failure to sustain the hypotheses by introducing data that was processed as a result of the first stage (archival documents and questionnaires) in conjunction with the remarks of the interviewees (which were compiled at the second stage of the data collection).  










Chapter 16: Research Design

My research design contained two stages in order to collect data in a cumulative way. Stage 1 focused upon assembling hard data, whilst Stage 2 focused on live data and acted as a check upon Stage 1. Together these two Stages combined to address and answer my research questions. In Stage 1, I was concerned to collect hard data that was only to be found in the archives and documents of government.

 The outcome from this process gave me a stronger understanding of the topic from which I then designed a questionnaire for distribution in the public domain and to extend my base of hard data. These two forms of data collection provided different types of information. The documentary evidence included legal documents, central and local government policy statements, governmental budgetary information, national reports, Ministry committee minutes, various numeric data, official letters, plus daily and weekly newspapers. This latter item specifically included the statements made by the Mayors of municipalities (Haaretz newspaper,24 November 1992; Kol Hadarom,5 March 1993) about their respective educational budgets. 

The aim of the questionnaire was to collect comprehensive data at the municipal level to complement that of the governmental level. My (optimistic) intention was to seek responses from all local authorities in Israel. The questionnaire was designed to access information that could not be found in the documents at the national level of government. These two methods of data collection placed me in a detached relationship from my field work (Punch, 2002) due to their respective 'objective' form of design and administration.  

Stage 2 of my research involved interviewing key persons in the governmental system at the local and central level as well as some academics.  The purpose of this Stage was to explore personal opinions about the findings that were derived from the questionnaires, and to obtain the views of respondents on matters of policy and educational budgeting.  According to Punch,(2002) this form of data collection placed me in an involved and subjective relationship to my respondents due to the interactive process of interviewing.

Thus, my research design contained a search for both objective and subjective data combining together in a cumulative manner.  Because the topic for my research was in the national context, I decided that outcomes from it should be capable of generalisability.  This meant that the research approach had to be deductive and that hypotheses had to be developed that tested the assumptions which had emerged from my theoretical perspectives. In this way the conceptual framework has guided the research design and the selection of hypotheses

                                      
16.1-  Research Hypotheses

The conceptual framework formulated in the previous chapters constitutes the basis for the following research questions and hypotheses:

1.  Despite the dependency of the local authorities on the central government in education, there is a gap between the education policy of the central government in the area of education budgets and its implementation by the local authority. This hypothesis is based on the following assumptions: 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8

1.1 The larger the budgetary participation of the Ministry of Education in the local authority budget, the smaller the gap in implementing its policy.  This hypothesis is based on assumptions 5, 11

      2. The local authorities which differ in size, in socio-economic strength, in ethnic composition and in municipal status, will show differences in the level of the gap in implementing budgetary policy. This hypothesis is based on assumptions 5, 10

      3. The more involved the mayor of a local authority is in education system budget management, the greater the gaps in implementing budgetary policy. This hypothesis is based on assumption 9.

4. Effective external and internal supervision and control processes on education budget management in the local authority will lead to a reduced gap in the implementation of the education budgetary policy.  This hypothesis is based on assumption 4.

4.1 In strong cities, from a socio-economic perspective, the supervision and control processes will be less effective and in these cities the gap in implementation of budgetary policy will increase. This sub-hypothesis is based on assumption 4.

5. The greater the gap in implementing the budgetary policy the higher the level of scholastic achievement, and vice versa. This hypothesis is based on assumption 10. 

The current research will examine the link between the four independent variables and the two dependent variables and will attempt to provide answers to three questions:

a.  What are the components of the education budget policy as it is determined by the central government (Ministry of Education)?

b. What are the sources of the gap (if such exist) between policy and implementation?





16.2-  Presentation of the variables
               
Independent Variables:

1. The amount of resources earmarked for education, which the central government places at the disposal of the local authority (out of the local authority’s total education budget).

 This factor reflects the differing concepts of the centre and the periphery as regards the local authorities’ educational needs.This variable is to examine the financial manifestation of the government budgetary policy of the municipal education system. The scope of government funding is purported to have an influence on the municipal education deficit volume and on the scholastic achievements in the specific authority. The greater the extent of government funding, the lower the local education budget deficit volume and vice versa.  Greater government funding reflects greater dependence of the local authority on government funds.

2. The socio-economic status of the local authority: the local authority’s social-economic status as classified by the Ministry of the Interior in accordance with the Ministry’s 1995 revision thereof. This variable examines the socio-economic status of the local authorities. The socio-economic status of the local authority is purported to have an influence on its education budget deficit volume and on the scholastic achievements of its students.  The higher the cluster of the local authority the greater the deficit, as the local authority will have the ability to accumulate alternative funds and consciously go into a budget deficit.

3.  Local authority education expenditure supervision and control:
- External control by the Ministries of Interior and Education.
- Internal control by the local authority itself.
	This variable examines the effectiveness of the external and internal supervision and control processes on the local authority education budget management. The nature of the supervision and control processes (effective or ineffective as they may be) are purported to influence the education budget deficit volume and the scholastic achievement level.  The more effective they are in the opinion of the relevant entities, the lower the deficit will be, and vice versa.  Strong local authorities, from a socio-economic point of view, that are less dependent on government funding will, to a certain degree, overlook government supervision and consciously go into a budget deficit. 

4. The extent of involvement of the Head of the Local Authority and/or the person in charge of the education portfolio in decisions and issues concerning the education budget, and his willingness to allow a larger deficit in the education budget. The Head of the Local Authority’s involvement in formulating an education budget is also gauged by the releasing of monies and the raising of funds for education from alternative sources.

This variable examines how the involvement of elected representatives influences the extent of the gap in policy implementation. The degree of involvement of the local authority head and/or holder of the education portfolio is purported to influence the deficit volume and the scholastic achievement level.  The more involved the local authority head and/or holder of the education portfolio is in education, the more will be invested in educational input (particularly financial resources) and the authority will consciously go into an education budget deficit.


 The dependent variables:

1. The policy implementation gap = the percentage of the disparity between the approved budget and its actual implementation (the percentage of the budget surplus or deficit) by the local authority.

This variable examines the deficit volume in budgetary policy implementation (deficit volume in municipal education budget).

2.  The locality’s scholastic achievements – 1999 matriculation exam results. This variable examines the scholastic achievement level in the locality in 1999, gauged by the percentage of the local authority’s students who succeeded in the matriculation exams in 1999. 

In the first section of the research, the budgetary gap is a dependent variable, in terms of the theoretical overview and the emerging findings.  In the second section, the gap variable indeed undergoes a transformation from a dependent variable to an independent variable of matriculation achievements.









































The operative model of the research is derived from the theoretical model described above and it focuses primarily on section 6, which delineates the local authority, comprised of different and separate units  {which differ in their municipal status – (municipality, local council and regional council), ethnic composition (Jewish and non-Jewish), size and socio-economic status} that have unequal access to education resources and an unequal scope of education services provided to their residents.
This is an explanatory study and not a definitive study. It provides an initial exploration of the fact that the gap in the local authority’s implementation of the education budgetary policy (the education budget deficit) explains the correlation with scholastic achievements and that the “extent of freedom” which the state grants the local authority (to exceed budgets) elucidates the gap and hence the scholastic achievements. The operative model will examine the link between the four independent variables and the two dependent variables.


























Chapter 17: Research Methodology

The methodology chapter deals in the construction and implementation of research tools to be used in the research process.  Similarly, the chapter describes the methods and processes used to collect data.
This chapter includes the following sub-chapters:
17.1  The methodology.
17.2  The Sample




17.4   Validity and Focus Group.
17.5   The Statistical  Processing.
17.6   Reliability.
17.7  Triangulation.
17.8  The ethical perspective of the research.





Following what has been said in chapter 13, the methodology selected must be appropriate for the research subject, as well as suited to the subjects from whom the data is to be collected. This “matching” is comprised of three aspects:

a. The data collection method used must provide the same kind of data required to examine the research hypotheses (general budgets and budgets relevant to the sphere of education in the local authorities and their connection to the government’s financing policy with regard to education within the local authorities).

b. An additional objective of the methodology is to provide data to enable the formation of generalisations.

c. The methodology selected suits the characteristics of the subjects from whom the data was collected. This involves professionals in the field of municipal education administration in Israel and professional officials from central and local government institutions in Israel who usually speak in the same professional language.

The creation of this suitability is optimally acquired by combining two research paradigms( see chapter 13), the positivist paradigm and the phenomenological paradigm (the paradigm as a representative term – an outlook on life, relevant values, and beliefs and creates a procedural framework for examining phenomena), i.e.: a combination of the quantitative method and the qualitative method in the data collection process.  Providing answers to research questions required numerical data, however it was also necessary to express personal and sector-related standpoints that reflected on philosophies, interests, etc(see appendixes 11 and 12).

17.2	The Sample
This chapter includes the following details:
	Information on the research population.
	Information on the sampling strategy.

1.	The research population includes 262 education department directors in the local authorities in Israel, to whom the questionnaires were sent in the mail.  This population is to provide the required data in order to answer the research questions and hypotheses.  This population encompasses 147 local councils, 53 regional councils and 62 municipalities. Similarly, the sample was weighted according to the distributions of the municipal status of the local authorities in the country (regional councils, local councils and municipalities), according to the type of population – Jewish or non-Jewish (see Appendix no. 3), and according to additional parameters, such as the socio-economic position of the local authorities in the sample within three groups of clusters (according to the Ministry of the Interior index – 1 represents the weakest localities and 10 the strongest.  The groups are clusters 1-4, 5-7, and 8-10) and according to the size of the locality (all local authorities in the sample were divided into three groups of localities of up to 20,000 inhabitants, localities with 20,001-90,000 inhabitants and localities that had over 90,000 inhabitants).


The sample included 36 local authorities that responded to the questionnaire that was sent (see Appendix no. 7) as stated to all local authorities throughout the country (numbering 262 in 1997); the limited size of the sample and the fact that it was not I who selected it, called, as previously mentioned, for the exercise of caution regarding the general application of the research findings to all local authorities in Israel.

While processing the findings, an attempt was made to find the link between the independent variables and the dependent variables in each one of the above parameters (municipal status, Jewish and non-Jewish sector, size of the local authority, its socio-economic status), however the limited scope of the sample, in many cases, did not allow me to obtain the clear link between the variables, aside from the same cases that will be cited further on. 

A limited sample calls for a high correlation and thus the examination of the existing links between the variables in each one of the above mentioned parameters requires a larger sample than any one of them. This provides the challenge to conduct future research on this subject (with a larger sample). It is highly significant that there was an unprecedented collection and exposure of detailed and original data in this research that was obtained from people in key positions relevant to this research topic.   During the processing of the findings there was considerable use of data that was collected with questionnaires (see Appendix no. 10).

The following are several distributions of the sample according to the aforesaid parameters:

Table 17.2.1: The distribution of the local authorities according to their municipal status
 









Table 17.2.2: The  sample distribution according to Jewish sector/non-Jewish sector parameter









Table 17.2.3: A. sample distribution according to clusters (socio-economic status)














Average cluster of the sample – 5.72


Table 17.2.4: A sample distribution according to cluster groups







Note: One locality was not yet defined and it constitutes 2.8% of the sample


Table 17.2.5: A sample distribution according to local authority size groups

% of sample	Number of authorities	Affiliation group
41.7	15	Up to 20,000 inhabitants
33.3	12	20,000-90,000 inhabitants
22.2	8	90,000   inhabitants and up

Note: one new undefined locality constitutes 2.8% of the sample.

Part IV- will discuss the research findings analysis with regard to the processing of the questionnaire findings and interviews.


b. Sampling Strategy 


In research there are usually two main sampling methods (Schofield, 1996; Cohen & Halliday, 1979, 1982, 1996). The researcher must decide whether to use a probability sampling or non-probability sampling. The probability sampling uses randomisation and enables the calculation of a sampling error, and consequently, an estimation of the possible diversions.  In a probability sampling, one may construct representative samples of the population and as a result have the possibility of applying generalisations from the sample to the population.

In a non-probability sampling, representative samples cannot be obtained, it is impossible to calculate sampling errors, and therefore, one cannot generalise either.  The sampling strategy that was selected in this research is, at the initial stage, a probability sampling.  A mailed questionnaire was sent to 262 education department directors in the local authorities.  In actuality, 36 responded to the questionnaire in full.  The limited scope of the answers limited the possibilities of generalising, and to a certain degree, impaired the external validity (the researcher using the mailed questionnaire, is almost always confronted by the problem of how to assess the impact those who didn’t respond could have had – on the research results).

In light of this drawback of the sample, and in order to collect more data, the need arose to use a non-probability sampling (purposive), and to directly refer to the subjects holding key positions who could provide essential information for the research objectives. For this purpose, interviews were conducted with 15 people (holding key positions in the local authorities, each of a different nature, in government offices in the local government and in the academia).  This involves the combination of two types of sampling – quota and dimensional.

The objective of the interviews was to receive personal feedback on the quantitative results from the questionnaire processing, and which was presented to the interviewees, as well as to receive an updated picture on the spectrum of opinions, outlooks, and interests of the professionals relevant to the research hypotheses and its questions, and to validate the results that were obtained from the questionnaire processing. The choice of combining two strategies emerged from the criterion of adaptation to the research objectives and limits, the research methodology, the data collection method, and research constraints.

17.3	The Procedure – Instrumentation and Data Collection
 
The data collection process in this research was based on the need for diverse data (for receiving answers to research questions) including, facts, numbers, attitudes, comparison of answers and results on the subject of budgets in the local authorities, budget gaps in the field of education; and likewise, data providing information on the government policy regarding budgeting of the school system in local government. In other words, the triangulation method was used, i.e. questionnaires, interviews, and government documents.  Initially, there was a need for numerical data, and therefore questionnaires were used (which passed a focus group test).   However, in order to verify the data that was collected from the local authorities that were investigated, there was a need to collate them with data that was collected from government documents (that included financial reports of the Local Government Centre, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Education).






Attached is the flow chart of the data collection process.

Figure 17.3: Instrumentation and data collection process.





















The questionnaire is the most prevalent and efficient tool in collecting data through surveys. It provides structured data, sometimes numerical data, which can be carried out in the researcher’s absence, and may also be compared (Wilson & McLean, 1994). The brief pre-research questionnaire included 6 sections only (with open-ended and closed questions).  The objective of this questionnaire was to receive general initial feedback on research questions and hypotheses.  It included an estimate of the data (in percentages), but not exact data. Therefore no special effort is required of the respondents to fill it out.

	Subsequent to the receipt of feedback in the wake of processing the preliminary questionnaires, a meeting was held with the focus group, numbering 5 people, who figure among the education department directors, where a discussion was held on planning the desired questionnaire. The questionnaire was delivered to a focus group numbering 5 people with experience in the research topic and in preparing questionnaires, in order to obtain their assessment on the questionnaire structure and the clarity of the questions.  The final wording received their approval. This questionnaire was constructed while referring to the needs, questions and data required in order to accomplish the current research objectives. This is a semi-structured questionnaire, including 34 closed questions and 3 open-ended questions.  At the initial stage of the questionnaire planning, it was effective to use the flow chart technique, in order to arrange a series of questions.

	The operationalising process is a process, which takes a general objective or a series of objectives and transforms them into concrete research fields, for which data may be collected (Wilson & McLean, 1994). In a questionnaire sent to the local authorities, a (brief) introductory letter was enclosed explaining the importance of the research form the point of view of central-local government relations in Israel in the education budget framework, and from a professional and personal point of view of each one of the respondents (the beneficence aspect).

 As stated in the introduction, the research was conducted at a time when the investigator was serving in a public role as the Chairperson of the education department directors union in the local government.  It is safe to assume that this fact had some kind of an effect on the respondents, which will be hard to measure.  It was clear to the respondents that the investigator has no interest in focusing on the micro (the local authority itself), but on the macro (the entire country), and in obtaining the picture of the national status with regard to the research. The researcher considered evading damage, maintaining confidentiality and anonymity, and was mindful of the sensitivity of the questions when the questionnaire was formulated.

	The typical percentage of answers to the mail survey ranges from 20-40 percent. The percentage of respondents in this research comes to 13% only, so that the researcher almost always confronts the problem of how to estimate the potential influence of those who didn’t respond on the research findings themselves, and if the distribution of their answers was identical to those who responded to the questionnaire (Belson, 1986).

The problem of the lack of response (the voluntary bias according to Belson) can in part be inspected and controlled, particularly when the postal questionnaire is sent on a continuous basis.  This includes the continued contact with the non-respondents by inviting them for an interview.  Hudson and Miller (1997) proposed several strategies in order to increase the response to postal questionnaires, such as: attaching stamped self-addressed envelopes, making several “rounds” for follow-up and to request answers, emphasizing the beneficial factor in filling out a questionnaire, for the group and the individual, providing interim data for those who didn’t respond to the questionnaires in order to recruit them for research, accompanying the questionnaire with a personal telephone call, addressing people personally in writing and not generally, inviting people for a follow-up interview (in a face to face conversation or over the phone), encouraging the participation of a third party, who is friendly and above all, awareness as to the characteristics of the questionnaire itself (the ability to fill it out, the time it takes to fill out, the sensitivity of the questions, the length of the questions, etc.).

There are several possible and relevant reasons for the limited number of respondents, which are related primarily to the questionnaire characteristics:

1)  The questionnaire was perhaps too long.

2) The questionnaire required an effort and time on the part of the respondents due to the amount of data required.

3) The questionnaire required knowledge of the budget books of the local authority and not every education department director has knowledge of these books.

4) Some of the education department directors needed help from the treasurer or a finance person in order to locate budgetary data.  They didn’t always succeed in getting help (in at least three cases I was told by an education department director that the treasurer would not give him data and so he could not fill out the questionnaire).

5) Personal fear of exposing lack of knowledge or familiarity with the subject of the questionnaire. 

6) Potential fear of possible damage in exposing data and revealing personal attitudes regarding the subject.

7) The investigator, apparently, did not make sufficient effort in the area of follow-up and handling the problem of the lack of response.

The limited scope of the sample restricted possibilities of obtaining valid results with regard to the sub-groups (municipalities, local councils and regional councils, or Jewish authorities as opposed to non-Jewish authorities), but it did facilitate obtaining relatively valid correlations with regard to the sample in its entirety (36 authorities). The objective of using interviews in the data collection process was to assist the investigator in overcoming weaknesses that emanate from the lack of response, which may introduce a significant bias in the findings (Nahmias and Nahmias, 1998).

Structure of the Preliminary Questionnaire and the Final Questionnaire-

Preliminary Questionnaire- 
The preliminary questionnaire (consisting of closed and open-ended questions) includes 6 sections according to the following break down:

1. The general part includes two questions:
a) How many pupils are there in the school system in the locality in the year 1998?
b) Is there a worker in the education department who deals with budget items, aside from the department director?
2. Gap between the budget and the implementation (with regard to budgets 1996 and 1997).
3. Involvement of the head of the authority and/or the person in charge of the education portfolio.
4. Budgetary autonomy of the education department.
5. Budgetary control.
6. Suggestions for improvement (see appendix 6).

Final Questionnaire
The questionnaire is a combination of a closed questionnaire and a questionnaire with open-ended questions.  The questionnaire (see appendix 7) consists of questions that may be divided into the following categories:

1. Background variables which characterise the local authority: the size of the locality, the type of authority from the municipal point of view (local council, regional council, town), type of population (Jewish, non-Jewish), rank of the socio-economic level of the authority according to the Ministry of Interior.  Education budget-related questions for the year 1997 (to obtain data referring to the research variables).

2. Questions regarding the area of involvement of the head of the authority and/or the person in charge of the education portfolio in the education budgets.
3. Budgetary supervision and control – to what extent were supervision and control processes carried out in 1997 regarding education-related expenses paid by the following entities: the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Interior, the local authority, and the education department.
4. Closed questions relating to the possible reasons for the discrepancy in implementing the education budget in 1997 (gap between the approved budget and its implementation), if such a discrepancy exists.
5. Particulars of the education department director, including: education, tenure, and previous position.





The interview allows participants to talk about their interpretation of the world in which they live and through their perceptions, to illustrate certain situations from their viewpoint.  From this point of view, the interview is not only for collecting data about life, but rather it is part of life.  The human combination is inevitable. Cicourel (1964) argues that no matter how much the interviewee tries to be methodical and objective, the limitations of life will be part of the interpersonal biases that are generated. Kerlinger (1970) suggest using the interview in the wake of unforeseen results, for example, or in order to validate other methods or to delve into the motives of the respondents and explain their answers.

The interview used in this research is a standard open-ended interview (see appendix 13). This type of interview facilitates a comparison between respondents with regard to all the identical questions similarly, it leads to fewer biases and makes it easier to arrange and process data.  This type of interview contributes to the integration (triangulation) in the various research tools; in this case, with the questionnaire results and the archival documents. The decision to use the standard open-ended interview in this research made it easier to address Kvale’s seven stages (1996), and to plan the interview (specification of objectives, editing, implementation, rewriting, analysis, verification and reporting).













The flow chart of the interview was as follows (see: appendix 8):
Figure 17.3.2.2: The flow chart of the Interview

particulars open-ended question regarding the education budget policy


reference to the research results ( with regard to the questionnaire results)


reference to the causes for the discrepancy in the implementation of the education budget in the local authorities (based on questionnaire results)


open-ended question regarding suggestions for changing the situation

The interviews were one to two hours long.  16 out of 17 interviews were conducted in the offices of the interviewees and one of the interviews was held in my office (the interview with the Director of the Education Division in the Tel Aviv Municipality, who is currently the Director of the Ministry of Education).    I was personally acquainted with all the interviewees by virtue my position as Chairman of the Union of Education Dept. Directors, with the exception of the representative of the Ministry of Finance, whom I met for the first time.  She struck me as being very courteous and straightforward.

I was personally familiar with the interviewees.  One interview was recorded (since one of the interviewees found it difficult to formulate his responses).  In all other interviews, recording didn`t  take place during the interview.Following the interviews, there was clear rewriting (provided the things that were said were still “fresh”). The interview analysis method is a combination of the content analysis and seeking patternship of responses.  The content of the main interview responses is analyzed in order to demonstrate consistent patterns in the analysis. The analysis of the first 15 interviews took three factors into account:

a. The division of the interviewees into 8 sub-groups, according to their work place, and their positions (directors of education departments, representatives of the local government, representatives of the Ministry of Finance, a representative of the Ministry of Education, a representative of the Ministry of Interior, a representative of the municipal advisors, a representative of the economic and financial sector, and the academia).

b.  Having each sub-group address all the questions in the interview.





17.3.3  Archival documents-






17.4	Validity  and Focus Group-	

The questionnaire as a research tool received its criterion-related validity upon examining the connection between the independent variables (the Ministry of Education’s share in the financing of education in the local authorities, a socio-economic feature of the local authority, internal and external supervision and control processes, involvement of the head of the authority and/or the person in charge of the education portfolio in the local authority in education budgets, scholastic achievements in the locality) and the dependent variables – the discrepancy in implementing policy, i.e.; education budget deficit. An indication of the coefficient of the validity of any such connection, points out the questionnaire’s degree of validity.The sample’s disadvantage (its limited scope) to a certain extent, affects the possibility of applying the results to all local authorities and therefore caution must be exercised not to make such a generalisation. 

The questionnaire is characterised by apparent validity, after having been examined in the focus group. The focus groups by Morgan & Krueger (1998), are effective for the following objectives:
1) To aim towards one focus field.
2) To develop subjects, flow charts for interviews and questions.
3) To generalise hypotheses which derive from the group.
4) To generalise and evaluate data of sub-groups in the population.
5) To collect feedback from previous studies.
6) To conduct triangulation with traditional forms of interviews, questionnaires and observations.

The diversification of interviewees (17) representing incumbents holding key positions from various local authorities (of different sizes), government ministries (Finance, Interior, Education), the local government authority, municipal advisors and academia – is intended to facilitate more external validation of the results obtained from the questionnaires and to neutralise the limitations of the questionnaire to a certain extent. The subjects widely vary, representing different interests and different outlooks on life. The investigator looked for bias in the interviews, because this was not a theoretical question, but rather one that divulged interests.
The interview has apparent validity after having undergone a process of expert judgement, which is related to external judgement.  This is associated with some of my colleagues in the local authorities, in the academe and in the focus groups who have had experience in academic research and who gave their opinion on the structure of the interview from a personal perspective.  In this context, we may refer to the words of Goran (1977), who argued that expert judgement may be received personally or in a group, and that an expert or a group of experts may be interviewed together, or one may receive a structured or informal opinion in writing.

17.5	 The statistical processing-

The statistical processing was done on SPSS, and included distributions of variables, averages, standard deviations, Pearson correlations, to examine the connection between the various variables and the education budget deficit, t tests for independent samples to examine the differences between the deficit groups and to analyse one-directional variation to examine the differences between the deficit groups.
                          
 17.6    Reliability –

In the course of the study, there were no scales or summed up variables.  Likewise, the number of interviews does not enable analysis and accord among the judges; therefore, there is no report of the degree of reliability.
                       
17 .7    Triangulation –
 
Triangulation is defined as the use of two or three data collection methods during the study of the different aspects of human behaviour.  The complexity of human behaviour forces social scientists to examine it from different aspects in qualitative and quantitative data.
The triangulation that pertains to this study is methodological triangulation – in the research tool and the data collection process (questionnaires, interviews, and government documents).  The triangulation was obtained, as stated, once the investigator arrived at the interviews with questionnaire results, with the numerical data being cross-compared with the government documents. This triangulation is designed to cope with the disadvantages of the sample (limited sample and the existing restrictions in its generalisation). In the empirical research the triangulation in the data collection referred as stated, to research questions and the analysis appears below.
                       
The following is the empirical research analysis:

Table 17.7.1: The triangulation in the data collection

Question	IInterviews	QQuestionnaires	DEArchival documents
1	Government policy for municipal education system budget	40%	10%	50%
2	Gap in policy implementation	10%	70%	20%
3	Reasons for gap	30%	30%	40%

According to this analysis in the first question –the data collected from government documents and interviews bore greater significance. In the second question, the questionnaires bore greater significance, and in the third question there was more or less of a balance between the three sources.  The triangulation facilitated, as mentioned, the receipt of comprehensive answers to the research questions and the collation of statistics and data.  In the chapter on the research findings analysis, we will make integrative use of the findings that were collected from all sources.


17.8    The ethical perspective of the research-

 All the subjects in the research agreed to take part.  Their consent was received verbally, with regard to their full consent to fill out the questionnaire and participate in the interview (informed consent). The research objectives and the possible results were clarified to the participants. They were promised to receive a research summary (upon its conclusion) and if possible a complete copy.






As part of the attempt to grapple with possible biases and to ensure that the interviewees would speak the truth (authenticity), the investigator created a pleasant and friendly atmosphere in the interviews, and clarified the research objectives and the result applications to the interviewees. The investigator made an effort to conduct the interviews with caution and sensitivity.  Kvale (1996:147) argued that the investigator is the research instrument. 







































Part  IV: PRESENTATION OF RESULTS






General analysis of the research findings. 








Chapter 18:  Processing of Questionnaire and Analysis of Results

The research examined the connection between the following (independent) variables: Size of the locality, type of locality and its social-economic status, percentage of the total Ministry of Education budget allocated to financing the locality’s school system, external and internal authority education budgets supervision and control processes, involvement of the head of the authority and/or the person in charge of the education portfolio, as compared to the budgetary deficit or surplus in the education budgets as well as the level of scholastic achievements (the percentage of eligibility for matriculation exams) as dependent variables. In order to examine the connection between the independent variables and the dependent variables, a regression will be carried out.














The following figure (18.1) presents the correlations between the independent and dependent variables:
































The following are the research results relating to the correlation between the independent variables and the dependent variables (see appendix number 10):

1.  A negative link was found between the level budgeted by the Ministry of Education and the education budget deficit volume(r=-0.841, p<0.001).In other words, the greater the share of the Ministry of Education in the education expenditure of the local authority, the smaller the deficit and vice versa.

With regard to sectors(Jewish and non-Jewish) it was found that the above correlation is greater in the non Jewish sector (F(1,33)=10.091,p<0.03), meaning that the Ministry of Education’s share is greater in the non-Jewish sector and this correlation is clear in the context of the socio-economic status of the local authority as well. In other words, the lower its position in the cluster (low socio-economic status), the greater the share of the Ministry of Education (F (2,32)=9.339,p<0.01). Concerning the size of the authority it may be said that there is a tendency toward differences between the authorities in term of their size, with the share of the Ministry of Education being greater in mid-sized and small authorities (F(2,32)=3.254,p<0.052). There was no clear correlation evident between the share of the Ministry of Education and the municipal status of the local authority.






3.  There is no correlation between the involvement of the Head of the local authorities and/or the holder of the education portfolio and the education budget deficit volume of the local authority. No such correlation was found with regard to the parameters mentioned in the previous sections (size, sector, municipal status and socio-economic status of the locality),

4.  There is no correlation between the supervision and control processes and the education budget deficit volume of the local authorities (also with regard to the parameters of size, municipal status, sector and socio-economic status).

5. A significant negative correlation between the share of the Ministry of Education of the local authority and the scholastic achievements level(r=-0.047,p<0.028). There is a significant correlation between the socio-economic status of the local authority and the level of scholastic achievements in the locality(r=0.699,p<0.001). This finding was reinforced by the parameter of Jewish and non-Jewish sector. The scholastic achievements level in the Jewish sector is 55.04% opposed to 48.55% in the non-Jewish sector.

In the parameter of the authority size it was fond that in mid-sized authorities (20000 to 90000 inhabitants) there is a correlation between the socio-economic status and the scholastic achievements level(r=0.646,p<0.023). In the parameter of socio-economic status, it was found that the level achievements is higher in the higher clusters(F(2,21)=8.922,p<0.002).It also emerged that the smaller the local authority, the higher scholastic achievements level.(F(2,21)=3.599,p<0.045).
	
There was no correlation between the involvement of the head of the authority and/or holder of the education portfolio and the scholastic achievements level (in all the parameters). There was no correlation between the supervision and control processes and the scholastic achievements level.






























     Chapter 19: Processing Interviews and Analysis of results

a. Education department representatives figured among the questionnaire respondents, according to the following categories:
         	
Big city.





Interviews were conducted with representatives of the Local Government Council,Central Government,Academe , Senior Municipal Advisor and Coordinator of the Dovrat Committee.

Deputy Director of the Council and Education Supervisor.
	Deputy Director of the Economic Division.
           Deputy Director of the Economy and Finance Society, formerly the Director General of the Economic Division of the local government.
	Representative of the Ministry of Interior – Local Authority Education Budgets Supervisor.
	Deputy Director of the Ministry of Education and Budget Supervisor.
           Legal Adviser  of the Ministry of Education( Central District).
           Coordinator of Dovrat National  Committee.
	Representative of the Ministry of Finance, Local Authority Budgets Supervisor.
	Former Ministry of Finance official, currently the Comptroller of the Economy and Finance Society.
	Senior Municipal Advisor in the field of education budgets.

Interviews were conducted with members of the academe in the field of research:

Senior lecturer at Bar-Ilan University.
Researcher and advisor on public administration and local 
     government (former director of the Finance and Budget
     Division of the Ministry of Interior).

The first 15  interviews were comprised of the following sections (see Appendix no. 8):

a. Interviewee particulars (name, job, seniority).
b. Open ended question on the local authority education budget policy components of the Ministries of Education and Interior.
c. Reference to the research results subsequent to the statistical analysis of the questionnaires.
d. Reference to the factors responsible for the gap in implementing the education budget policy in the local authorities, based on the questionnaire analysis.
e. Question regarding the proposal for a change in status in education budget in the local authorities to be introduced by the Ministries of Education and Interior.

The sixtteenth  interview  was conducted with the Coordinator of the Dovrat committee.It comprised  four  open-ended  questions on the ambiguity in the allocation of state and local resources and  how it impacts  the creation of gaps in the budgeting of the education system in the authorities and does the relationship between central government have an effect on gaps in budgeting of the education system in the local authorities.

The  seventeenth   interview was conducted with the Legal Adviser  of the Ministry of Education( Central District).It comprised two open-ended questions on the ambiguity in the education legislation and its impact on
the budgeting of the education system in the local authorities.     
                                                                                                                             
                                                                                                   
                                                                
19.1	Interview Results Analysis-
 
The interview analysis method is a combination of the content analysis and seeking patternship of responses.  The content of the main interview responses is analyzed in order to demonstrate consistent patterns in the analysis. 17 senior incumbents in the Ministries of Education ( including the coordinator of Dovrat Committee), Interior and Finance, the Local Authorities Council, the Economy and Finance Society, education department directors in the local authorities and academics were interviewed (several complete interviews appear in Appendix no. 11).   It was essential to clarify their positions and comments on the research results in order to complete the academic discussion regarding the research results.  It also served as a backdrop for determining practical recommendations, that not only need to take into account the attitudes involved in the actions, but perhaps may even be influenced by them.

Almost complete agreement prevailed among the interviewees regarding the facts and even regarding the need for a reform in the area of education budgeting in the local authorities.  The report on the main points emerging from the first 15  interviews is arranged firstly according to the respondent groups and then in relation to all the interviewees. The interviewees’ positions will focus on four areas (The interviewees’ comments did not always encompass these four areas). 


	The school system budgeting policy within the local authority of the Ministries of Education and Interior.
	Commentary on the research results (based on the questionnaires).
	Commentary on the factors causing the gap in implementing the budgeting policy.





The following are the comments of various incumbents:

The attitudes of education department directors in local authorities (Tel Aviv Municipality, Or-Yehuda Municipality, Regional Council of the Modi’in District, Local Council of Zichron Yaakov, Local Council of Abu Gosh)-  I am personally acquainted with all the interviewees, the interview was conducted in their offices, with the exception of the Education Authority Director of the Municipality of Tel Aviv who consented to come to my office in Givat Shmuel.  The interviews were conducted at ease and with candor. I used a tape recorder in Abu Gosh only.
	
The policy of the Ministry of Education does not take into account the needs and preferences of the local authority.  It cannot be argued that a budgeting policy exists, but rather that there are agreements between the local government and the Ministry of Education regarding the budgeting indices of various fields. (Such as janitors, secretaries, lab technicians, assistants, education institution construction, etc.).  The study hours are transferred directly to the schools.  The budgeting indices (including the matching method) that exist are to the detriment of the local authorities and lead to under-budgeting of the school system; as a result an education budget deficit is generated in the local authorities.

The education department directors were of the opinion that there is insufficient transparency in transferring education budgets (because there are still local authorities which for historical reasons do not receive funding beyond the above indices, either because of personal ties between incumbents in the local authority and in the Ministry of Education, or because of the heightened awareness of what may be obtained from the Ministry of Education).  As stated by the Education Authority Director of the Tel Aviv Municipality: “There is a lot of negotiating.  If you don’t ask for something you won’t get it, you need connections, professional strength to demand”.  Furthermore, it was stated that the Minister of Education does not implement what I requested of him by law (the Compulsory Education Law article 7 b): 
“…The Minister, in consulting with the Minister of Interior, will determine in an ordinance that will be published in the gazettes regarding each school year and each local authority, the percentage of the state’s and the local authority’s participation….”

 The minister is evasive and does not do what is obligated by law.  The Ministry of Education advocates an obscure policy in order to place a budgetary burden on the local authority.  The law will facilitate a standard of comparison between local authorities. Failure to announce the policy obstructs public discussion regarding the issue.  The ministry’s policy is the lack of policy. The ministry’s “policy” reflects the existing power relations in society and not the intentions of the legislator.  There is a situation of obscuring the policy in order to benefit strong populations, and over the years there has not been structural change in the school system.

	Usually there is agreement with and understanding of the research results.  There was a certain surprise at the section which states that there is no connection between the head of the authority and/or of the person in charge of the education portfolio and the magnitude of the education budget deficit.  The Education Department Director in the local council of Abu Gosh was not particularly surprised and asserted:
 “It is less surprising that a deficit is engendered due to system constraints, this cannot be avoided.  What occurs on the ground leads to deficit”.

The interviewees received and even argued the positive correlation between the local authority’s socio-economic status and the volume of the education budget deficit.  They asserted that when this involves a strong authority, parents have demands and expectation from the local authority and the local authority also has high exigencies of itself.

The positive correlation between the scope of the education budget deficit and the achievements on the matriculation exams further reinforced their opinion that expenses in the field of education are to be considered an investment, which ultimately yields positive results in the form of scholastic achievements. In this context, a representative of the Arab local authorities, stated that the Arab sector has been deprived for years by the Ministry of Education (especially in the field of construction), and this has an impact on scholastic achievements.  In his opinion, the Arab sector still gains no benefit from corrective discrimination (comparable to affirmative action); indeed areas were defined as areas in which corrective discrimination would be implemented, but in practice they do not receive what they need from the Ministry.

There was agreement regarding the factors accountable for the gap as they were presented in the research results.

Proposals for improving the status were as follows:

1) The government of Israel must decide if it is to undertake the responsibility for education (Free Compulsory Education Law).  In actuality this is not being carried out.
2) The share of the Ministry of Education and of the local authority must be predetermined; each side must implement and finance according to its responsibility.
3) Each local authority may invest more in accordance with its educational vision and its priorities, but the nucleus (the solid core) will be fully funded by the Ministry of Education.
4) Decentralisation – the Ministry of Education fears separation from the centres of power, hence it will not implement the decentralisation process very quickly.  The Ministry of Education must continue determining national policy and planning, setting standards and control and supervision processes.  The local authorities must be included in the planning stage in order to gather resources and consolidate thoughts.  Each partner should declare in advance its portion in the school system financing, and after budgeting the programs work may be started.  The school principals will operate and the supervisory body and the local authority will supervise.
These processes are designed to narrow the gap in budgeting of education in the local authorities.  The decentralisation in the school system must be implemented gradually.  In weak places one must allow the district to lead the way, and not immediately loosen the knot.  One of the proposals suggested by the Education Department Director in Zichron Yaakov: “Each local authority should have a representative in the Ministry of Education.  Each school year a local education program should be formulated with the representative in the Ministry of Education.  The program would be backed financially and the share of each party involved would be predetermined”.

      The position of the Local Authorities Council-
The interviews were conducted amicably in the Local Government Council.  I am well familiar with the two interviewees (Local Government Authority Deputy Director – Education Supervisor and Director of the Financial Department), who cooperated with me throughout the interview.  The following is a summary of their standpoints:

There is a tremendous gap between intentions and implementation.  If there would be a clear policy, it would be demonstrated in the budget.  For example, the affirmative action for the Arab sector – this is illustrated in the budget to a certain extent, but there is no determination, no energy.  There is no concerted effort in the Ministry.  The state does not provide the proper backing for implementing policy or laws (such as Extended School Day Law, Compulsory Education for 3-4 year olds, construction).  The state pays lip service to its policy, but it is a prisoner of the budget itself. The Ministry does not have a clear policy; the budget sets the tone.  The Ministry does not bring any new funds and is not wise enough to set priorities.  There is a quasi-policy situation, but no real attempt to formulate policy. 

 The grants given by the Ministry of Interior take the education budget deficit into account.  The local authority must demonstrate the disparities and the Ministry of Interior must provide grants according to its budgetary capacity.  The size of the grant does not resolve the gaps in education nor does it meet the needs of the local authority.  The grant is provided according to Swery formula (the socio-economic status of the authority and the budgetary capacity of the authority at the time).  The Ministry of Education is dependent upon the Ministry of Finance.  The question is why does the Ministry of Finance not appropriate funds in accordance with government policy and education laws (there is no proper budgeting of construction and infrastructure, natural expansion), the Extended School Day Law, the Compulsory Education Law for 3-4 year olds, etc.

The Council representatives received the research results and indicated that education should be viewed as an investment and not an expense, however it must be examined whether the local authority can continue functioning over time, when it has a deficit in the education budgets.  The income test is important.  Each authority must have a normative income base; an entity that knows how to invest, must also know how to collect, because one who collects a great deal – receives a great deal more in return (such as the education fee, government ministries, income from voluntary bodies, contributions, etc.).  

The true test of the local authority is in its capacity to accumulate resources from the population, hence the authority bears the right to invest of its own money in the field of education.  As far as supervision and control are concerned, the opinion is that this is a tool that serves its function only partially.  As regards the variable of the involvement of the head of the authority and/or the person in charge of the education portfolio, this result must be examined over time, because the elected representative carries a certain weight on this issue.

Factors accountable for the gap in implementing budgeting policy. In this section it was stated that the level of expectations of the residents play an important role.  The more pressure is exerted upon the elected representatives – the more the gap increases.  An additional reason is the authority’s failed management, the disregard for the method of collection.  Additional reasons raised by the Local Government Council Deputy Director are: “The gap stems from the perception of the heads of the authorities that the education services are not only state services, but also municipal services.  Geographical and topographical problems can affect the gap and do not facilitate flexibility in registration areas, pupil regulation, transportation, etc.”

	The authority budget must be balanced either by income or by grant (objective gap).  The state must assign itself tasks and the remaining tasks must be assigned to the local authority, subsequent to a review of needs.  The state must raise a tremendous amount of funds.  Prolonging the current situation will perpetuate the deficit.  The state must invest resources in education according to its real needs, in accordance with the principle of corrective preferential treatment.  There must be a differentiation in funding, a different foundation. An authority requiring support (has a high drop out rate and low achievements) must be financed more specifically.  The lack of decentralisation emanates from the lack of confidence, therefore all the proposals suggested by the Local Authorities Council are rejected.    The supervision and control mechanisms must be enforced.  Any solution that relegates responsibility to a local authority that does its job properly is a serious solution.   

Compulsory education services package must be determined in the law or the government policy (what a child is entitled to in kindergarten, primary school, secondary school, and high school).  This package will provide a supplement according to defined parameters (such as state-religious education, development areas, socio-economic status, neighbourhoods in distress, etc.).  A special package will also be determined for Special Education.  It is proposed that the service package not be determined according to national averages, but rather should be adjusted to each authority.  This does not involve a supplement in resources, but rather various calculation systems.  A profile of the local school system may be outlined.  In short – allocating the money to the authority without dictating the nature of the expense, but requiring the submittal of a report on the implementation plan.

	Ministry of Education Position –

The meeting was held in the office of the Budget Department Manager with whom I have become well acquainted on the job in the context of my position on the national level.  As per his request, the interview was not recorded.  He gave the impression that he identifies with the position of the Local Government Council pertaining to the budgeting of local education.

	Budgeting policy components as presented by the Deputy Director of the Ministry of Education: “There is no clear policy, the root of the current agreements must be sought.”  The “Givsh-Marom” agreement serves as the basis: Gvish was the Chairman of the Education Committee of the Local Authorities Council and Marom was the Budget Supervisor in the Ministry of Education.  The agreements are the product of negotiations between the Ministries of Education and Finance, and the Local Authorities Council.  Over the years, various public committees were established which determined settlements such as: the Kubersky, Zanbar and Hermelech Committees.   The committees were established in the wake of budgetary crises in the local authorities.  

     The Hermelech Committee proposed to define all the services provided by the local authority and price them and then decide who will finance them.  His recommendations were not implemented.  The Finance Ministry representative in the committee defined implementation boundaries.  He considered the real recommendation of the committee in terms of the budgetary reality.  The Ministry of Education representative in the committee referred to the definition of services and not to whom would finance them.  There is no ministry more transparent than the Ministry of Education.  The consolidated payment system deals in all the parameters between the Ministry of Education and the local government.  All the payments are transferred in one cheque, the Ministry informs the authority ahead of time what it will be paying.  In addition to the consolidated payment system, there are two committees that also participate in the funding of the local government:
	Support committee (such as projects for value-oriented education, 
   education towards democracy, etc.).
	Procurement committee operating according to tenders.
	
In practice, the funding of the local authority is carried out according to two indices:
According to the number of classes, and according to the number of pupils.  Regarding the subject of transparency of the budgeting of categories, there are fields in which the received budgets derive from previous decisions, and the extent of their actual funding is higher than what is owing according to current criteria and it is difficult to change this situation today (meaning, transfer over budgeting from certain authorities to other authorities, for example – financing 
psychologists).

Commentary on research results –

A deficit in education can emanate from providing a service level that is not approved.  If the service level is higher than approved – a deficit is generated.  The current budgeting arrangement (such as janitors, secretaries, psychological assistants, etc.) is based on averages.  No real settling of accounts can actually be carried out with every authority.  The higher the socio-economic level of the authority, the greater the demands of the parents under the jurisdiction of the authority.  As long as there are no sanctions against those who created the deficit, the question of supervision and control is merely theoretical.  There could be a situation in which a dominant head of a local authority will take resources from other fields and transfer them to education.  The positive correlation found between the deficit in the education budget and the achievements in matriculation exams suggest efficacy of the investment in education.

 
Suggestions for improving the situation –

1. The central government and the local government must arrive at a settlement on the range of services, their nature, and their pricing – after a process of redefinition.  The Local Authorities Council must address the Ministry of Finance 	and request a change in service standards; once every so often, a committee must be convened to examine the state of affairs and update them accordingly – this involves a dynamic and not a static policy.

2. After determining a service package and its pricing, it must be decided how to divide the financing between the Ministry and the local authority.

	The position of the Ministry of Finance –

The interview was conducted with two representatives of the Ministry of Finance; one still serving in his position and the other transferred to another position outside the Ministry of Finance.  The interviews were conducted without a tape recorder and in a relaxed atmosphere.
The general impression received was that the Finance Representatives view local government as the source of the problem of deficits and not the Finance Ministry.  The following is a summary of their answers in the interviews.

	Budget policy components in the field of education as presented by the (current) representative of the Ministry of Finance: “There are rules according to which the local authorities are budgeted, in conjunction with the local government.  The budgeting policy maintains a balance.  The Ministry of Finance does not discriminate against the local government.  There is a problem in managing the local authorities as a result of inadequate management, which is manifested in squandering funds and inflated mechanisms.  There is no real attempt to confront a balanced budget.  There are authorities with a balanced budget that succeed in providing good education services (such as Raanana and Carmiel).  This is proof that authorities may be well managed using the current education budgets.
 
 In the opinion of the Ministry of Finance representative, the budgeting policy should not be changed, but specific treatment of weak authorities should be carried out (such as a project for 30 localities), and not sweeping treatment for all.  There is no clear law that clarifies what the state and the authorities should fund.  For example: who decided that a psychologist is part of compulsory education.  The local authority must finance education through property tax it collects from its residents.  The government finances a minimal level of service, the authorities can add from their budgets.  This of course has implications on the gaps”.
 
The other Finance Ministry representative asserts: “The Ministry of Education is conservative and marking time. It transfers input to the local authorities without allowing them any incentive for streamlining (earning more for less money).  The Ministry of Education is exhibiting great responsibility toward the state budgets, including education, because without the Ministry of Finance – anyone would make a fuss over the issue of budget.  The Ministry of Finance argues that the Ministry of Education does not feel comfortable prioritising.  It is more convenient to request an additional budget for a new project.  There is a lack of sufficient introspection within the system”.

Commentary on some of the research results –

 The state provides a certain level of services and the local authority can expand upon it.  There is no supervision and control system in the field of education budgets.  The school system does not check output, but is evaluated more often respective of input.

	Suggestions for improvement –
 The actual representative of the Ministry of Finance claims that it is inappropriate and unjustifiable to alter the current situation.  Whereas the former representative of the Ministry of Finance introduces the following suggestions for improvement:

1) A clear and unequivocal definition of the government and local authority tasks in the field of education services.  The definition will include what will be financed 100% by each side.
2) The government will indicate one budgetary source for financing education services (and not from different ministries, such as the Ministry of Interior, Housing, etc.).
3) The ministry will outline a policy and finance it, but the responsibility and authority for implementation will lie with the local authority.
4) The Ministry of Education will transfer a normative budget according to agreed rules (with the local authority) and the local authority will operate within the confines of the budgetary restrictions, while prioritising on the local level.
5) The local system will gauge output and input.
6) The school principals will acquire more authority – so that they can formulate an annual work plan, and so that they indicate targets, means and output.  The school principal will be evaluated each year according to output.
7) The option of self-management of the local education authority should not be ruled out – if a good and suitable manager will be at the helm (who will also handle informal education).

	Position of the members of the academy –

The interview with the senior lecturer at Bar-Ilan University was conducted in his office in a friendly atmosphere, as we have been acquainted with one another for many years.  The interview was not recorded.  The following is the interview content. 

	Ministry of Education budgetary policy components as described by the senior lecturer-
  “The Ministry of Education has no budgetary policy; what exits today is what existed in the past with a few additions.  There is a supplementary-oriented policy.  There is no policy of setting targets and means for achieving targets.  It is not clear what the Ministry of Education wants; the Ministry does not know how to deal with the local authorities.  The legislation is at fault.  The laws may be interpreted differently and this is very convenient for the Ministry of Education.  This is how things work in a centralised system: everyone wants to make his mark in his own way.  When there is no clear direction – there are power struggles and pressure is exerted. 
 
Article 7a of the Compulsory Education Law indicates general guidelines but there are no specifics,  that is the problem.  The law may be interpreted in various ways; there are no specific definitions, it is convenient for the Minister of Education not to define services.  He is interested in areas which are less confining”.

Commentary on results – 
We accept the results but we are surprised by the results concerning the involvement of the head of the authority and the matriculation achievements.





1) Decentralisation of the system – closed economy.  A budgetary encasing adjusted to certain indices (such as the index of Barzel Yeshayahu).
2) The decentralisation will be practical if the Ministries of Education, Interior and Finance and the local government agree to it.  This will encourage the local authority to arrive at the correct decisions and prioritise.  Authorities that go into dept will pay out of their own pockets.  

	Position of the education financial advisors –
 
The interview with one of the interviewees was conducted in his office and the other was conducted at the interviewee’s house.  I am well acquainted with both interviewees, hence the interviews were held in a very friendly and relaxed atmosphere.  The following is the interview content.

Education policy budgeting components as described by the former Director of the Finance and Budget Division in the Ministry of Interior:  “The budgeting is not structured according to a method or a set model.  The financing is a collection of historical events.  The budgeting system is built on agreements between the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance and the local government.  The system has advanced: there is a data base and more transparency.  The local authority cannot steer its own policy based on the Ministry of Education budgets alone.  Local political influence is demonstrated mainly in the local authority budgets, and not in the Ministry of Education budgets.  The financing which currently exists, mainly in the field of expenses that are not salary-related, is inappropriate in terms of local authorities.  For example: building maintenance, transportation, equipment, developing cultural and social aspects, etc.”

b)  Suggestions for improvement –

	1) Financing according to criteria of the number of pupils or the number of classes; similarly the Ministry of Education must participate in the financing of the authority’s Education Administration.
	2) Education department models must be formulated (Administration Section).
3) The criterion for financing must include funding for the maintenance of education institution buildings (including electricity).
4) Compensatory policy for weak authorities: Today the support for an authority in distress is coincidental.  There is no method that meets the needs.  The Shahar department and other departments in the Ministry of Education provide reinforcement, support, but not methodically.  A compensatory policy narrowing the gaps must be initiated.  
5) Price the Ministry of Education’s service packages more generously (particularly to increase funding of expenses that are not salary-related).
6) Reassign the responsibility to the local authority that wishes to and is capable of leading its system on its own.
7) The Ministry of Finance’s claim that this involves only a 
           failed handling of the local authorities is a utopian illusion.

	
Position of the Ministry of Interior –

The Ministry of Interior representative argued that it does not handle the education budget in the local authorities.  The Ministry of Education alone is to be addressed on this issue.

The sixteenth  and the seventeenth  interviews  were conducted with the Coordinator of the Dovrat committee and  the Legal Adviser of the Minisry of Education in their offices.

The following is the Interview content:
The ambiguity in the allocation of state and local resources impact the creation of  gaps in the budgeting of the education system in the local authorities .The ambiguity derives mainly from the following factors:lack of transparency at all levels,problems in enforcing collection of parents` payments,”allocations packages” for the municipal education system are not always disributed equally,there is no clear arrangement between the two levels of government when it comes to the distribution of budgets and financing.

	The additional reasons that have an impact on gaps in the financing of the local education system are:the  authority`s political,economic and social power,as well as how important the Mayor deems education to be.
	The means  of narrowing these gaps can be arranged by differentiating according to the strenght of the authority , by restricting and setting payments collected from parents and by establishing a truly egalitarian budgeting according to student profile .
	The main features of the relationship between central government and local government that have an effect on gaps in budgeting of the education system in the local authorities are:lack of trust between between the two systems,political ties between the political leaders from central government and local government pave  the way to larger budgets,lack of transparency and no clear definitions in the distribution of funds among the two government srata of the education system within the local authorities. 
   
The  seventeenth  interview was conducted with the Legal Adviser  of the Ministry of Education (Central District).It comprised two open-ended questions on the    ambiguity in the education legislation and its impact on the budgeting of the education system in the local authorities.

The following is the Interview content:
The legislator did not have any hidden agenda.The central authority sought to leave its role ambiguous through the legislation and therefore all legislation related legislation is vague.A state of anarchy currently prevails in budgeting the main issues unsettled from a legal point of view.The government is interested in keeping everything close to home.


The relevant examples of ambiguity in legislation are –

a) Section 7 b  of the Mandatory Education Law of 1949 that states that the state and the local authorities must jointly maintain education institutions;however the role of each authotity remains indefinite.
 
b) The issue of the right  to free education which the the legislator established-what is the scope of the state`s obligation to provide free
education. It does not  appear in the legislation.  

 c)   In the realm of the establishment of new education instititions within the       local authorities the requisite maximal distance a student should be from
 his/her school has not yet been defined.There have been difficult struggles   regarding the establishment of new schools.This entire issue is open to interpretation.        


d)   Collecting parents` funds-This issue is not defined yet. The issue of the rate of payment is open to interpretation to this day.      
             

19.2	Summary of the Interviews-

 The 17 interviews conducted on the research subject enabled a broad and diverse picture while referring to five fields:

Components of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Interior budget policy for the local authorities (in the field of education),           
The ambiguity in the education legislation and its impact on the budgeting of the education system in the local authorities.     
	Commentary on questionnaire results.
           Commentary on the factors responsible for the gap in implementing the budgetary policy of the Ministry of Education.
Suggestions for improving the budgeting policy of the local school                system.

It should be noted that the interviewees (who are key informants) expressed their positions and perceptions concerning the research subject and particularly concerning the above five fields.  Their answers cannot be unequivocally regarded as proof or lack of proof of the research hypotheses. The majority of the interviewees indicated that there is no clear           budgeting policy of the Ministry of Education, and of course there is no local perspective of budgeting.  “The policy” that exists today is the product of agreements between the central government (the Ministries of Education, Finance, and Interior) and the local government.  “This policy” is the product of a “supplementary-oriented policy” (layer upon layer), as well as a partial adoption of the reports of the state public committees (that discussed the improvement in methods of government financing for the local authorities).  These agreements do not solve the problem of the financing of education as a state service.

There is an ambiguity in the allocation of state and local resources that creates gaps in the budgeting of the education system in the local authorities.This ambiguity derives mainly from the following factors:

problems in enforcing collection of parents' payments, "Allocation packages" for the municipal education system are not always distributed equally, lack of transparency at all levels and there is no clear arrangement between the Ministry of Education and the local authorities when it comes to the distribution of budgets and financing. 

The current education laws do not precisely define the task distribution between the Ministry of Education and the local authority, and that is one of the significant factors involved in the deficits in the field of education of the local authorities. The central authority sought to leave its role ambiguous through the legislation  and therefore all education related legislation is vague.A state of anarchy currently prevails in budgeting with the main issues remaining unsettled from a legal point of view.The government is interested in keeping everything close to home.

 The average deficit volume in the field of education reaches 37% in the Jewish sector and 27% in the non-Jewish sector.  Most of the   interviewees asserted that the Ministry of Education obligates an obscure  policy in order to place the budgetary burden on the local authority and obstruct a public debate on the issue.  The Ministry of Finance asserts that the budgetary policy is clear and transparent.  The main reason for the deficits is the inadequate and failed management of the local authorities.  The Ministry of Education argues that the Ministry of Finance defines the education budgeting policy. The Ministry of education is subordinate to the budgetary confines of the Ministry of Finance and is subject to its directives.

      	Most of the interviewees' accepted all the research results. Some were surprised by sections d and e which indicate that no link was found between the supervision and control processes (external and internal) and the involvement of the head of the authority and/or the person in charge of the education portfolio and the deficit in the education budget of the local authority.

All the interviewees' accepted the reasons for the gap in implementing budgetary policy, as were discovered in the questionnaire findings.The coordinator of the Dovrat Committee said the additional reasons of the gaps are the authority`s political,economic and social power as well as how important the Mayor deems education to be.

The relationship between central government and local government have an effect on gaps in budgeting  of the education system  in the local authorities because of these main features: lack of trust between the two systems, political ties between local authority heads and leaders and government ministers, particularly with the minister of education, pave the way to larger budgets,lack of transparency budgeting and no clear definitions in the distribution of funds among the two government strata of the education system within the local authorities. 


The suggestions for improvement of the budget policy were interesting and varied:
1) The Ministry of Education should fully finance education needs within the authority as a state service.
2) The Ministry of Education and the local government will clarify the task distribution among them, including the scope of financing provided by each side.
3) Enable strong authorities (from a socio-economic status perspective) to manage the school system on their own (decentralisation of the school system) once the school system will transfer the budgetary casing, based on updated pricing of the service packages in education (pre-school, primary school, secondary school and Special Education).
4) The Ministry of Education will appoint a representative for each local authority.  The representative and the local authority will formulate an annual local plan in the field of education and will determine the division of financing among them.  This will allow each side to prepare ahead of time in terms of budget.
5) The Ministry of Education and the local government will be reexamine all the education services provided in a local setting, will price these services and divide the financing among them, so that the Ministry of Education finances 75% of the services and the local authority 25% (if the first proposal is not accepted).
6) The Ministry of Education will outline and fund a policy; the local authority will assume responsibility and the authority to implement.
7) Leave the financing process as is, but set up more generous packages (additional option of improving financing in a special way).




Chapter 20:  Analysis of Research Findings.





Despite the dependence of the local authorities on the central government in the field of education, there is a gap between the education policy of the central government in the education budget and its implementation by the local government. The more the Ministry of Education participates in the local authority budget, the smaller the gap in the implementation of the policy and vice versa. 
 
The theoretical model for the interrelationship between the central government and the local government includes limitations (as presented in the first section) such as obscurity and inconsistency in government policy, lack of unified criteria for funding of the local government, an improper set of laws, ineffectiveness in the supervision and control processes: all these spur the creation of the gap between government policy on budgeting of local education and its implementation by the local authorities. The following refer to the hypothesis based on the research findings on two levels:

	Factual level of the presentation of numerical data.
	Empirical level (combining the theory with the research)

The average gap in all the authorities that appeared in the sample amounts to 34.61%, The research has unearthed that the Ministry of Education finances on average a total of 56% of the education budget of the local authorities in Israel, with the portion of the Jewish sector amounting to 48% and that of the non-Jewish sector amounting to 66%.

 The data (see Appendix no. 5) indicates that there is government under funding in the finance of municipal education services and this under funding is the main cause for this gap. In this research it emerged that there is a negative correlation between the level budgeted by the Ministry of Education (out of the total education budgets of the local authority) and the education budget deficit volume (r = -0.841, p<0.001), in other words, the greater the share of the Ministry of Education in the education expenditure of the local authority, the smaller the deficit and vice versa.  The share of the Ministry of Education quantitatively expresses the budgetary policy of the Ministry of Education. Meaning, there is an inverse ratio between the budgetary policy in education and the magnitude of the gap in its implementation.

Similarly, it emerged that there is a negative correlation between the percentage of financing per capita of the Ministry of Education and the education deficit volume of the local authority, meaning that the larger the share of the Ministry of Education per capita, the lower the education budget deficit volume (r = -0.505, p<0.002). With regard to sectors (Jewish and non-Jewish), it was found that the above correlation is greater in the non-Jewish sector (F(1,33) = 10.091, p<0.03), meaning that the Ministry of Education’s share is greater in the non-Jewish sector and this correlation is clear in the context of the socio-economic status of the local authority as well, in other words, the lower its position in the cluster (low socio-economic status), the greater the share of the Ministry of Education (F(2,32) = 9.339, p<0.01).

For instance, the financing percentages of the Ministry of Education are higher in lower clusters in fields such as: Educational Psychological Services (58.9% in Clusters 1-4, as opposed to 30.77% in Clusters 8-10).  The same goes for the supplementary education fields (29% as opposed to 11%), in the teaching assistant job slots (79% as opposed to 31%), in family afternoon programs (49% as opposed to 21%), and in construction (86% as opposed to 71% and 8%).

Concerning the size of the authority, it may be said that there is a tendency toward differences between the authorities, in terms of their size, with the share of the Ministry of Education being greater in mid-sized and small authorities (F(2,32) = 3.254, p<0.052).  For example, in student transportation (67% in small towns, 76% in mid-sized towns and 32% in large municipalities).  In the parameter of school secretaries – the financing for small towns amounts to 77%, in mid-sized towns 100% and in large cities 55%.  In construction – the financing in small towns is 72%, in mid-sized towns 92% and in large cities 38%. 

There was no clear correlation evident between the share of the Ministry of Education and the municipal status of the local authority.  As far as the authority sector is concerned, it emerged that the share of the Ministry of Education in financing public libraries is greater in the non-Jewish sector, (30.4% as opposed to 11.87% in the Jewish sector), the same goes for the Security Officer job slot (70.47% as opposed to 32.35%) and in equipment (50.6% as opposed to 30.4%).

Regarding these findings, the Education Department Directors mentioned during the course of the interviews that the Ministry of Education policy does not take into account the needs and preferences of the local authority and that the existing budgeting indices (including the matching method), are to the detriment of the local authorities and lead to under funding of the local education system.  As a result, a deficit is formed in the education budgets of the local authorities.  In their opinion, there is insufficient transparency in the transfer of education budgets, because there are local authorities that receive funding exceeding the above indices, due to historical reasons, or because of personal ties between incumbents in the local authority and the Ministry of Education. The Education Authority Head of the Tel Aviv Municipality argued that “there is a lot of negotiating, if you don’t ask for anything, you don’t get anything, you need ties, professional entities that will demand”.

Similarly, the Education Department Directors argued that the Ministry of Education supports an obscure policy in order to impose the budgetary burden on the local authority.  The Director of the Education Department of the Or Yehuda Municipality asserted that “the policy is one of momentary peace in the local authority and an ambiguous policy was implemented in order to prevent public debate concerning this issue”.  The local government representatives argued that there is a tremendous gap between the intentions of the Ministry of Education and the implementation of the budgetary policy.  

Similarly, they indicated an important point, according to which the grants that are given by the Ministry of the Interior, take into account a deficit in the education budgets. The local authority must show gaps and the Ministry of the Interior must give grants according to its budgetary capacity.   There is no           coordination between the gaps in education, the needs of the local authority and  the size of the grant, meaning – the authority heads know that they will receive a grant from the Ministry of the Interior which will cover some of their deficits in education and so they consciously enter a deficit.

The representative of the Ministry of Education argues that the budgeting provided to the local authorities is carried out according to signed agreements between the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of the Interior and the local government (after these agreements underwent several transformations due to the reports of several public committees that have been discussed in further detail in the theoretical chapter).  In his opinion, the unified payments system of the Ministry deals with all the parameters between the Ministry of Education and the local government, there is no government office more transparent than the Ministry of Education. The Finance representative argues that: 
“There are rules according to which the local authorities are budgeted, in conjunction with the Local Government Center.  The budgeting policy maintains a balance, the Ministry of Finance does not discriminate against the local government.  There is a problem in managing the local authorities as a result of poor administration, manifest in squandering and overblown apparatus. There is no true attempt at coping with a balanced budget, there are local authorities with a balanced budget, which try to provide good education services (such as Raanana or Carmiel), this is proof that authorities may be very well managed through the existing education budgets”, and she adds: “Is there no clear law that elucidates what the State and the authorities must finance, for example, who determined that a psychologist is part of compulsory education?  The local authority must finance education through property taxes, which it collects from inhabitants. The State funds a minimal level of the service and the local authorities can add from their budgets, obviously this has an impact on the gaps”. 

 Academics argue in this context:

 “The Ministry of Education has no budgetary policy.  What exists today is what there was in the past with additions, there is a policy based on supplements.  There is no policy as to setting targets and means whereby they may be achieved.   The desire of the Ministry of Education is unclear, the Ministry does not know how to “contend” with the local authorities, and the legislation is to blame.  The laws may be interpreted in different ways, and this is very convenient for the Ministry of Education, this is how things work in a centralistic system – everyone wishes to make an impact in his/her own way; when there is no clear method – there are power struggles and pressure is exerted.  It is convenient for the Minister of Education not to establish services, he/she is interested in things that are less committing”.

 The Coordinator of  the Dovrat Committee argued  that in fact the ambiguity in the allocation of state and local resources derives mainly from the following factors: lack of  transparency at all levels, “allocation packages” for the municipal education systems that are not always distributed equally,there is no clear arrangement between the Ministry of Education and the local authorities when it comes to the distribution of budgets and financing, the authority`s political-economic-social power and as well as how  important  the Mayor deems education to be.

To sum up the interviewees statements, it may be said that the majority argue (aside from the representatives of the Ministries of Finance and Education) that there is no clear-cut budgeting policy in the Ministry of Education and of course there is no local perspective on budgeting.  “The policy” that exists today is the result of agreements between the central government (Ministries of Education, Finance and the Interior) and the local government.  This “policy” is the result of a “policy of supplements” (layer upon layer), as well as the embrace of sections of the reports of the state public committees (which have discussed improving methods of government funding of local authorities), however these agreements do not solve the problem of funding education as a state service.  The education deficit volume still reaches 38.9% in the Jewish sector and 29.52% in the non-Jewish sector.

Most of the interviewees contended that the Ministry of Education compels the implementation of an obscure policy in order to impose the budgetary burden on the local authority and to avert a public debate on this issue.  The current education laws fail to accurately define the task distribution between the Ministry of Education and the local authority and this is one of the main reasons for the education deficits in the local authorities.  The Ministry of Education asserts that the Ministry of Finance is the entity that determines the education budget policy, the Ministry of Education is subject to the Ministry of Finance’s budgetary framework and its guidelines. 

The conclusion that may be deduced from the findings and interviews regarding the   budgetary policy of the Ministry of Education toward the local authorities is as follows:
The ambiguous policy of the Ministry of Education in the area of budgeting, the shortcomings in legislation (that do not sufficiently clarify the work distribution and the burden of financing between the Ministry of Education and the local authorities), the mutual influence of the elected representatives and clerks in the Ministry of Education and local authorities, the cognizance of the Heads of the local authorities that a portion of their deficits will be covered through grants provided by the Ministry of the Interior – all influence the Heads of authorities to be inclined to consciously journey into deficits in education – hence the gap formed between the level budgeted by the Ministry of Education and the total education expenditure in the local authority.  This gap is part of the Israeli reality. This is also the reason why non-Jewish localities that encounter difficulties in obtaining extra-governmental budgets (from parents or private entities) go into fewer deficits, which is manifest in the educational services in non-Jewish localities as well. 
 
The Human rights watch report included in the present study clearly indicates the fact that Arab-Israeli schools are discriminated in comparison to the Jewish school system in Israel. This discrimination is due to the system of educational funding in Israel as it is examined in the present study. Thus, it is another example of how the educational funding system influences school achievements. The interviews added to this study clearly indicate the role the legal system and the political system contributes to the present situation. Thus, the conceptual framework can be understood only by taking the role of the political as well as the legal system into consideration. The legal and political factors are inseparable parts of the total educational environment.

To sum up this finding, it may be said that the larger the portion of the Ministry of Education in the education budget of the local authority, the lower the education deficit of that same local authority and the smaller the gap in implementing the budgetary policy. On the second level, it may be elucidated that the gap may develop due to internal structural reasons behind the policy, as is manifest in the quality of the policy instruments that were established, or the way they were formulated.  A gap may form as a result of external influences that are exerted upon the new policy from the outset, its degree of perfection having no bearing.  Therefore, the gap must be examined as an outcome of the interrelationship between the inner strength of the policy and the intensity of the pressures exerted upon it.

The internal reasons for the gap are chiefly related to two factors:                                    
The policy formulation method-
The clearer the formulation of the policy, it may be assumed that the less obscure the policy makers’ intentions will be, and the message will be clearer to those implementing the policy and those and receiving it.  The exact meaning of the various wordings may be unclear and ill defined.  Different concepts are sometimes worded in a way that may be interpreted differently, in order to settle conflicts or avoid them when formulating policy. (Elboim-Dror 1980).  The gap between policy and its implementation is also generated in those cases where, a priori, there was no intention of actually implementing the policy. “This type of policy is symbolic and ritual, it was designed to stir the feeling among the public that there is someone who is handling affairs, however, in reality, it is also clear to policy makers that these things cannot be implemented at all or they did not wish to implement them in the first place” (Gal-Nur 1981).  One may conclude from this research that the Ministry of Education did not define a clear policy relating to budgeting of the municipal school system (setting objectives, targets, and means of achieving them), for the following reasons:

1. The objective of the obscure policy is to ensure industrial quiet.  In Article 7 of the Compulsory Education Law, it is stated: The existence of official education institutions for providing free primary education…is the responsibility of the state, and that of the local authority in conjunction.  The Minister, in consulting with the Minister of Interior, will determine in an ordinance to be published in the gazettes, for each school year, the share of participation of the state and of the local education authority.  If the Minister would abide by the law, things would be clear and one could speak of a clear policy. 

The availability of the law will provide a standard for comparing between the local authorities.  It is reasonable to assume that the reason behind the omission to enforce the law is to obstruct a public debate regarding this issue.  The policy of the ministry reflects the existing power relations in society and not the intentions of the legislator.  The policy that exists today is a product of historical agreements that were built layer by layer, between the central government and the local government, which are founded on financial claims of the local authorities and on restraint on the part of the central government.

2. In the pre-state period – in the absence of basic state concepts and a central education authority which would be able to assume full responsibility for Jewish education – suitable ground was developed for the take over of the decentralisation trend of the school system, that is to say – the strengthening of the position of the local education authorities and this was apparent in the financing of the local school system. This trend was reinforced during the period following the establishment of the state, particularly subsequent to the Yom Kippur War, in the wake of which parental involvement in the school system increased and after the Direct Mayoral Election Law was passed in 1975.  

This law increased the investment of the local authority in the municipal school system the mayor of Ashkelon expressed this situation succinctly: when the 1993 city budget was submitted for approval of the City Council, it was explained that the deficit included in the budget constitutes “a policy target” (Kol Hadarom, 5 March 1993).  “I am proud to generate deficits” – proclaimed the mayor of Tel Aviv – “because a deficit is only money that comes and goes, but I raised the level of education of the neighbourhoods of Tel Aviv, this is something that will remain forever” (Ha’aretz 24 November 1992). The State Comptroller knew how to sum up the prevailing opinion with respect to the reliability of local politicians: “In order to present achievements to the electorate, there is great temptation to proceed with unbridled activity which deviates from the provisions of the law, including actions that are not covered by the budget” (1986:3).

The subject of education has always been (and particularly subsequent to the Direct Mayoral Election Law) at the top of the list of priorities of most of the local authority heads.  The ongoing ties with parents (who are also the electorate) induce the heads of the authorities to invest in the subject of education beyond the budgeting level of the Ministry of Education, and knowingly run into deficits in the area of education.

To conclude this section, it may be stated that the Ministry of Education, with the intention of obscuring the “budgeting policy” and due to budget constraints, viewed in a positive light the fact that the heads of the local authorities were prepared (voluntarily or forcibly) to invest in education beyond the budgeting level of the Ministry.


Ensuring appropriate tools for achieving policy aims-

These tools may include budgeting, enforcement, supervision, timetables, adjusting the organisational structure, division of authority in the organisation, feedback and evaluation.  Appropriate tools demonstrate to a great extent the commitment of policy makers to achieve the objectives they defined (McDonnal-Elmone, 1987).  Beyond the objective problems of planning, such as the difficulty in anticipating the future and the difficulty in simultaneous control over a great number of variables which may affect policy determination and implementation, the policy wording and the tools may demonstrate the features of the compromise that was attained in determining policy.  There is also the option, which is very prevalent, that policy makers do not intend a priori to fulfil the objectives or part thereof; their support for the law (in this case, the laws of education) “was purchased” at a relatively cheap price due to electorate pressures. In this case there will be proclaimed agreement on the objectives and ambiguous or non-committal language with regard to the means required to fulfill the objectives (Elboim-Dror, 1986).

 In Israel there is a tremendous gap between the recognition of education as a state service that the state is to provide (although “in association with the local government according to the Compulsory Education Law  1969 – section 7b) and finance, and the tools that are provided by the state (through the local government) in order to provide it to the residents.  The root of the budgeting policy must be sought in the current agreements, which are the product of negotiations between the Ministries of Interior, Education and Finance representatives and the representatives of the Local Authorities Council as well as a product of adopting some of the recommendations and public committees formed since the establishment of the State (figuring among them – the Witkin, Kubersky, Zandbar, Hermelech and Swery Committees).  

To illustrate the under-budgeting in the financing of education services in the local authorities, the results from my study show that the financing percentage of the Ministry of Education in the following sections in 1997 (out of the total actual expenditure) will be presented as follows (see appendix 10):
a.	Sports package – 31.5%
b. 	Public libraries – 20%
c. 	Pupil transportation – 	1. Local councils – 62%
            	                            	2. Regional councils – 80.5%
                                 3. Municipalities – 54%
d. 	Supplementary education – 19%
e. 	Pre-compulsory kindergartens – 49%
f. 	School Janitors  - 77%
g. 	School secretaries – 78%
h. 	Educational psychological service – 57%
i. 	Regular Attendance Officer job slot – 56%
j. 	Security Officer job slot – 62%
k. 	Family after school programs – 42%
l. 	Computerised school system – 46%
m. 	Equipment – 37%
n. 	Construction – 73%
o. 	Renovations – 43%
p. 	Labs and shop rooms – 37%

This deficit certainly reflects the government under-budgeting in different inputs, but it is not monolithic; it derives from the variance in service composition and in their effective operation (the derivative of size, layout, administration capacity, and professional approaches). Increasing the government budget for the authorities to the said deficit level would indeed yield an overall budgetary balance, but at the expense of the public which would be problematic.  The extent of state participation cannot be detached from the normative decision as to which education services should be secured for Israeli children through the local authorities.  The question is not whether the calculation of the cost of a janitor, secretary, or assistant in schools is correct or incorrect, or whether an escort for trips in Special Education is on the budget.  The question that must be posed is what is the efficacy of the service as a whole.  The budgetary division of the educational services into dozens and perhaps hundreds of budget items and regulations in the budget inevitably solicits financing distortions.  

This division reflects the organisational division of the fields of activity into various ministerial units, with each one having its own interest and different priorities.  This allocation may be demonstrated in budgetary “surplus” (on a specific subject), whereas for others it may be manifested in lack of resources, due to the failure to view educational service financing according to overall service units (service packages) for pre-primary education, primary education, secondary education and special education.  Following the analysis of the questionnaires and the interviews no convincing answer was obtained for the main questions generated above: that is, does the overall deficit reflect a financing mishap on the part of the Ministry of Education or is the problem “surplus” expenditure on the part of the local authority? There is not necessarily an unequivocal answer to this. 

 The budget is the chief executive tool of the Ministry of Education “policy”, and was designed to allow the local authority to provide services for which the state is responsible, however their operation is the responsibility of the local authority by law or according to an arrangement.  Some of these services are operated conjointly by the government and the local authority.  For example, primary education in which the teaching personnel is the responsibility of the government (employing teachers and paying their salary) whereas the logistic services (facilities, maintenance services) are the responsibility of the local authority.
The Ministry of Education’s participation sum is unknown to the local authorities when their budgets are planned, and are only revealed several months after the budget year has started.  The Ministry of Education’s participation appears in the municipal budgeting handbooks distributed by the Economics and Budget Administration of the Ministry of Education. Only subjects possessing clear criteria for ministerial participation are included in this handbook; the handbook does not refer to additional financing offered by two financing committees of the Ministry of Education (support committee and procurement committee).  The budget provided according to clear criteria is transferred every month to the local authorities.

Upon analysis of the research results, it emerges that Ministry of Education has insufficient effective means of enforcement and supervision over that which is implemented in the local authorities.  A periodical report on some of the financed spending must be submitted (such as: assistants, Regular Attendance Officers, psychologists, Security Officers, etc.) and on some spending there is no reporting at all (such as: janitors, secretaries, renovations, etc.).  From this it may be deduced that the tools selected to implement the budgetary policy of the Ministry of Education are only partially suitable.

These tools reflect a compromise that was reached in determining policy, meaning, on the one hand government budgeting to implement a national education policy according to clear criteria of the Ministry of Education (when it is known in advance that this involves under-budgeting with the local authorities requested according to agreements to supplement what is missing) and on the other hand providing possibilities to the local authorities to utilize the budget effectively for local needs and even to add to it from their budgets as they see fit.

The research results show that there is no significant link between the government supervision and control processes and the extent of the deficit in the education budgets in the local authorities.  Hence it may be deduced that the policy makers took into account that the supervision and enforcement tools and methods that were determined by them are not meant to be the optimal tools for achieving the “policy objectives”. The research results indicate that there are additional internal determinants of the budgetary gap: 

A gap between the way the Ministry of Education perceives the needs and the way the local authority views them.  The local authorities have in recent years become the main address for applications of parents and educational institution administrators within the locality jurisdiction.  Parents turn to the local authority not only regarding economic-administrative issues, but also on subjects with a pedagogical-educational aspect such as scholastic achievements, providing solutions to the special needs pupils population or replacing a principal of a school who is not functioning properly.  There is still ambiguity as to the task distribution between the Ministry of Education and the local education authority.  Additionally, the stronger the locality from a socio-economic perspective, the more involved the residents and the local authority become, and this is manifested in the larger budgetary gap.  This gap reflects the differing perceptions between the two government levels concerning educational needs in the locality.

There is still a certain lack of confidence between the central government and the local government in the realm of the local government’s capacity to manage the education budget effectively and efficiently.  This is reinforced by the words of the Ministry of Finance representative, who argues that the financial crises of most of the local authorities stem from the incompetent management of the local authority. The basis for this argument is the fact that many local authorities have no educational planning unit to scientifically plan the needs of the locality while taking rational considerations into account in the budget distribution.

Budgetary dependence of the local authority in financing special educational projects.  The Ministry of Education finances some of the educational projects within the jurisdiction of the locality using the “matching” method (meaning the  request for corresponding financing on the part of the local authority) – such as: computerisation, improving the facade of the educational institutions, educational initiatives of educational institutions, etc.  All these contribute to the budgetary dependence on Ministry of Education budgets on the one hand, however also lead to a deficit in the municipal education budgets on the other hand.

The central government ignores the cost of enforcing its policy on the local authority.  The local government is subordinate to the collective agreements (in employing professional personnel) and in tender results (such as: transportation, construction, renovation, and equipment).  The budget of the Ministry of Education does not always match the actual costs, which generates a budgetary deficit.

The lack of flexibility in implementing policy due to previous commitments for example, a commitment to agreements and local commitments to implement certain educational projects.

Differences of opinion between the Ministry and the local authority concerning the task distribution between them.  This also generates the differing concepts regarding needs between the two authorities, and pursuant to the increasing trend in local government to employ professional personnel to manage education departments, the need for initiating local educational projects has risen, and greater involvement in pedagogical aspects of the local school system.  This has not always corresponded with the position of the Ministry of Education, despite the significant positive movement on the part of the superintendents (Yair, G, 2000).  The following results were obtained in this research, regarding education and seniority of the education department directors in the local authorities in the year 2000(see appendix 10):
1) Teaching certificate holders – 45.9%
2) Bachelor’s degree holders – 42.8%
3) Master’s degree holders – 45.8%
4) Doctoral degree holders – 11.4%
5) Average seniority – 9 years




From a theoretical point of view, it may be argued that if at the policy making and implementation planning stage all the possible up to date factors which may influence the nature of the implementation are taken into consideration, the objective to which the policy makers aspire will be achieved in its entirety.  However, the implementation is carried out in a realistic situation, and therefore “not only is it difficult to detect the factors which will affect the implementation, even if they are detected they may be inevitable, and for this reason gaps will generally be generated between aspirations and desires of policy makers and the end results of the policy” (Doron, 1986).  

The external factors refer to the Israeli model, which reflects the interrelationship between the central and local governments.  In this relationship there is a kind of strategic partnership based on interdependence.  In this relationship, informal factors play a significant role in their joint activity in defining the nature of local government in general and in Israel in particular, as well as the central-local government relations in general and in Israel in particular, the legal aspect of the central-local government relationship in the field of education, and the structure of the education budget of the local authorities (in the field of incomes from the Ministry of Education and the autonomous budgetary supplement of the local authority), and in contributing public committee meetings concerning education budgets in the local authorities.  

The nature of local government in Israel differs to a certain degree from other democratic countries (Kalcheim, 1987). The strengthening of the trend of decentralisation of the local government in Israel, especially subsequent to the Direct Mayoral Election Law in Israel, influences the range of municipal resources for financing educational services in the local authorities.  Nurturing the municipal school system receives top priority in the eyes of the heads of the local authorities, and this evidenced in the portion of the education budget out of the total local authorities’ budget (30.71% on average according to current research).  

Education as a state-municipal service constituted since the establishment of the State and up to the present, a major issue in central-local government in Israel, particularly in the area of financing municipal educational services.  The differences in the overall public financing (both of the Ministry of Education and the local authority) influence the level of the educational service in the local authorities. The research has unearthed that the Ministry of Education finances on average a total of 56% of the education budget of the local authorities in Israel, with the portion of the Jewish sector amounting to 48% and that of the non-Jewish sector amounting to 66%. As stated, in the theoretical portion, the factors shaping the interrelationship between the central and local governments in the area of education are: 

Educational legislation –
“The lacunae” that the legislator left in the principle of “cooperation” between the two government authorities, has engendered a situation in which the central government can regulate the distribution of resources at its disposal according to its own set of priorities.  The Ministry of Education reaches agreements with the local authority concerning the criteria for participation in financing education in the jurisdiction of the local authority.  “The lacunae” cause a disparate distribution of education resources to the local authorities by the Ministry of Education.   This is manifested chiefly in the special budgets that the Ministry transfers to the local authorities (pedagogical initiatives to assist pupils in need and for other purposes).

The inadequate legislation (mainly the ambiguity as to the distribution of the burden between the two government authorities) is one of the main determinants of the gap generated between the budgeting policy of the Ministry of Education and its implementation by the local authorities.The legislator did not have any hidden agenda.The central authority sought to leave its role ambiguous through the legislation, and therefore all education related legislation is vague.

The current administrative capacity of the local government–
 the educational autonomy of the authorities was creatively nurtured by upgrading personnel in the education sections of the local authorities, by reinforcing educational input, initiating projects, educational programs, and investing in scholastic methods and facilities.

The influence of local authorities on the level of education in their           localities by allocating resources – increasing public interest in education, the great parental involvement and the renewed review of the fundamental principles of the school system in Israel on the public and academic level – increased the commitment of the heads of the local authorities to the subject of education and made local activities more involved in financing educational services in their localities (beyond the income from the Ministry of Education).

The main features of  the relationship between central government and local government that have an effect on gaps in budgetting of the education system in the local authorities are :lack of trust between the two systems;political ties between local authority heads and government ministers,particularly with the Minister of Education,pave the way to larger budgets; lack of transparency budgeting and no clear definitions in the distribution of funds between the government strata of the education system within the local authorities.

To conclude the external reasons, it may be stated that the political, social, economic reality in the country dictated the development of the division of the burden between the authorities.  In actuality, the local government’s portion is on the rise (44% in this research-1977).  The budgeting policy of state education has generated great differences between the local authorities in the overall public financing for educational services.  This signifies that the range and level of the services offered to one child in one locality greatly differ from those provided in another locality. The school system is the main tool via which one may provide each child with an equal opportunity to get ahead according to his capability.  But in the current situation, the principle of equal opportunity is adversely affected and there is no worthy compensation for pupils from populations in distress. 

The economic reality in the State of Israel withholds the Ministry of Education form possessing the capacity to finance the total cost of education in the local authorities.   The Ministry of Finance argues that the local government must finance education with part of the property tax that it collects form the residents – in spite of the fact that there is no obligation to do by the prevailing law.  The diversity and variance in the socio-economic capacity of the local authorities, the formal weakness of the local government opposite the Ministry of Education (as opposed to its informal strength), the ambiguity in legislation ,the  features of the relationship between the central government and local government ,  the frequent cutbacks in the Ministry of Education’s budget, the lack of proper budgetary backing from the Ministry of Finance (see the slow implementation of the Extended School Day Law and the Compulsory Education Law for 3-4 year olds) to implement the education policy of the Ministry of Education and the ministry’s inability to define a different set of priorities for itself (that will provide a proper solution to local government) – all this has contributed to the contemporary situation of the budgeting policy of the Ministry of Education.

       
Hypothesis no. 2

The local authorities, which differ in their socio-economic strength, their ethnic composition and their municipal status, will also differ in the implementation of the budgetary policy.

The analysis of the empirical research findings reveals a positive correlation between the socio-economic status (the cluster) of the locality and the education budget deficit (r = 0.435, p<0.01), meaning, the higher the socio-economic status of the locality (from 1 to 10), the greater the deficit, and vice versa.  For example, in clusters 1-4, the deficit volume is 28.07%, in clusters 5-7, the deficit volume is 35.9% and in clusters 8-10 the volume is 43.97% (F(2.32)=3.435, p<0.045).

In the sectors parameter, it emerged that there is a strong correlation between the cluster and sectors (Jewish and non-Jewish) according to the Chi Square Test – X2(2)=6.68, p<0.05, in other words the Jewish sector is positioned in higher clusters than the non-Jewish sector.  The deficit in the Jewish sector is 38.9% and in the non-Jewish sector it is 29.52% - in other words, the gap in budgetary policy implementation of the Ministry of Education is smaller in the non-Jewish authorities due to their limited capacity to gather extra-governmental resources or because they settle for what they have.  It should be noted that there is a correlation between positioning in the cluster and the deficit volume in the non-Jewish sector (r = 0.506, p<0.046).  In the Jewish sector no significant correlation was found.





No significant difference was found between them in terms of deficit.  In this context, it is important to note that the local councils are positioned on average in cluster 6.18, the regional councils in cluster 5.20 and the municipalities in 5.42.  There is no significant difference between them.
The conclusion of the examination of the research hypothesis is that the higher the local authority’s position in the cluster, the less it settles for Ministry of Education budgets; it is prepared to invest more of its own resources and enter deficits.  It is important to point out that the Jewish sector is positioned in higher clusters than the non-Jewish sector and therefore also reaches a higher deficit in education.  The size of the local authority and/or its municipal status cannot be associated with the deficit volume. In this context, asserted the Education Department Directors, when a strong local authority, from a socio-economic point of view, is involved, parents have greater demands and the local authority is also self-demanding.






Effective external supervision and control processes on the management of the education budget in the local authority will lead toward a reduced gap in implementing the budgetary policy.  In localities that are strong from a socio-economic point of view, the supervision and control processes would be less effective and in these localities the gap in implementing the budgetary policy would increase. This research has found that there is no connection between the supervision and control processes (both external and internal) and the education budget deficit volume of the local authorities (also with regard to the parameters of locality size, municipal status, sector and socio-economic status).

The representatives of the Local Government Centre contended, in this context, that the supervision and control processes constitute a tool that fulfills its purpose only partially, whereas the representative of the Ministry of Education points out that as long as there are no sanctions imposed against the person who creates the deficits, then the question of supervision and control is merely theoretical. The representative of the Ministry of Finance indicates that there is no supervision and control system presiding over the education budgets.   The education system does not examine the output but is measured more by input.






The more involved the Head of the local authority is in managing the education system budget, the more he/she creates gaps in the implementation of the budgetary policy. The analysis of the research findings demonstrates that no correlation was found between the involvement of the Head of the local authority and/or the holder of the education portfolio and the education budget deficit volume of the local authority.  No such correlation was found with regard to the parameters mentioned in the previous sections (size, sector, municipal status, and socio-economic status of the locality).  It is important to note that the involvement of the Head of the local authority and/or holder of the education portfolio in educational content and initiatives is greater in municipalities (3.41 out of 5) than in local councils (2.0) and regional councils (1.6) – (F(2.21) = 3.599, p<0.045).

This finding did not surprise some of the interviewees, for example, the Education Division Director of the local council of Abu Gosh asserted that: “It is less surprising that the deficit developed due to system constraints - it cannot be prevented, events on the ground lead to deficit”.  Whereas the representative of the local government argued that  - “this finding must be examined over time, because the person who has been elected has a say on this issue”. The representative of the Ministry of Education contends “there could be a situation where a dominant mayor will take resources from other areas and transfer them to education whereby he/she will consciously enter education deficits”.







In this study, there was an attempt to find statistical correlations between the four independent variables (the share of the Ministry of Education, the socio-economic status of the local authority, the involvement of the Head of the authority and the supervision and control processes) and the dependent variable of scholastic achievement. Even if this correlation is not backed by a relevant theory because this was not the primary intention of the research.

The following is the hypothesis:
The larger the gap in implementing the budgetary policy, the higher the scholastic achievements and vice versa.  The following are findings from the analysis of the questionnaires and interviews:

A significant negative correlation was found between the share of the Ministry of Education in the education budget of the local authority and the scholastic achievements level.  In other words, the greater the share of the Ministry of Education, the lower scholastic achievements, i.e. the lesser the participation of the Ministry of Education out of the total education budget of the local authority, the greater the level of scholastic achievements (r = -0.447, p<0.028). The Director of the Education Department in Abu Gosh and the representative of the Ministry of Education contend that the more the local authority invests of its resources in education, this investment must be deemed as something that provides positive output in the form of scholastic achievements. 

It was discovered that there is a significant correlation between socio-economic status of the local authority and the level of scholastic achievements in the locality (r = 0.699, p<0.001), in other words, the stronger the local authority is from a socio-economic point of view, the higher its scholastic achievements level.  Further to what I assumed in the empirical model, the strong local authorities are prepared to invest more of their resources beyond the share of the Ministry of Education and to enter a larger budget deficit in education.  These investments in infrastructure and pedagogy ultimately provide outcomes in the form of scholastic achievements. 

This finding was reinforced by the parameter of Jewish and non-Jewish sectors as well.  The scholastic achievements level in the Jewish sector is 55.04% as opposed to 48.55% in the non-Jewish sector.
(the Jewish sector r = 0.678, p<0.005)
(the non-Jewish sector r = 0.713, p<0.031)
In the parameter of the authority size – it emerged that in mid-sized authorities (20,000 to 90,000 inhabitants), there is a correlation between the socio-economic status and the scholastic achievements level (r = 0.646, p<0.023). It is important to note that in the parameter of socio-economic status, it was found that the level of achievements in the cluster 1-4 group is 47.33% as compared to 55.56% in the cluster 5-7 group and approximately 63.4% in the cluster 8-10 group (F(2.21) = 8.922, p<0.002).

In the parameter of the municipal status of the authority the following finding was obtained:
Local councils – 68.5%
Regional councils -  59.66%
Municipalities – 49.82%
It emerged that the smaller the local authority, the higher its scholastic achievements level (F(2.21) = 3.599, p<0.045).
The explanation for this lies in the fact that the smaller the locality, and the stronger in socio-economic status, with more homogeneity among the inhabitants, the higher the scholastic achievements that may be obtained.  

There was no correlation found between the level of involvement of the Head of the authority and/or holder of the education portfolio and the scholastic achievements level (in terms of the entire sample, the sectors, authority size and municipal status), in the socio-economic status of the local authority a negative correlation was found between the involvement of the Head of the authority and/or the holder of the education portfolio and the scholastic achievements in the cluster 8-10 group (p = -0.944, p<0.016), in other words, the more involved the Head of the authority in stronger localities, the lower the achievements level and vice versa.

The explanation that may be obtained for this finding is that in strong localities the students will get along without intervention of the Head of the authority or the holder of the education portfolio – because the entities contributing to their success are different parties (such as intervention on the part of parents, good teachers, a great amount of resources from parents – including private tutoring).

No correlation was found between the supervision and control processes and the scholastic achievements level, not in any of the other parameters of the local authorities either. Upon examining the correlation between the education budget deficit volume and the scholastic achievements level, it emerged that it is a significant correlation, in other words, the deficit volume has an impact on the level of achievements – the greater the deficit, the greater the level of achievements (r = 0.360, p<0.042).If we examine this correlation according to the other parameters (size, socio-economic status, municipal status and ethnic sector) – we will not obtain a significant correlation due to the limited number of authorities observed.

The interviewees (mainly Education Department Directors) explained the significance of this finding by stating that it strengthens their opinion that education expenditure must be viewed as an investment that ultimately results in positive outcomes in the form of scholastic achievements.  The Education Division Director of Abu-Gosh contends that the Ministry of Education has deprived the Arab sector for years (particularly in the area of construction), and this in turn affects scholastic achievements. The representative of the Ministry of Education asserted that this correlation indicates the effectiveness of investment in education. 

My explanation for this correlation is as indicated in the operative model – the more local authorities are willing to invest more of their own resources (beyond the share of the Ministry of Education), and are prepared to enter deficits in order to invest in education (in infrastructure, equipment and pedagogy), the greater their chances of increasing the level of scholastic achievements.





PART V: RESEARCH SUMMARY
























Chapter 21: Research Discussion

This chapter will be constructed in a cone-shape, commencing with matters specific to this research: research problems, main findings and research limitations.  It will then proceed to the conceptual conclusions of the research.
The main research question as presented in the Introduction was whether there is a gap in the government budget policy in education and its actual implementation and, if this gap does indeed exist, what are the causes of its development and its effect on scholastic achievements. 

 The theoretical model of the research exhibited a general analysis of the interrelationship between the two government strata (central government and local government).  The main features of the model portray two government strata as constructed in a formal manner, in the form of a pyramid, with the central government operating as a collection of self-sufficient agencies and the local authority as an elected political unit that well comprehends the needs of its residents and is responsible to them, and has the authority to collect taxes and provide services, but is still subordinate to the government; The two government strata operate in a framework of strategic partnership that is based on interdependence and maintain a network of many communication channels which include specific informal mutual agreements in local endeavors. The central government encounters difficulty in enforcing its policy on the local government despite the fact that it still finances a significant portion of the local authority expenditure.  

The theoretical model includes the broader context of the research, in other words, the relationship between the central and local governments in general and education in particular.  This context includes the factors comprising the theoretical framework of the research (historical background of the central-local government relationship, the legislative framework, the contemporary relationship between the central government and local government and the socio-economic status of the local authorities).  The limited context relates to the policy of the Ministry of Education regarding the budgeting of the local education system, which is actually implemented by the local authorities, upon examining their influence on additional factors that were compiled following a review of the professional literature (the role the Ministry of Education plays in funding the municipal education system, the status of the local authorities in terms of size, ethnic sector, municipal status and socio-economic status, the impact of supervision and control processes and the intervention of the Head of the local authority or the person who holds the education portfolio on the actual implementation of this policy).

This model characterizes the main factors that affect the government's policy for budgeting the municipal education system and it outlines the direction of the design of the conceptual framework.  The latter outlined the direction of the research in order to answer the research question through an empirical examination (using questionnaires and interviews) of the research hypotheses and the possible connection between the four independent variables and the two dependent variables – the magnitude of the gap in budgetary policy implementation in the local authority (education budget deficit) and the level of the scholastic achievements in the local authority.  SPSS statistical processing was carried out, as well as an analysis of the findings that were obtained in the processing of the questionnaires and interviews.

As aforesaid in the Methodology Chapter, four main factors composed the conceptual framework of my research, namely: the legal system, the historical background, the interrelationship between the central government and local government, from a political and professional perspective, and the socio-economic status of the local authorities. Further on, this framework is described graphically in order to demonstrate the reciprocal influence of conceptual framework components on the broader context of the research, its findings and conclusions.  The findings are enumerated in the previous chapter and are integrated in this chapter in the context of the theoretical model and the conceptual framework of the research in order to maintain the research coherence and to arrive at the proper research conclusions.
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The research findings within the context of the above conceptual framework led me to conclusions which take shape in the following diagram:
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Field 1 – reflects the conjunction of the legal framework and the interrelationship between the central government and local government in Israel.
Field 2 – reflects the conjunction of the legal framework and the historical background.
Field 3 – reflects the conjunction of the historical background and the socio-economic status of the local authorities.
Field 4 – reflects the conjunction of the interrelationship between the central government and the local government in Israel and the socio-economic status of the local authorities.
Field 5 – reflects the conjunction of the legal framework, the historical background and the interrelationship between the central government and the local government.
Field 6 – reflects the conjunction of the legal system, the historical background and the socio-economic status of the local authorities.
Field 7 – reflects the conjunction of the historical background, the interrelationship between the central government, the local government and the socio-economic status of the local authorities.
Field 8 – reflects the interrelationship between the central government and the local government, the legal framework and the socio-economic status of the local authorities.
Field 9 – reflects the surplus value of the research relative to other research studies and expresses the unique outcome of all four components of the conceptual framework - i.e. – the legal framework, the interrelationship between the central government and the local government, the historical background and the socio-economic status of the local authorities.

The research findings provide the following answers to the primary question of the research – 

There is most certainly a gap between the budgetary policy of the Ministry of Education and its implementation by the local authority.  The budgetary policy of the Ministry of Education for the local authorities is an ambiguous policy that aims to achieve momentary peace and considers the extra funding by the local authorities as a positive step.  This is a policy which its implementation by the local authority is manifested in gaps in the scope of the education services in those same local authorities.  The government's funding still constitutes a significant portion of the local authority budget (approx. 56% of the total expenditure in the current budget with the portion of the Jewish sector amounting to 48% and that of the non-Jewish sector amounting to 66%).

The current budgetary policy of the Ministry of Education stems from existing agreements that were approved as a result of discussions and agreements between the representatives of the following government ministries: the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Education and representatives of the Local Authority Centre as well as the embracement of sections from the public committee's recommendations that were instituted since the establishment of the State of Israel.  Only a small portion of the recommendations from these reports was implemented (mainly due to lack of financial resources and the government’s unwillingness to confer authority to the local government).

The budgetary policy of the Ministry of Education concerning the local authorities has indeed improved in recent years from the point of view of funding transparency by means of the unified report of the payments system and the publication of criteria for municipal budgeting. However, the budgeting itself includes national criteria that reflects national index. The explanation for this is that these authorities are capable of averages and not necessarily local averages – which give rise to disorder and under funding.  The economic situation in the State of Israel prevents the Ministry of Education from having the ability to finance the full cost of education in the local authorities. The Ministry of Finance supports the finance of education through property taxes that are collected from the inhabitants. 
 
 The average gap in all the authorities that appeared in the sample      amounts to 34.61%.  The gap is steadily increasing, mainly in the large Jewish local authorities that are strong from a socio-economic standpoint (in a high cluster according to the Ministry of the Interior index), the explanation for this is that these authorities are capable of adding a large portion of their resources to the local education system beyond the level budgeted by the Ministry of Education and are consciously prepared to journey into a budget deficit in education. 

 As stated, the residents of these local authorities exert pressure on their elected representatives to invest more in education and the heads of the authorities are also aware themselves of the significance of education as a means of gaining electoral votes and getting elected into office for a second term, and so they are aware of the fact that sooner or later the Ministry of the Interior will assist them in paying off deficits deriving from education (this refers to the authorities which receive a grant from the Ministry of the Interior). The data (see Appendix no. 5) indicates that there is a government under funding in the finance of municipal education services and this under funding is the main cause for this gap.

In this research it emerged that there is a negative correlation between the level budgeted by the Ministry of Education (out of the total education budgets of the local authority) and the education budget deficit volume (r = -0.841, p<0.001), in other words, the greater the share of the Ministry of Education in the education expenditure of the local authority, the smaller the deficit and vice versa.  The share of the Ministry of Education quantitatively expresses the budgetary policy of the Ministry of Education. Meaning, there is an inverse ratio between the budgetary policy in education and the magnitude of the gap in its implementation. Similarly, it was discovered that there is a negative correlation between the percentage of financing per capita of the Ministry of Education and the education deficit volume of the local authority, meaning that the larger the share of the Ministry of Education per capita, the lower the education budget deficit volume (r = -0.505, p<0.002).

With regard to sectors (Jewish and non-Jewish), it was found that the above correlation is greater in the non-Jewish sector (F(1,33) = 10.091, p<0.03), meaning that the Ministry of Education’s share is greater in the non-Jewish sector and this correlation is clear in the context of the socio-economic status of the local authority as well, in other words, the lower its position in the cluster (low socio-economic status), the greater the share of the Ministry of Education (F(2,32) = 9.339, p<0.01). For instance, the financing percentages of the Ministry of Education are higher in lower clusters in fields such as: Educational Psychological Services (58.9% in Clusters 1-4, as opposed to 30.77% in Clusters 8-10).  The same goes for the supplementary education fields (29% as opposed to 11%), in the teaching assistant job slots (79% as opposed to 31%), in family afternoon programs (49% as opposed to 21%), and in construction (86% as opposed to 71% and 8%).

Concerning the size of the authority, it may be said that there is a tendency toward differences between the authorities, in terms of their size, with the share of the Ministry of Education being greater in mid-sized and small authorities (F(2,32) = 3.254, p<0.052).  For example, in student transportation (67% in small towns, 76% in mid-sized towns and 32% in large municipalities).  In the parameter of school secretaries – the financing for small towns amounts to 77%, in mid-sized towns 100% and in large cities 55%.  In construction – the financing in small towns is 72%, in mid-sized towns 92% and in large cities 38%. 

 There was no clear correlation evident between the share of the Ministry of Education and the municipal status of the local authority.  As far as the authority sector is concerned, it emerged that the share of the Ministry of Education in financing public libraries is greater in the non-Jewish sector, (30.4% as opposed to 11.87% in the Jewish sector), the same goes for the Security Officer job slot (70.47% as opposed to 32.35%) and in equipment (50.6% as opposed to 30.4%).

Regarding these findings, the Education Department Directors mentioned during the course of the interviews that the Ministry of Education policy does not take into account the needs and preferences of the local authority and that the existing budgeting indices (including the matching method), are to the detriment of the local authorities and lead to under funding of the local education system.  As a result, a deficit is formed in the education budgets of the local authorities.  In their opinion, there is insufficient transparency in the transfer of education budgets, because there are local authorities that receive funding exceeding the above indices, due to historical reasons, or because of personal ties between incumbents in the local authority and the Ministry of Education.

The Education Authority Head of the Tel Aviv Municipality argued that “there is a lot of negotiating, if you don’t ask for anything, you don’t get anything, you need ties, professional entities that will make a demand”. Similarly, the Education Department Directors argued that the Ministry of Education supports an obscure policy in order to impose the budgetary burden on the local authority.  The Director of the Education Department of the Or Yehuda Municipality asserted that “the policy is one of momentary peace in the local authority and an ambiguous policy was implemented in order to prevent public debate concerning this issue”. 

 The local government representatives argued that there is a tremendous gap between the intentions of the Ministry of Education and the implementation of the budgetary policy.  Similarly, they indicated an important point, according to which the grants that are given by the Ministry of the Interior, take into account a deficit in the education budgets.   The local authority must display its gaps and the Ministry of the Interior must give grants according to its budgetary capacity. There is no correlation between the gaps in education, the needs of the local authority and the size of the grant, meaning – the authority heads know that they will receive a grant from the Ministry of the Interior which will cover some of their deficits in education and so they consciously enter a deficit.

The representative of the Ministry of Education argues that the budgeting provided to the local authorities is carried out according to signed agreements between the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of the Interior and the local government (after these agreements underwent several transformations due to the reports of several public committees that have been discussed in further detail in the theoretical chapter).  In his opinion, the unified payments’ system of the Ministry deals with all the parameters between the Ministry of Education and the local government, there is no government office more transparent than the Ministry of Education. 

The Finance representative argues that “there are rules according to which the local authorities are budgeted, in conjunction with the Local Government Center. The budgeting policy maintains a balance; the Ministry of Finance does not discriminate against the local government.  There is a problem in managing the local authorities as a result of poor administration, manifest in squandering and overblown apparatus.  There is no true attempt at coping with a balanced budget, there are local authorities with a balanced budget, which try to provide good education services (such as Raanana or Carmiel). This is proof that authorities may be very well managed through the existing education budgets, and the Finance representative adds: “Is there no clear law that elucidates what the State and the authorities must finance, for example, who determined that a psychologist is part of compulsory education?  

The local authority must finance education through property taxes, which it collects from inhabitants.    The State funds a minimal level of the service and the local authorities can give additional funding from their budgets, obviously this has an impact on the gaps”.  Academics argue in this context: “The Ministry of Education has no budgetary policy.  What exists today is the same thing that was in the past with additions, there is a policy based on supplements.  There is no policy as to setting targets and means whereby they may be achieved.   The desire of the Ministry of Education is unclear, the Ministry does not know how to “contend” with the local authorities, and the legislation is to blame.  The laws may be interpreted in different ways, and this is very convenient for the Ministry of Education, this is how things work in a centralistic system – everyone wishes to make an impact in his/her own way; when there is no clear method – there are power struggles and pressure is exerted. 

 It is convenient for the Minister of Education not to establish services, he/she is interested in things that are less committing”. The Coordinator of  the Dovrat Committee argued  that in fact the ambiguity in the allocation of state and local resources derives mainly from the following factors: lack of  transparency at all levels, “allocation packages” for the municipal education systems that are not always distributed equally, no clear arrangement between the Ministry of Education and the local authorities when it comes to the distribution of budgets and financing, the authority's political-economic-social power and how important the Mayor deems education to be.

To sum up the interviewees’ statements, it may be said that the majority argue (aside from the representatives of the Ministries of Finance and Education) that there is no clear-cut budgeting policy in the Ministry of Education and of course there is no local perspective on budgeting.  “The policy” that exists today is the result of agreements between the central government (Ministries of Education, Finance and the Interior) and the local government. This “policy” is the result of a “policy of supplements” (layer upon layer), as well as the embracement of sections of the reports made by the state public committees (which have discussed methods of improving the manner in which the government funds local authorities). However, these agreements do not solve the problem of funding education as a state service.  The education deficit volume still reaches 38.9% in the Jewish sector and 29.52% in the non-Jewish sector.

Most of the interviewees contended that the Ministry of Education compels the implementation of an obscure policy in order to impose the budgetary burden on the local authority and to avert a public debate on this issue.  The current education laws fail to accurately define the task distribution between the Ministry of Education and the local authority and this is one of the main reasons for the education deficits in the local authorities.  The Ministry of Education asserts that the Ministry of Finance is the entity that determines the education budget policy, the Ministry of Education is subject to the Ministry of Finance’s budgetary framework and its guidelines.

The conclusion that may be deduced from the findings and interviews regarding the   budgetary policy of the Ministry of Education toward the local authorities is as follows: 
The ambiguous policy of the Ministry of Education in the area of budgeting, the shortcomings in legislation (that do not sufficiently clarify the work distribution and the burden of financing between the Ministry of Education and the local authorities), the mutual influence of the elected representatives and clerks in the Ministry of Education and local authorities, the awareness of the heads of the local authorities that a portion of their deficits will be covered through grants provided by the Ministry of the Interior – all influence the heads of authorities to be inclined to consciously journey into deficits in education – hence the gap formed between the level budgeted by the Ministry of Education and the total education expenditure in the local authority.  This gap is part of the Israeli reality. This is also the reason why non-Jewish localities that encounter difficulties in obtaining extra-governmental budgets (from parents or private entities) go into fewer deficits, which is manifest in the educational services in non-Jewish localities as well. 
 
The Human Rights Watch Report included in the present study clearly indicates the fact that Arab-Israeli schools are discriminated in comparison to the Jewish school system in Israel. This discrimination is due to the system of educational funding in Israel as it is examined in the present study. Thus, it is another example of how the educational funding system influences school achievements. The interviews added to this study clearly indicate the role the legal system and the political system contributes to the present situation. Thus, the conceptual framework can be understood only by taking the role of the political as well as the legal system into consideration. The legal and political factors are inseparable parts of the total educational environment.

To sum up this finding, it may be said that the larger the portion of the Ministry of Education in the education budget of the local authority, the lower the education deficit of that same local authority and the smaller the gap in implementing the budgetary policy. On a different level, it may be elucidated that the gap may develop due to internal structural reasons behind the policy, as is manifest in the quality of the policy instruments that were established, or the way they were formulated.  A gap may form as a result of external influences that are exerted upon the new policy from the outset, its degree of perfection having no bearing.  Therefore, the gap must be examined as an outcome of the interrelationship between the inner strength of the policy and the intensity of the pressures exerted upon it.

Field 9 (which includes the four components of the conceptual framework) refers to the main question of the research regarding the true meaning behind the government budgetary policy of the municipal education system and whether there is a gap between it and its implementation by the local authorities.  With respect to the reasons for the existence of this disparity, the responses are reflected in the various fields of the diagram as follows:

Factors causing the formation of a gap in the implementation of the budgetary policy – 

A. there is a clear link between the socio-economic strength of the local authority and the magnitude of the gap in implementing the budgetary policy. As stated in the previous section, the higher the socio-economic status of the local authority (according to the Ministry of the Interior index) the greater the extent of the gap.  The explanation for this was provided in the previous section. This finding relates to the historical background of the State of Israel.  The Jewish settlement in the period of the Ottoman rule and the British Mandate, gave priority to autonomous management of the Jewish education system, which was manifest in the allocation of self- resources of the local authorities, and particularly of the stronger ones (field 3).

B. Large local authorities are usually capable of gathering a greater quantity of alternate resources to those provided by the Ministry of Education, and so the magnitude of the gap in these authorities is greater .The policy of under-budgeting of the Ministry of Education coerces the stronger local authorities to invest more than their self-resources (field 3). The analysis of the empirical research findings reveals a positive correlation between the socio-economic status (the cluster) of the locality and the education budget deficit (r = 0.435, p<0.01), meaning, the higher the socio-economic status of the locality (from 1 to 10), the greater the deficit, and vice versa.  For example, in clusters 1-4, the deficit volume is 28.07%, in clusters 5-7, the deficit volume is 35.9% and in clusters 8-10 the volume is 43.97% (F(2.32)=3.435, p<0.045).

In the sectors parameter, it emerged that there is a strong correlation between the cluster and sectors (Jewish and non-Jewish) according to the Chi Square Test – X2(2) =6.68, p<0.05, in other words the Jewish sector is positioned in higher clusters than the non-Jewish sector.  The deficit in the Jewish sector is 38.9% and in the non-Jewish sector it is 29.52% - in other words, the gap in budgetary policy implementation of the Ministry of Education is smaller in the non-Jewish authorities due to their limited capacity to gather extra-governmental resources or because they settle for what they have.  It should be noted that there is a correlation between positioning in the cluster and the deficit volume in the non-Jewish sector (r = 0.506, p<0.046).  In the Jewish sector no significant correlation was found.





No significant difference was found between them in terms of deficit.  In this context, it is important to note that the local councils are positioned on average in cluster 6.18, the regional councils in cluster 5.20 and the municipalities in 5.42.  There is no significant difference between them.

The conclusion of the examination of the research hypothesis is that the higher the local authority’s position in the cluster, the less it settles for Ministry of Education budgets; it is prepared to invest more of its own resources and enter deficits.  It is important to point out that the Jewish sector is positioned in higher clusters than the non-Jewish sector and therefore also reaches a higher deficit in education.  The size of the local authority and/or its municipal status cannot be associated with the deficit volume.  

In this context, the Education Department Directors asserted, when a strong local authority, from a socio-economic point of view, is involved, parents have greater demands and the local authority is also self-demanding. The representative of the Local Authority Centre indicated that in this context, the test of the local authority is its capacity to gather resources from the population, and therefore the local authority has the right to invest its own money in education.

 The representative of the Ministry of Education argues that “the higher the socio-economic status of the local authority, the greater the demands of the parents from the local authority”. The representative of the Ministry of Finance indicates that the State provides a certain level of service and the local authority can expand it. The conclusion of this finding is that in view of the questionnaire and interview analysis, the local authority’s socio-economic status is the dominant characteristic that features in an education budget deficit.  

C. Government under funding of the municipal education system. It was caused due to the ambiguous legal framework and the nature of the agreements between the central and local governments in terms of budgeting, which did not provide a proper solution for the local authorities (field 3). The research has unearthed that the Ministry of Education finances on average a total of 56% of the education budget of the local authorities in Israel, with the portion of the Jewish sector amounting to 48% and that of the non-Jewish sector amounting to 66%. Such that the under funding is greater the higher the cluster level of the local authority from a socio-economic standpoint (38% in clusters 8-10 as opposed to 68% in clusters 1-4).

 Under funding is manifest in government resources that are earmarked for development of education institutions.  Under funding derives mainly from the failure to finance local education services according to comprehensive units (such as: pre-primary, primary, secondary and special education); the budgetary split of educational services according to dozens or hundreds of budget items and regulations inevitably induces finance distortions. The under-budgeting derives from unrealistic agreements which were formed between the central government and the local government as well as due to the ambivalent legislation (field 3).

The shortcomings in the legislation are a primary and significant factor in the creation of the gap; the ambiguity as to the portion of each entity (central government and local government) in the maintenance of education institution’s, imposes the budgetary burden on the local authorities.  The relevant clauses of the law indeed indicate that both government strata must jointly maintain education institutions; however the quality of the cooperation is indefinite and unclear. Both strata are not on an equal footing on this issue, because the Minister of Education is the person who determines every school year as to method of dividing the financial burden among each local authority. 

The obscurity leads to the imposition of the budgetary burden on the local authorities while the Ministry of Education does not provide sufficient backing to implement its policy and encounters difficulty in implementing laws that were passed (such as the Extended School Day Law, Compulsory Education for ages 3-4 Law, and the Special Education Law), the lack of multi-year budgetary backing by the government poses a burden on the local government and causes delay in implementing the above education-related laws by the Ministry of Education and the local authorities. The central-local government relationship in actuality relies on the ambivalent legislation which enables flexible rules of the game between the government strata (field 1).
The legislator did not have any hidden agenda. The central authority sought to leave its role ambiguous through the legislation and therefore all related legislation is vague. A state of anarchy currently prevails in budgeting the main issues unsettled from a legal point of view. The government is interested in keeping everything close to home.

The relevant examples of ambiguity in legislation are:
1) Section 7 b of the Mandatory Education Law of 1949 that states that the state and the local authorities must jointly maintain education institutions; however the role of each authority remains indefinite
2) The issue of the right to free education which the legislator
Established -- what is the scope of the state's obligation to provide free   education. It does not appear in the legislation.  
3) In the realm of the establishment of new education institutions within the
Local authorities the requisite maximal distance a student should be from   his/her school has not yet been defined. There have been difficult struggles regarding the establishment of new schools. This entire issue is open to interpretation.        
4) Collecting parents` funds -this issue is not defined yet. The issue of the rate of payment is open to interpretation to this day.                        


D. The historical background of the State of Israel (from the pre-state period), and particularly the Direct Election Law of the Head of the local authority have in a large part prompted the current reality, in which the Head of the local authority assumes a greater responsibility in managing the municipal education system, including its budgeting such that it exceeds the level budgeted by the Ministry of Education. This finding derives from the professional literature and not from an empirical study of this issue (field 7).

E. Additional primary factors involved in the creation of the gap in different levels of intensity, are the gap in the perception of the needs between the Ministry of Education and the local authority, with the Ministry of Education seeing the general national picture versus the local authority’s focus on a local perspective as well as differences of opinion between the two entities as to the task distribution among them, due to the over-involvement of the local authority in pedagogical aspects of the local education system as well; lack of trust between the two systems ; political ties between local authority heads and leaders and government ministers, particularly with the Minister of Education, pave the way to larger budgets; lack of transparency budgeting and no clear definitions in the distribution of funds among the two government strata of the education system within the local authorities. These factors derive from a review of chapter 10 which focuses on the theoretical financial aspects which may provide possible reasons for the gap between the financial policy and its implementation and which were examined in empirical research (in question 31 via the questionnaire and in interviews). 

These findings elucidate the reasons for the limitations of the Ministry of Education in implementing its policy as it appears in section 2 of the theoretical model (matching field 4 of the conceptual framework which reflects the combination of the interrelationship between the central government, the local government in Israel and the socio-economic status of the local authorities).

In this study it has been discovered that there is not enough effective supervision and control on the implementation in the local authorities.The finding of the empirical research indicates the lack of a correlation between them, regardless of the strength of the local authority (matches field 5). This research has found that there is no connection between the supervision and control processes (both external and internal) and the education budget deficit volume of the local authorities (also with regard to the parameters of locality size, municipal status, sector and socio-economic status).

The representatives of the Local Government Centre contended, in this context, that the supervision and control processes constitute a tool that fulfills its purpose only partially, whereas the representative of the Ministry of Education points out that as long as there are no sanctions imposed against the person who creates the deficits, then the question of supervision and control is merely theoretical. The representative of the Ministry of Finance indicates that there is no supervision and control system presiding over the education budgets.   The education system does not examine the output but is measured more by input.

To sum up this section – it may be said that if we connect between the theoretical model and operative model of the research and the aforesaid finding – it appears that the characteristics of the central-local government relations in Israel, in which two government layers operate in a framework of mutual partnership, make it difficult for the central government to enforce its policy on the local government, a fact that provides an additional explanation for this finding.

Similarly, the involvement of the Head of the local authority and/or the holder of the education portfolio in the management of the education budget does not affect the extent of the gap. The strong local authority heads do not fear plunging into budgetary deficits due to reduced dependence on Ministry budgets and the possibilities of investing self-resources of the authority (field 4).

The analysis of the research findings demonstrates that no correlation was found between the involvement of the Head of the local authority and/or the holder of the education portfolio and the education budget deficit volume of the local authority.  No such correlation was found with regard to the parameters mentioned in the previous sections (size, sector, municipal status, and socio-economic status of the locality).  It is important to note that the involvement of the Head of the local authority and/or holder of the education portfolio in educational content and initiatives is greater in municipalities (3.41 out of 5) than in local councils (2.0) and regional councils (1.6) – (F(2.21) = 3.599, p<0.045).

This finding did not surprise some of the interviewees’, for example; the Education Division Director of the local council of Abu Gosh asserted that: “It is less surprising that the deficit developed due to system constraints - it cannot be prevented, events on the ground lead to deficit”.  Whereas the representative of the local government argued that - “this finding must be examined over time, because the person who has been elected has a say on this issue”. The representative of the Ministry of Education contends “there could be a situation where a dominant mayor will take resources from other areas and transfer them to education whereby he/she will consciously enter education deficits”.

To sum up – the explanation for this finding is that the deficit in the education budgets in the local authorities is an inevitability due to government under funding, and due to the inequality in the access of the local authorities to resources, such that this deficit does not depend upon the involvement or lack thereof of the Head of the authority or the holder of the education portfolio.

This study has demonstrated the existence of a significant statistical correlation between the magnitude of the gap (the education budget deficit volume) and the level of scholastic achievements in the local authority.This conclusion is derived from the combination of all four above mentioned factors, with the dominant factor being the socio-economic status of the local authorities (field 9).

Upon examining the correlation between the education budget deficit volume and the scholastic achievements level, it emerged that it is a significant correlation, in other words, the deficit volume has an impact on the level of achievements – the greater the deficit, the greater the level of achievements (r = 0.360, p<0.042). If we examine this correlation according to the other parameters (size, socio-economic status, municipal status and ethnic sector) – we will not obtain a significant correlation due to the limited number of authorities observed.

The interviewees (mainly Education Department Directors) explained the significance of this finding by stating that it strengthens their opinion that education expenditure must be viewed as an investment that ultimately results in positive outcomes in the form of scholastic achievements.  The Education Division Director of Abu-Gosh contends that the Ministry of Education has deprived the Arab sector for years (particularly in the area of construction), and this in turn affects scholastic achievements. The representative of the Ministry of Education asserted that this correlation indicates the effectiveness of investment in education. The researcher’s explanation for this correlation is as indicated in the operative model – the more local authorities are willing to invest more of their own resources (beyond the share of the Ministry of Education), and are prepared to enter deficits in order to invest in education (in infrastructure, equipment and pedagogy), the greater their chances of increasing the level of scholastic achievements. 

Strong localities, from a socio-economic perspective, are aware of this issue and they have a greater capacity to invest and thus attain higher achievements.  Smaller localities, that are more homogenous in terms of population composition and stronger from a socio-economic standpoint, may attain a higher level of scholastic achievements. Moreover, it may be said that additional definitions may be suggested for scholastic achievements, and not only matriculation exam results (there are local authorities that argue that it is in bad taste to refer solely to matriculation exam results as scholastic achievements, and that additional parameters must be reviewed). This finding does not indicate causality, therefore one must be wary of reaching an unequivocal conclusion “that more money equals more achievements”.  There are many intervening factors.  This finding points to the need for future research on this subject.
 
It has been proven in this research that the local authority which views education as an investment and spends a portion of its budget which exceeds the level budgeted by the Ministry of Education, by gathering extra-governmental resources (donations, funds, parents, etc.), and willingly and consciously journeying into education deficits – attains higher scholastic achievements in comparison to other local authorities. The significance of these findings is that the differences in the financial input in the education process between the local authorities is liable to induce differences in the scope and level of educational services provided to the child in one locality as compared to a child in a different locality.This difference also prompts differences in the level of scholastic achievements. The conclusion is that the education system in the State of Israel has “missed the train” in that it has crushed the principle of equal opportunity in education. In light of the decline of the welfare policy in Israel (due to the worsening economic situation), an increase in inequality is anticipated among the local authorities.

Finally, the findings of the present study clearly indicate that there exists an interaction between the legal factors involved, the relevant political system, and the socio-economic background. All of these variables are major players in the educational funding system and its influence on school achievements and educational levels. One cannot understand the whole situation without examining the contribution of each of these components. As aforesaid, in this chapter, a connection was made between the theoretical model, the conceptual framework and the research findings.  This connection enables the reader to understand the meaning of the findings in a broader perspective of the central-local government relationship.













                                Chapter 22: Conclusions


In Israel there is a gap between the government funding policy of the municipal education system and its implementation by the local authorities.  This is manifest in budgetary deficits in education budgets. Similarly, there are funding gaps between the local authorities that are manifest in disparities in scholastic achievements. This has been a central issue throughout the existence of the State of Israel and particularly in recent years it has become a key political issue. 

The Israeli government established a state committee (Dovrat Committee) in late 2003 to propose a reform in the education system in Israel. In January 2005, its recommendations were approved. The Committee recommendations focused on the relationship between the central government and the local government in terms of education system management in general and its funding in particular. The reform is a proponent of the decentralization of power and of changing the method of delegating positions among the Ministry of Education and the local authority with the focus being on the Education Ministry's relegating authority to local education directors (who will assume a statutory status and will be based in one local authority or in a union of several authorities).  Likewise, the Committee recommended that the Education Ministry fund schools differentially through regional education directors and not through the local authorities.  The budget for education institutions would be earmarked and could not be utilized for other purposes.  The avowed objective of the reform is to increase the level of scholastic achievements and to reduce the gaps between the local authorities and between students from different settlements and neighborhoods. The Committee also recommends changing education related legislation.
 
The question that arises is what may occur with regard to this reform based on the current research findings? The main findings explaining that the existence of a gap in funding derives mainly from under-funding and originates in the difference in social-economic strength of the local authorities.  Can the proposed differential budget contend with the gap? It may be assumed that the funding will depend less on the local authority's capacity and will be more differential with priority given to weak populations and it will be established according to objective and national standards, with the funding volume determined in advance according to definitive parameters. This may certainly affect the narrowing of gaps.  Eradicating these gaps cannot be raised as a possibility seeing as the stronger authorities will continue to invest beyond the actual funding provided by the Ministry of Education.

 An additional question is whether the reform will amend the injustices that have been mentioned in three cases at the beginning of the research, and which were cited in the study, namely: the one-time only funding that was provided to certain authorities to prepare for the start of the school year, which did not follow definitive criteria, the discrimination between Jewish authorities and Arab authorities, or the improvement in excess under-funding of the local education system (with government funding amounting to a mere 56%).

The reform is designed to cope with the ambiguous legislation in terms of establishing the relegation of authority and relegating the burden of funding between the Ministry of Education and the local authority. This will be a law-based reform. The legislation purports to provide a solution to the weaker links that have been detected in this research - in the abuse of political and personal relationships by heads of authorities to receive resources that are not within a framework of clear and definitive criteria, of relegating an indefinite budget burden or generating under-funding.  The legislation will aspire to put the central-local government relationship back on track to a more formal, fair, proper and outlined relationship, despite their interdependence and strategic partnership.

According to the reform recommendations, the education system is expected to change.  It is important that starting now, research will begin with the objective of monitoring the changes in the implementation of the new funding arrangements and to examine their impact on the level of scholastic achievements.


                    


































                    Chapter 23: Critique of the research process


The research topic as stated in the Introduction – Examination of the gap in implementation of budgetary policy of the government in education by the local authorities – led me to read the relevant literature in the field of the research and subsequently to focus on the research questions.  The formulation of the conceptual framework enables the researcher and the reader to focus on all the research-related issues within four categories and to examine the research findings in view of this framework, and to reach conceptual conclusions that reflect the surplus value which the research provides to the knowledge available on this topic. The deductive method was chosen for this research because there were hypotheses derived from the conceptual framework of the research.  The theories relating to the relationship between the central and the local governments directed the subsequent research, and the specific questions arose from within the general framework.  The questions did not emerge from the field work.

In order to answer the research questions, The author needed to compile numerical data, for which he deemed it fit to send questionnaires to all the local councils as well as to review relevant government documents. The data obtained did not furnish me with sufficient information and perspectives on government budgetary policy with respect to the municipal education system and therefore he decided to complete the missing data by interviewing 17 key functionaries from the central authority, the local authorities and the academic world. The interviews were aimed at eliciting the reactions to the findings based on an analysis of the questionnaires and the position regarding budgeting policy by the Ministry of Education, including suggestions for improvement. The author's personal acquaintance with a significant number of the persons helped me to obtain the required information.

In view of the relatively small number of responses, I feel in retrospect that I could have made a greater effort to obtain a larger number of completed questionnaires by importuning the education department directors in the local councils, as well as perhaps structuring the questionnaires differently (e.g. adhering only to items relevant to the research questions). I feel that the use of triangulation in the process of data collection was justified as it allowed me to obtain comprehensive answers to the research questions. 

In the course of the research I developed diagrams of models illustrating the research process. In doing so, I was also guided by the need to facilitate the reader's understanding of the logical sequence of the work. With respect to the main research question, the statistical analysis appears to offer a simple answer to the existence of the gap. In reality, however, it was necessary to collect additional data from the local authorities (which were not available with the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Education), detailing the extent of under funding by the government with respect to the various items (psychologists, janitors, equipment, construction, computerisation, etc.). A more effective examination of the gaps between the various local authorities (according to size, ethnic composition, municipal status and socio-economic level) based on use of the statistical data thus allowed the research hypotheses to be confirmed or refuted.

The main problem is the amount of information collected.  The small sample size reduces the estimation of its implications, and the fact that the sample is so small relative to the studied population restricts the capacity to apply the research to the general population.  The fact that the sample does nevertheless represent the population in central cross-sections is somewhat alleviatory; however this still remains a major criticism of the research.

Although the variables examined in this study are correct, other significant factors were not taken into consideration. For example, that parent's involvement in school and in helping their children study varies depending on the socio-economic level. Also, low socio-economic areas may attract less qualified teachers who typically reside in more affluent areas. Thus, the gaps in school achievements are not just because of the funding policies that were the subject matter of the present thesis. These points and others may be the subject of additional future studies.
































Chapter 24:  The relevant experience in the world

This chapter will describe the international experience about the budgeting policy of the municipal school system in the world. The international experience that has been accumulated over the past two decades may be of assistance particularly the European Union  (such as in England) that will be presented as a model to be imitated.  
 Any method of municipal budgeting in general and in education in particular, as good as it is as an approach and technique, cannot deviate from intrinsic limitations that emanate from the structure of government, the relationships between the central government and the local government, the work distribution method, the nature of the tasks and the financial commitments that ensue therefrom.  A comparative analysis of the local government pattern in developed countries, including in those where the public business administration approach stands out, suggests that two parameters affect the extent of government involvement in financing municipal activities:
a)	The nature of the local government
b)	The functions of the local government

As for the nature of the local government, two main models may be distinguished: the narrow municipal model and the expanded model (BEN-ELIA, 1999).






The other model, the expanded local government model, is for the most part in the European Union ( northern European) , and reflects the “welfare states” model (including England).  This is a local authority with an overall responsibility for a wide variety of public and communal services, including housing, medical services and comprehensive welfare services.  Also figuring among these models are the Scandinavian countries, in which the functions of the central government, such as providing social stipends (national security) and operating employment services, are also the responsibility of local government. 
In the European Union (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​European_Union" \o "European Union​) education is the responsibility of Member States; European Union institutions play a supporting role. According to Art. 149 of the Treaty of Amsterdam (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Treaty_of_Amsterdam" \o "Treaty of Amsterdam​), the Community
“	shall contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging cooperation between Member States,	”
through actions such as promoting the mobility of citizens, designing joint study programmes, establishing networks, exchanging information or teaching languages of the European Union (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Languages_of_the_European_Union" \o "Languages of the European Union​). The Treaty also contains a commitment to promote life-long learning for all citizens of the Union. The EU also funds educational, vocational and citizenship-building programmes which encourage EU citizens to take advantage of opportunities which the EU offers its citizens to live, study and work in other countries. The best known of these is the Erasmus programme (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Erasmus_programme" \o "Erasmus programme​), under which more than 2,000,000 students have taken part in inter-university exchange and mobility over the last 20 years. Since 2000, conscious of the importance of Education and Training for their economic and social objectives, EU Member States have begun working together to achieve a set of 13 specific goals in the field of Education. This is referred to as the Education and Training 2010 (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​w​/​index.php?title=Education_and_Training_2010&action=edit" \o "Education and Training 2010​) programme. By sharing examples of good policy practice, by taking part in Peer Learning activities, by setting benchmarks and by tracking progress against key indicators, the 27  Member States aim to respond coherently to common challenges, whilst retaining their individual sovereignty in the field of Education policy. The European Union is also a partner in various inter-governmental projects, including the Bologna Process (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Bologna_Process" \o "Bologna Process​) whose purpose is to create a European higher education area (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​European_higher_education_area" \o "European higher education area​) by harmonising academic degree (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Academic_degree" \o "Academic degree​) structures and standards as well as academic quality assurance (​http:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Quality_assurance" \o "Quality assurance​) standards throughout EU Member States and in other European countries.
As Bulgaria aligns itself for EU accession in 2007 the country’s government are working on ensuring that the children of Bulgaria have free access to a quality, well structured but open education system that will allow them to learn the skills and gain the knowledge necessary to compete equally with their European counterparts on the world business and economic stage. Since 1989 the country has worked on reforming the entire education structure from primary through to higher education and as a direct result the quality of education available in Bulgaria today is far more sophisticated and of a much higher standard than it was only a few years ago. 

The British Model 
Britain is one of the international models that should be emulated in terms of its fairness.  Despite the anti local government policy that the various conservative governments conducted in the early 80s and 90s, Britain developed one of the most objective and fair methods for state participation in financing the municipal sector (see: GOLDSTEIN, H. 1994, SENIOR, M.L., 1994, THOMAS, R.W. 1997, Department of the Environment, Audit Commission, 1993, 1995).
Britain accomplished this in concomitantly to its pronouncing reduced spending in the public sector and encouraging the market economy.  The uniqueness of the British method lies in the fact that the government participation in financing the local government is based on:
1.	One overall participation unit (a revenue support grant).  
2.	Financing is provided by only one Ministry, which concentrates all handling of local government (currently the Department of the Environment, the Regions and Transport).  The revenue support grant is not designed to subsidise all authority services, but rather only a defined variety of services that may be defined mainly as “state services” (as in Israel).  These are services that the central government seeks to ensure for the public, in spite of the fact that their supply is assigned to the local authorities.  Therefore, the British general grant is not directed towards subsidising the municipal services (“local services”), and it does not assist the authority’s general administration.  The key to calculating the grant is determined according to the central government’s standard spending assessment (SSA), which is meant to issue specific authorisation for providing services (including paying debts, but excluding development spending), taking into account the total public spending that in the government’s opinion should be spent for this objective, estimating local needs and local statistics which affect the cost of the services.  The calculation of the total standard spending assessment (SSA) for each authority is based on the “service blocks” definition, including in Britain’s case 7 blocks: educational services, personal welfare services, police, fire fighting services, inter-city road maintenance, various other services and financing development investments (interest).  Every year a separate calculation is made setting the financing percentage for each block.  The British central government does not participate in financing services that are not state services (municipal), these are financed directly by the local authorities, through the general municipal tax.  The local authorities in Britain are required to act within the confines of a balanced budget.  The British method illustrates how central government takes overall responsibility for financing services which in its opinion it would be appropriate for the state to maintain, adopts a definitive and transparent budgeting formula, and simplifies the allocation process and the transfer of funds by concentrating them in one department only, without detracting from the professional responsibility of the various designated departments.








                          Chapter 25: Research Contribution


The contribution of this research to knowledge is manifested in several areas:

1. It facilitated the testing of existing theories in the field of central-local government relationships and in the area of understanding the possible reasons for the gaps in policy implementation. It facilitated additional knowledge introduced in the field of study: The theoretical model that was illustrated in this research including its limits is designed to constitute a theoretical infrastructure for the entire research process and is original in the field of central-local government relationship. The formulation of the original conceptual framework enables the researcher and the reader to focus on all the research-related issues within four categories and to examine the research findings in view of this framework, and to reach conceptual conclusions that reflect the surplus value which the research provides to the knowledge available on this topic.

2. The knowledge gap which is the subject of this research is a very crucial issue, politically and budget-wise; each year it is on the public agenda – however, to date there has been no scientific research to provide direction as to how to evaluate this situation and its resulting complications.  The information gap justifies the entire research study.

3. The research facilitated additional knowledge introduced in the field of    study.
	Understanding the background to the government budgeting policy of the school system and the analysis of this policy.
	Detecting the differences in budgeting among the different local authorities in Israel and between the Jewish and non-Jewish localities.
	Indicating the link between the financial resource volume and scholastic achievements, meaning viewing educational spending as an investment which will yield profit in the form of scholastic achievements.
	Raising the need for improving the index and/or tools for assisting weak localities.
	Raising the need for improving the current legislation.
	The State of Israel possessing a basically socialistic vision in terms of equality in education generates inequality between the local authorities due to budgetary constraints.  This inequality is notable in budgeting and scholastic achievements.
	If the trend in the world in general and in Israel in particular is towards limiting welfare policy, an increase in inequality between the local authorities may be anticipated (this is in tune with the rhetoric regarding the free market, decentralisation, competition, etc.).  It will be difficult for the weak authorities to compete with the strong ones.


4.   It appears that this research will better elucidate the mechanisms creating the budgetary gaps in the various local authorities, as well as the possible impact these gaps have on scholastic achievements at the local authority level.  If a future study should reinforce the preliminary findings of this research, it will explain the functional problems of public government in Israel, and furthermore, it will clarify the resulting complications in the level of scholastic achievement and spatial inequality throughout Israel.  I contend that this would be an onerous task for one research study.

5. The above results are significant in that the decision makers in the government and the local government will find it difficult to overlook them and I hope that they will make an effort to improve the government budgeting policy in order to facilitate more equal opportunity in education for Israeli children. The National Dovrat Committee was established by the Israeli Government in late 2003, with the aim to propose a reform in the Israeli Education System (including the educational funding system).Its chairman invited me to be a member of the Committee. The findings of my study were taken into consideration by this Committee.

6.  The research process itself allowed me to experience a fascinating intellectual journey and acquire skills of an independent researcher.  This process enabled the inquirer to delve into the multitude of professional literature in the field of research methodology, and to understand and identify the subjects relevant to this research, such as: the combination of research methodologies, the sampling methods, the data collection process, advantages and disadvantages of research tools (such as: questionnaire, interview, and archival documents), the types of triangulation, validity, reliability and authenticity.  The process itself gave the inquirer great satisfaction and an appetite for more…

7.   To sum up the research conclusions, it may be said that the state’s socialist vision to provide equal education to everyone cannot be realized in practice due to the special model according to which the interrelationship between the central and local government operates in reality, which also involves a partnership, interdependence and specific informal agreements as well as the governmental budgeting policy for local authorities which derives therefrom.   This policy has been greatly influenced by the central-local government relationships in Israel since pre-state times and to the present day, and by inadequate legislation in the sphere of education.  These influences have to a great extent shaped the ambiguous budgeting policy of the local school system; a policy which leads to unequal allocation of educational resources among the local authorities, and consequently, generates gaps in the range and level of educational services, which are ultimately evidenced in the scholastic disparity between the pupils of the local authorities. If the trend of limiting welfare policy continues, an increase in inequality between the local authorities may be anticipated.
 The international experience that has been accumulated over the past two decades may be of assistance (particularly the European model (such as in England) that was presented as a model to be imitated.  This change has two possible directions:
1.	Changes deriving from government reforms or structural adaptations.
2.	Direct changes in the area of financing.
A comparative analysis of the local government pattern in developed countries, including in those where the public business administration approach stands out, suggests that two min parameters affect the extent of government involvement in financing municipal activities:
a)	The nature of the local government
b)	The functions of the local government
Britain is one of the international models that should be emulated in terms of its fairness.  Despite the anti local government policy that the various conservative governments conducted in the early 80s and 90s, Britain developed one of the most objective and fair methods for state participation in financing the municipal sector.
The uniqueness of the British method lies in the fact that the government participation in financing the local government is based on:
1.	One overall participation unit (a revenue support grant).  
      2.     Financing is provided by only one Ministry, which concentrates all handling of local government (currently the Department of the Environment, the Regions and Transport).  The revenue support grant is not designed to subsidise all authority services, but rather only a defined variety of services that may be defined mainly as “state services” (as in Israel).
Each of the above models (see chapter 24 ) reflects a superior value-oriented concept which relates to the nature of society and the state’s role, and also dictates the work distribution between the central government and the local government.  The two models in the context of Israel must specify the question of the nature of the local government and its role – governmental or functional?   Would this be a comprehensive local government or a local government focusing on handling narrow municipal issues?  If the local government has expanded responsibility according to the first model, a compatible financing method is required.  The problem in Israel is that in reality a hybrid is engendered: the local government according to the northern European model  - from a functional point of view, but is based more and more on financing principles of the North American model.  International experience does not offer proof that a “welfare-oriented” local government may be maintained without suitable government financing.  Despite the attempts to reduce public spending due to macro-economic considerations, most developed countries, supporting the welfare principles, participate significantly in the financing of the local authorities, whether in direct budgeting of the central government, or in joint budgeting with the sub-national government echelons (states, provinces) or whether in waiving revenues (granting increased taxation authority to the local government at the expense of government taxation).  Any discussion regarding the government’s participation in financing the local government must firstly refer to the type of designated local government, which directly or indirectly expresses a clear government decision regarding its commitment as a state to ensure services to the citizen, and regarding the question who is supposed to undertake the operational financing responsibility.  The area of state services significantly illustrates this ambiguity.  It is not at all clear as to whether these services are indeed defined as state services and operated with secondary assistance of the local authorities, or whether they are local services in every sense of the word, supported by the government. The proposed model (that was taken into consideration by Dovrat Commettee ) is based mainly on the welfare model  (the northern European and particularly the English model) which regards the local government as bearing overall responsibility for a wide variety of public and communal services

8. I believe that my research represents the doctorate level. My handling of the theoretical material, the amount of empirical material I collected (despite the limitations of the sample), and my contending with the qualitative and quantitative analysis were all carried out with relative success – these elements validate this study as worthy of being approved for a doctoral degree.

9.  The Recommendations for Research Expansion will be as following:
	Examining the connection between the municipal education budgetary policy and the gap in implementation (deficit in the municipal budget) over time.
	Examining the link between the municipal budget deficit and the scholastic achievements over time.
	Examining the possible factors that may contribute to the link between the municipal budget deficit and the scholastic achievements.
	Examining the new municipal education budgetary policy and the implementation due to Dovrat Committee Recommendations during the years 2008-2010

                  

                   


































 Chapter 26: Reflections on My Intellectual Journey

As I said in the prologue, I decided to submit my candidacy for studies towards a doctoral degree (PhD) at New Bulgarian University.  I decided that it was time to conduct a comprehensive research study on the subject of government financing of the municipal school system.  

Upon the inception of the research study I compiled the relevant professional literature which was no small task.  This involves extensive international and Israeli literature existing in this field of research. The research questions assisted me in focusing on the relevant literature and to arrive at suitable hypotheses and obtain the relevant variables.  During the research, I thought of an idea to examine whether there is any link between the education budget deficit volume (the gap in implementing the budgetary policy) and success in matriculation exams. When a positive link was discovered between them I deemed it fitting to indicate this as a significant result. It was obvious to me that my research was not intended to grapple with the reasons for the link between the education budget deficit and scholastic achievements. I believe that this issue must be examined in another study.  This result compelled me to change my research topic.

One of the research tools was an in-depth questionnaire that was distributed among all the local authorities in Israel (after it was processed in the wake of preparing a brief preliminary questionnaire and a discussion among a focus group of education department directors). I expected to receive a response from at least one hundred local authorities. Unfortunately, I received only 36 responses. I was comforted by the fact that this was a sample that included the diverse authorities in Israel (large municipalities, medium-sized municipalities, local councils, regional councils and non-Jewish authorities).  I weighted the sample relative to the actual distribution that exists in the State of Israel. I feared lest the numerical data I received through the questionnaires would not mirror reality (due to the apprehension to tell the truth when a budgetary deficit is involved or due to lack of knowledge of the statistics), therefore I collated the data using relevant documents that I received from the financial department of the Local Authorities Council and the Ministries of Education and Interior.  I also conducted interviews (with incumbents holding key positions related to the research subject) in order to support the data and to obtain commentary on the results derived from the questionnaires.

 A few surprises emerged from these results: such as – the existence of a statistical link between the local education deficit volume and scholastic achievements, the magnitude of the gap in the Arab sector, the absence of a link between the involvement of the head of the local authority and/or the person in charge of the education portfolio and the education budget deficit volume, the absence of a link between the supervision and control processes and the deficit volume, the positive link between the socio-economic strength of the local authority and the education deficit volume.  The conversion of the results into conclusions was an additional intellectual stage, which was intriguing from a personal point of view. 
 
The research enabled me to develop as a researcher. It found expression in the causal, provident arguments which gave significance, meaning and reason to the phenomenon I was investigating. Creating an original conceptual framework. It made me more understanding statistical systems and the significance of the results, the combination between quantitative and qualitative data, and the translation of the results into conclusions.
 
It is important to point out that the guidance I received from the Bulgarian tutor (Prof. Svetla Strashimirova) was of great assistance to me and helped me to advance and gain more confidence.  The administrative support that I received from the Israeli Coordinator (Prof. Akiva Fradkinl) made it easier to communicate with the university.  
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Education Department Budget Management

a. General:
Number of pupils in local authority’s school system in the locality/council during the 1998 school year : ____________.
Is there an employee in the department who deals with budget-related issues aside from the department director?	Yes		No

b. Gap between the budget and its implementation (1996-1997):
1. Circle the percentage which most approximates the following:
Percentage of education budget approved compared to budget requested: 
     		50    60    70    80    90    100
Percentage of budget actually transferred to the local authority:
	50    60    70    80    90    100
Percentage of budget actually transferred to the department:
            	50    60    70    80    90    100
Percentage of budget where flexibility was exercised on the department’s  	     considerations:
              0     5     10   15     20     30
Percentage of budget utilised by the department:
            50	60	70	80	90	100	110	120

2. On a scale of 1 to 5, circle the score which most approximates the following 
situations:                                                    
1- Not at all       5- To a great extent
    Budget items realistically allocated by the department:                   
		1     2     3     4     5
    Budget items realistically allocated by the government:                  
1     2     3     4      5
    The department executed all projects listed in the budget:                
1     2     3     4     5

c. Involvement of Head of Local Authority and/or supervisor of 	education portfolio:
To what extent is the Head of the Local Authority and/or the person in charge of the education portfolio involved in the following:   

1- Not at all     5- To a great extent
Drawing up the department’s budget                                            
1     2     3     4     5
Release of funds for implementation                                             
1     2     3     4     5
Locating additional sources of funding for the department                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
1     2     3     4     5

d. Budgetary autonomy
In your opinion, to what extent would departmental autonomy be desirable with regard to the following:  
                                                              
1- Not at all     5- To a great extent

Determining budget proposal to be submitted to the government
1     2      3     4     5  
Negotiations with government ministries with regard to budget approval                                               1     2     3     4     5
Implementation of the budget, (receipt of a closed budget).                                                                 1     2     3     4     5  

e. Budgetary control
To what extent has budgetary supervision been exercised this year over education depart expenditure expenses by the following: 
1 - Not at all     5 - To a great extent
Ministry of Education  			1     2     3     4     5
Ministry of the Interior                             	1     2     3     4     5
The Local Authority                                	1     2     3     4     5
The Department of Education               	1     2     3     4     5


































Questionnaire for the director of the local education authority
(Administration, Division, Education Department Head)
(Submitted by Max Abisror)

1)	Name of Head of Local Education Authority: 	______________________
2)	Name of Local Authority: ___________________________ 
 
3)	Status of Local Authority:
      1.  Local Council
      2.  Regional Council
      3.  Municipality   (Circle the applicable response).
4)	Is your Authority under the close supervision of an auditor from the 
Ministry of Interior ?     (Circle the correct response).
                        Yes                     No
5)	Which term of office is the Head of your Local Authority serving ?
     a.  First          b.  Second      c.  Third or more  (Circle the correct response). 
6)	Local Authority population:

a.    Up to 5,000 residents
b.    Between 5,000 – 10,000 residents
c.    Between 10,000 – 20,000 residents
d.    Between 20,000 – 40,000 residents
e.    Between 40,000 – 90,000 residents
f.     90,000 residents and over.  (Circle the applicable response).

7)	Population composition:         (Circle the applicable response)
1.   Jewish            
 2.   Moslem
 3.   Druse





Circle the applicable response.
8)	Number of residents in 1997: _____________________
9)	Position of the Local Authority in the Ministry of Interior 
       	socio-economic status index: ________________
10)	What was the overall budget of the Local Authority in 1997 ?  
11)	Educational revenue from the government:       _____________ NIS.
12)   	Independent educational revenue :     ___________________ NIS
13)  	Total educational revenue:    _____________________ NIS
14)  	Total educational expenditure:   ________________ NIS
15)  	Educational deficit/surplus : _________________ NIS
16)  	Percentage of educational deficit/surplus:  ________________
17) 	Education budget percentage of total local authority budget: _____ NIS
18)	Difference between government-approved expenditure and local authority proposal:   ___________________ NIS_______________  %
19)	Difference between the approved educational budget proposal and actual expenditure:  _____________ NIS ______________ %
20)	Do the above figures reflect the situation in your local authority over the past three years?
1.	The gap has diminished.
2.	The gap has remained unchanged.
3.	The gap has increased.
21)	What percentage of financing was provided by the Ministry of Education in 1997 for the following budget items (out of the total actual expenditure) ? 
a.	Sports package: ______________
b.  	Public libraries: _____________





h.	Educational psychology services – personnel + counselling:____
i.	Regular attendance officer job slots: _______________
j.	Security officer job slots: ______________
k.	Assistant job slots: ________________                                                
l.	Family clubs:  _________________




q.	Laboratories and other shop rooms: _______________

22)	What was the total 1997 development budget?  NIS ______________
23)	What portion of the total 1997 education budget was expended on development?___________________
24)	How much did the school system in your authority raise from parents in 1997?    NIS________________
25)	What was the percentage of the parents’ contribution out of total educational expenditure in 1997? ____________________
26)	What amount did the local authority  raise from external sources in 1997 (that is to say: excluding Ministry of Education. and Ministry of Interior allocations and parental contributions) ? ______________ NIS
27)	What percentage of the total 1997 educational expenditure did the above 			amount represent ?  ___________________
28)	Who holds of the education portfolio in your local authority ?

1.	The Head of the Local Authority himself/herself.
2.	A council member from the same political party.
3.	A council member from a different political party.
4.	Other:___________________         

29)	To what extent is the Head of the Authority and/or the person in charge of the education portfolio involved in the following areas of activity? 
            1-   Not at all       5 -  To a great extent
         	Drawing up the department budget:   	       	1      2      3       4      5  
         	Release of funds for implementation:        	1      2      3       4      5
Raising additional departmental financing:	1      2      3       4      5            
Building and renovations:                            	1      2      3       4      5 
Educational content and initiatives:  	           1      2      3       4      5

30)	To what extent were supervisory and control measures carried out during the course of the year by the following ? 
       1-  Not at all      5 -  To a great extent 
       Ministry of Education: 				1      2      3       4       5   	Ministry of the Interior:                                    	1      2      3       4       5
       The Local Authority                                         	1      2      3   	   4       5     
 	The Education Department:                                1      2      3      4       5
        e.   Other (please specify):  ______________ 	1      2      3       4       5

31)	Does a disparity exist between the approved 1997 education budget and its implementation in practice?      
a.   Yes            b.  No        (Circle where applicable)

If you have answered “Yes”, what are the reasons for this disparity?   
Please mark with an “x “ those responses which in your opinion 
reflect reality.

       	(a)   	Is inadequate legislation a reason for the disparity?
            	Yes: ___               No: ___           Irrelevant:  ___
       	(b)  	Has an obscure budgetary policy caused the disparity?  
            	Yes: ___               No: ___           Irrelevant:  ___
(c)  	Have overly ambitious objectives on the part of the Ministry of 
Education caused the disparity ?
            Yes: ___               No: ___           Irrelevant:  ___
       	(d)	Have overly ambitious objectives on the part of the Local 
             Authority caused the disparity?
 Yes: ___               No: ___           Irrelevant:  ___
             (e)	 Is there a difference between the concepts of the central 
                       government and the local authority with regard to educational 
                       needs?
 Yes: ___               No: ___           Irrelevant:  ___
(f)	Has faulty communication between the Ministry of Education and the local authority (professional language and communication channels) caused the disparity?
Yes: ___               No: ___           Irrelevant:  ___
(g)	Does the central government lack confidence in the ability of the 
local authority to manage education budgets effectively and 
efficiently?
Yes: ___               No: ___           Irrelevant:  ___
(h)	Has an inadequate control and supervision apparatus overseeing 
the local authority orchestrated by the Ministry of Education and 
the Ministry of the Interior caused the disparity?       
Yes: ___               No: ___           Irrelevant:  ___
(i)	Has the dependence of the local authority on the Ministry of Education caused the disparity?
Yes: ___              No: ___           Irrelevant: ___
(j)	The central government (either consciously or unconsciously) 
ignores the cost of enforcing its policy on the local government.
Yes: ___             No: ___           Irrelevant: ___
(k)	Inflexible implementation of budgetary policy due to 
previous commitments (such as wage agreements etc).
Yes: ___             No: ___           Irrelevant: ___
(l)	The local government has gathered strength, while the 
central government has weakened:
Yes: ___             No: ___           Irrelevant: ___
(m)	Differences of opinion prevail between the Ministry of 
Education and the local government with regard to task 
distribution (that the central government should deal with 
educational issues, while the local authority should deal with 
economic and administrative issues only):
       	Yes: ___             No: ___           Irrelevant: ___
         
       
32)   What is your educational background?   (Circle the applicable 
        response):
        1.		12 years of schooling.
        2.		Higher education without an academic degree.

	University/College Location	Name of University/College	Degree	Year of Graduation
c. Teaching    Certificate				
d. Bachelor’s
    Degree				
e.  Master’s




    				


33)	What was your previous position?  _____________________________

34)	How long have you held your current position? ____________________   
35)	Could self-management contribute to reducing the budgetary gap?
        	a.  Yes:  (Explain)  _______________________________________________________
          	b.  No:  (Explain)  _______________________________________________________

36)   What suggestions do you have for improving the budgetary situation 
         of the local authorities in the context of their relationship with












I thank you for your cooperation, and the effort and thought you have invested in completing this questionnaire.  










3.	Seniority in your current position: ………………………
4.	What in your opinion are the components of the education budget policy of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Interior?
5.	The results of the research were as follows:
a.	There is a gap between the Ministry’s education budget policy in the local authority and its actual implementation (known in advance due to under-budgeting in financing).
b.	There is a positive link between the socio-economic status of the local authority and the magnitude of the disparity, meaning that the higher the status of the local authority the wider the gap.  That is to say, the investments in education are greater (exceeding that which the Ministry of Education finances).
c.	There is a negative link between the share of the Ministry of Education and the education budget deficit in the local authority, meaning that the greater the share of the Ministry of Education in the education budget of the local authority, the narrower the gap in implementing the policy (education budget deficit).
d.	No link was found between the supervision and control apparatus (of the Ministries of Interior and Education or of the local authority itself) and the gap (meaning the education budget deficit of the local authority).
e.	There is no link between the involvement of the head of the local authority and/or person in charge of the education portfolio and the gap (education budget deficit).
f.	There is a positive link between scholastic achievements (matriculation exams) and the magnitude of the disparity (education budget deficit volume). The wider the gap, the greater the achievements.

Your Opinion on the Following Results

6.	The reasons for the gap in budgetary policy implementation of the Ministry of Education based on the research are as follows:
a.	Inadequate legislation.
b.	Obscure budgetary policy of the Ministry of Education.
c.	Differences in the concept of needs between the Ministry of Education and the local authority.
d.	The central government’s lack of confidence in the ability of the 		local authority to manage education budgets effectively and 			efficiently.
e.	The local authority’s budgetary dependence on the Ministry of Education.
f.	The local government ignores the cost of enforcing its policy on
 	the local government.
g.	Inflexible policy implementation due to previous commitments.




7.	In your opinion is this gap inevitable or must we strive to eliminate or 	reduce it?




























Local Authorities Participating in the Study

1. Petah-Tikva			27. Maliya
2.  Efal Regional Council		29. Acre
3. Nazareth		   		30. Haifa
4. Holon				31. Or Yehuda
5. Ramat-Gan                         	32. Ramle
6. Tel-Aviv-Jaffa        	        	33. Ashkelon 
7. Usfaye	                          	34. Jerusalem                                                                
6. Tel-Aviv-Jaffa                  	8. Herzliya		   		35. Ness Ziona
9. Rahat	                           	36. Binyamin District Regional Council
10. Tiberias				37. Beer Sheva





16. Modi’in District Regional Council
17. Zichron Yaakov
18. Arad























The following is the processing of the response results obtained from 36 local authorities (according to question number as it appears on the questionnaire).
3)	Status of Local Authority:
a.	Local Council – 21 (57.1%)
b.  	Regional Council – 7 (19.6%)
c.   	Municipality- 8 (23.3)
4)	Is your Authority under the close supervision of an auditor from the 
Ministry of Interior? 
a.	Yes – 2.8%
b.	No  - 97.2%
5)  	Which term of office is the Head of your Local Authority serving ?
   	a.	First – 45.7%
b.	Second – 28.6%
c.	Third or more – 25.7%
6)	Local Authority population:
     	a.	Up to 5,000 residents – 15.2%
b. Between 10,000 – 20,000 residents – 18.2%
c.	Between 20,000 – 40,000 residents – 15.2%
            d. Between 40,000 – 90,000 residents – 15.2%
            e.	90,000 residents and over – 21.2%
 7)	Population composition:                   
a.	Jewish – 70.7%
b. 	Non-Jewish – 29.3%
 8) 	Number of residents in 1997: 75443.
 9) 	Position of the Local Authority in the Ministry of Interior 
socio-economic status index: (according to cluster: 1 indicates the 
lowest status and 10 the highest):
	Cluster 1 – 2.9%		Cluster 6 – 8.6%
       	Cluster 2 – 2.9%		Cluster 7 – 17.1%
Cluster 3 – 14.3%     	Cluster 8 – 5.7%
Cluster 4 – 20%                  Cluster 9 – 14.3%
            Cluster 5 – 11.4%              Cluster 10 –2.9%
Average cluster – 5.72 
10)	 What was the overall budget of the Local Authority in 1997 ?  
        	145 million NIS
11)	Average Educational revenue from the government: 20,434,690 
NIS.
12)	Average Independent educational revenue :     4,402,861.4 NIS
13)	Total average educational revenue:    23,967,923 NIS
14)	Total average educational expenditure:   39,625,037 NIS
15)	Average education deficit :15,670,352 NIS
16)	Average percentage of education budget out of total local authority 
        	budget - 30.71%
17)	Average difference between government-approved expenditure and 
local authority proposal:   7,887,191 NIS
                        	                        19.5%
18)	Average difference between the approved educational budget proposal 
and actual expenditure:  14,199,991 NIS 
            	                                  17.82%
19)	Do the above figures reflect the situation in your local authority over 
the past three years?
a.	The gap has diminished – 18.7%
b. 	The gap has remained unchanged – 35.9%
c. 	The gap has increased – 45.4%
The average is 2.27, meaning 76% indicate that the gap has widened or remained unchanged.
20)	What percentage of financing was provided by the Ministry of 
Education in 1997 (out of the total actual expenditure) ?  Average 
statistics:
       	a.	Sports package: 31.5%
       	b.	Public libraries: 20%
       	c.	Transportation for pupils:  
          	1)	Local councils – 62%
            	2)	Regional councils – 80.5%
           3)	Municipalities – 54%
          Total average for local authorities – 64%
          d.	Supplementary education: 19%
          e.	Pre-compulsory kindergartens: 49%
          f.	School janitors: 77%
          g.	School secretaries 78%
          h.	Educational psychology services – 57%
           i.	Regular attendance officer job slots - 56%
           j.	Security officer job slots – 62%
           k.	Assistant job slots – 58%
            l.	Family clubs – 42%
           m.	School system computerisation – 46%
           n.	Equipment – 37%
           o.	Buildings – 73%
           p.	Renovations – 43%
           q.	Laboratories and other shop rooms – 37%

21)	What was the total 1997 development budget?  
 on average a- 24,506,236 NIS
22)	What portion of the total 1997 education budget was expended on 
development?
 No response from the majority of respondents.
23)	How much did the school system in your authority raise from parents 
in 1997?    
On average – 4,825,280 NIS
24)	What was the percentage of the parents’ contribution out of total 
educational expenditure in 1997? 
     	On average – 9%
25)	What amount did the local authority raise from external sources in
1997 (that is to say: excluding Ministry of Education. and Ministry of 
Interior allocations and parental contributions) ? 
On average – 6,981,915 NIS
26)	What percentage of the total 1997 educational expenditure did the 
above amount represent ?  
on average – 12%
27)	Who holds the educational portfolio in your local authority?

a.	The Head of the Local Authority – 31.6%
b.	A council member from the same political party – 29.8%
c.	A council member from a different political party – 23.2%
d.	Another - 15.4%         

28)	To what extent is the Head of the Authority and/or the supervisor of the 
Education portfolio involved in the following areas of activity? 
            1-   Not at all       5 -  To a great extent

	Avg.	1	2	3	4	5
Drawing up the department budget	66.4%	6.9	23.4	14.2	38.1	17.1
Release of funds for implementation	69.2%	6.5	22.2	4.9	26.4	40
Raising additional departmental financing 	67.4%	8.6	21.7	22.7	38.1	8.8
Building and renovations 	73.6%	4.7	16.6	14.4	35.6	28.7
Educational content and initiatives	53.4%	35.3	33.9	6.9	18.8	5.2
                                                     
29)	To what extent were supervisory and control measures carried out 
during the course of the year over the local authority’s educational 
expenditure ? 
     






Local Authority                                            	77%	1.3	9	23.6	28.5	37.6
Education Department	87%	1.3	---	8.6	28.4	61.8
Other (please specify)	96%	--	--	--	38.2	61.8
30)	Does a disparity exist between the approved 1997 education 	budget and its implementation in practice?      
      	a.  No – 25.3%            b.  Yes – 74.7%

If you have answered “Yes”, what is the reason for this disparity?   
Please mark with an “x “ those responses which in your opinion reflect reality.

a)   Is inadequate legislation a reason for the disparity?
            	  Yes – 65%             No – 12.8%           Irrelevant – 22.1%
	b)   Has an obscure budgetary policy caused the disparity?  
            	 Yes – 76.6%             No – 11.7%         Irrelevant – 11.7	c)  Have overly ambitious objectives on the part of the 		     Ministry of Education caused the disparity ?
                       Yes – 34.4%             No – 42.8%      Irrelevant – 22.8%
d)	Have overly ambitious objectives on the part of the 
     Local Authority caused the disparity?
   Yes – 41.9%         No – 46.4%          Irrelevant – 11.7%
e)	Is there a difference between the concepts of the 
     central government and the local authority with regard to
     educational needs?
		   Yes – 89.9%               No – 7.1%           Irrelevant – 3%
f)	Has faulty communication between the Ministry of Education
     and the local authority caused the disparity?
	   Yes – 30.4%               No – 53.8%     Irrelevant – 15.8%
g)  Does the central government lack confidence in the ability of
     the local authority to manage education budgets effectively
     and efficiently?
             Yes – 57.6%               No – 35.1%       Irrelevant – 7.3%
g)	Has an inadequate control and supervision  apparatus
      overseeing the local authority orchestrated by the Ministry of
      Education and the Ministry of the Interior caused the
      disparity?       
 	  Yes – 37.4%              No – 59.8%         Irrelevant – 2.8%
        	i)   Has the budgetary dependence of the local authority on the 	     Ministry of Education caused the disparity?
		Yes – 80.1%              No – 13.8%           Irrelevant – 6.1%
j)   Does the central government (either consciously or
     unconsciously) ignore the cost of enforcing its policy on the
     local government?
Yes – 88.4%             No – 7.4%           Irrelevant – 4.2%
k)     	Inflexible implementation of budgetary policy due to 
Previous commitments (such as wage agreements etc).
        	Yes – 78.4%            No – 11.9%          Irrelevant – 9.7%
l)      	The local government has gathered strength, while the 
central government has weakened:
        	Yes – 45.8%             No – 38.6%          Irrelevant – 15.5%
m)	Differences of opinion prevail between the Ministry of 
        	Education and the local government with regard to task 
distribution (that the central government should deal with 
educational issues, while the local authority should deal 	with economic-administrative issues only):
           Yes – 75.4%             No – 9.7%           Irrelevant – 14.9%
                  
31)	What is your educational background?   
        	a.	45.9% - hold teaching certificates
        	b.	42.8% - hold Bachelor’s degrees
         	c.	45.8% - hold Master’s degrees
d.	11.4% - hold Doctoral degrees

32)	What was your previous position?  

          	School principal – 38.2%
          	Teacher – 25.8%
          	Education and Welfare Division Employee – 15%
          	Cultural Officer – 7.5%
          	Authority Treasury Office – 5.9%
          	Library Administrator – 1.6%

33)	How long have you held your current position?    
9 years on average





 b.	No – 1.8% 

34) (2) Reasons given for positive aspects of self-management (according 
            to frequency):
            a.	 Authority leads to responsibility, simplification of the decision 
               	 making process – 33.3%
             b.	Exact advance planning and control over resources – 27.8%
             c.	Internal streamlining of schools, setting priorities – 16.7%
             d.	Control over resources – 11.1%
             e.	Better perspective: school is more efficient and effective – 
            5.6%
             f.	 Increasing budgetary participation of the Ministry of Education 
            	– 5.6%

35)	What suggestions do you have for improving the budgetary situation 
of the local authorities within the context of their relationship with
the Ministry of Education? 

The following is the suggestion distribution by frequency:
       	a.	Setting new priorities and defining new criteria for budget 
           investments – 35.4%
       	b.	School self-management  - 32%
c.	Granting greater authority to the local government – 28.4%
       	d.	Raising the education budget – 21.5%
e. 	Cooperation between the Ministry of Education and the local 
           government – 14.8%
f.	Determining a budget index according to the number of 			residents and pupils – 10.6%
       	g.	Careful planning including organised and binding timetables – 
           9.2%
h.	Separating education budgets transferred by the Ministry of 
           Education to the local authority from all the budgets transferred 		to the local authority – 7.5%
i.	Preventing the transformation of the local authority into a 
           sub-contractor – 6.6%
j.	Separation between politics and education through legislation – 
            5.9%
k.	Assimilating the principle of a closed economy in 
             	education-related subjects – 5.9%
         	l.	Recognizing the real cost of maintaining and upgrading 			computers  – 5.1%
       m.	Utilising the budgetary system – 5.1%
        n.	Transparency in criteria and data – 3.1%
        o.	Greater coordination between the Ministry of Education and the 
            	local authority – 3.1%
        p.	Applying the principle of self-management on all education 
            budgets – 1.6%
        q.	Budgetary autonomy of the department of education – 1.6%
        r.	A joint Ministry of Education and local authority supervisory forum – 1.6%
        s.	Joint field trips























The differences between the Positivist and the Phenomenological Paradigms(Hussey and Hussey,1997).

	Positivist Paradigm	Phenomenological Paradigm
Basic Beliefs:	The world is external and objective	The world is socially constructed and subjective
	Observer is independent	Observer is part of what is observed
	Science is value free	Science is driven by human interests
Researcher would:	Focus on facts	Focus on meaning
	Look for causality and fundamental laws	Try to understand what is happening
	Reduce phenomena to simplest elements	Look at the totality of each situation
	Formulate hypotheses and then test them	Develop ideas through instruction from data
Preferred methods include:	Operationalising concepts so that they can be measured	Using multiple methods to establish different views of phenomena
	Analysing data from large samples	Small samples investigated in depth and/or over time











The characteristics of qualitative and quantitative research Table
(Hussey and Hussey, 1997)

POINT OF COMPARISON	QUALITATIVE RESEARCH	QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH
Focus of ResearchPhilosophical RootsAssociated phrasesGoal of investigationDesign characteristicsSettingSampleData collectionMode of analysisFindings	Quality (nature, essence)Phenomenology, symbolic interactionEthnographic, naturalisticUnderstanding, description, hypothesis generationFlexible, evolving, emergentNatural, familiarSmall, nonrandom, theoreticalResearcher as primary instrument, interviews, observationsInductive (by researcher)Comprehensive, holistic, expansive	Quantity (how much? How many?)Positivism, logical empiricismExperimental, empirical, statisticalPrediction, control, description, hypothesis testingPredetermined, structuredUnfamiliar, artificialLarge, random, representativeSurveys, questionnaires, scalesDeductive (by statistical methods)Precise, narrow, reductionism







The characteristics of different types of Interviews(Patton,1980).

Type of interview	Characteristics	Advantages	Disadvantages
1. Informal interview (conversation)	The questions arise from the immediate context and are asked in a natural sequence of conversation, there is no preliminary definition of the subjects of the questions or the words.	It increases the importance and relevancy of the questions.  The interviews arise and are constructed from observations.The interview is adapted to the details and the circumstances.	Different information, collected from different people with different questions.  Less methodical and comprehensive, if the questions are raised naturally.  Organising and analysing the conditions will be difficult.
2. Interview guide approach	Focal points and subjects that must be covered – predetermined.  The interviewer decides on the sequence and processing of the questions while conducting the interview.	The diagram reinforces the comprehensiveness of the data and turns data collection into something methodical for each respondent.Logical gaps in data may be anticipated and may be closed.The interviews remain mainly conversational and situational-contemporary.	Important and striking subjects may be eliminated by mistake.  The flexibility of the interview in formulating the questions can lead to different answers, which impedes the comparison of answers.
3. Standardised open-ended interview	The correct words and a predetermined sequence of questions; all interviews are conducted based on those same questions and are carried out in the same order.	The respondents answer those same questions, reinforce the comparison, every detail provides data for subjects relating to the interview.Diminishes the influence of the interviewer and the bias when there are several interviewers, allowing decision makers to see and examine the use of evaluation.Makes it easier on organising and analysing data.	Slight flexibility in the connection of the interviewer to the special details and circumstances, standardisation through wording of questions can restrict and guarantee naturalism and relevancy of questions and answers.
4. Closed quantitative interview	Categories of questions for predetermined answers, standard answers, the respondents select from an established series of answers.	The answers may be compared, and easily processed, a lot of the questions are brief asked in a very short amount of time.	The respondents must adapt their experience and feelings to the categories of the investigator.  It is perceived as impersonal, irrelevant and mechanical.  It can distort the intentions or the experiences of the respondents.
                                                          Appendix-14

Interview with the Former Director of the Education Authority
 in the Tel Aviv Municipality

The interview took place in my office in the Givat Shmuel Local Council in the year 2000.
The interviewee has been at the job for 3 years.  Our previous acquaintance facilitated the interview, which was conducted in a pleasant and relaxed atmosphere (without a tape recorder).

Answers to the Questions:

1.	What in your opinion are the components of the Ministry’s policy on budgeting education in the local authority and its actual implementation?
Answer:	“The Ministry of Education has the tools, it grants hour quotas to the schools.  The Ministry relies on the municipality reports, it does not dictate policy.  There is no written policy from above with a local perspective on the local authority.  There are directives at the national level.  You get what you get.  There is a lot of negotiating.  If you don’t request anything you don’t receive anything.  It should not be done this way.
In the Tel Aviv Municipality, there are more psychologists employed than in any other city because we exerted pressure.  In the Education Authority there are skilled professionals, who have connections in the Ministry and they know how to demand, it’s not fair, I am all for a maximal level of transparency.”
2.	What is your opinion on the research results?
Answer:	“The disparity is greater in the cities, because labour costs more, the Ministry has an anachronistic profile of employees.  In reality you pay more in Tel Aviv than in Yerucham.
The Ministry has followed a minimal profile, and so the municipality loses out.
I agree as to the connection between the socio-economic level of the local authority and the magnitude of the disparity in the education budget deficit.
Strong localities are required to provide skilled professionals, there are expectations, the population is involved, and so people demand the best, they also know what they deserve.
Everything is done by “matching”.  The local authority pays more according to this method – an example is the transportation financing.  The residents bring you before the High Court of Justice and the Ministry has strict and simplistic criteria.  I accept the result that there is a negative correlation between the share of the Ministry of Education and the budget deficit.  It’s obvious.  As for ruling out the link between the supervision and control processes and the deficit scope, I say that there is no consistent link between the supervision and control processes.  If there were transparency and a criterion were a criterion, it would not be true.  Sometimes it is and sometimes it’s not.  What the Ministry provides is not always related to transparent criteria, but rather to the connections of the professionals, the Mayor or the Managing Director.  Concerning the result ruling out the link between the Head of the Authority’s involvement and the education deficit scope – this is true.  There are very few mayors like Shmuel Aviav (Education Committee Chairman in the Local Government Council).
I accept the result which indicates the positive correlation between scholastic achievements and the deficit scope, because the more you invest in education budgets, the greater the chances are of obtaining better results on matriculation exams and the children benefit.”

3.	What is your opinion on the factors engendering the disparity in the budgeting policy implementation by the Ministry of Education based on the research?
Answer:	“I agree with the factors you have indicated.”

4.	In your opinion, is this disparity unavoidable, or may one aim to eliminate or contain it?
Answer:	“There should not be a disparity.  If the Ministry would take responsibility for x things and the authority as well – the student would ultimately gain.
When the situation is unclear and people don’t trust each other, then they blackmail you.  The gap must be narrowed so that long term planning can be carried out.”

5.	What are the steps that must be taken in your opinion in order to 	overcome the existing gaps in scholastic achievements as a 	result of the disparity in budgeting between the local authorities?
Answer:	“The State assumed responsibility for education (Free Education Law).  In practice, this is not what is happening.  It must be decided whether the Sate has an obligation to provide education, and if so then it must finance it in full.
Every local authority with its own local vision – should invest its budget.  But the core – the solid foundation of education should be financed by the Ministry of Education.
The local authority can allocate its budget to educational projects, but if it is determined that the State is responsible for construction and air conditioning, then it should be clear that the local authority is to finance them, I propose a budget according to packages.
The Ministry will not enforce decentralisation because it is afraid of disconnecting itself from the power centres.  The Ministry of Education must set the policy, must set the goals.  Schools must implement, the district managers will supervise and monitor.  The local authorities must participate in planning the collection of resources and know how.  Each partner will have its own say in financing the local school system.  Once the system is budgeted then it can go about its business.
The managers will execute, the supervisors and the local authority will supervise.
All this is supposed to bridge the gap in education 	budgeting.
Apropos decentralisation – it must be carried out 	gradually.



























Interview with the Deputy Managing Director
of the Local Government Council in Israel

The Deputy Managing Director of the Local Government Council is in charge of handling education.
The interview took place in the interviewee’s office on May 28, 2000 in a relaxed and friendly atmosphere.  I made the Deputy Managing Director’s acquaintance many years ago in my position as Chairman of the Education Department Directors Association in the Local Government.  He has been serving in his current position for 6 years.

The following is the interview content (without a tape recorder):

1.	What in your opinion are the components of the education budgeting policy of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of the Interior?
Answer:	“The budget determines policy.  There is a gap between intentions and execution.  If there would be a clear policy, it would be evidenced in the budget.  
For example: It was decided to conduct affirmative action (corrective discrimination) among the Arab sector.  This is manifested in the budget to some extent, however there is no determination, no energy, not the entire office is pitching in, the State is not providing the appropriate backing.
With regard to the “Extended School Day” – the Ministry policy is not evidenced in the budget, there is no investment in infrastructure.
The Ministry pays lip service to its policies, but is enslaved to the budget itself.
For teachers – it stops financing substituting hours, how can it consent to this?
The Ministry is not managed according to a clear line of policy, the budget calls the shots.
Financing is determined according to a declaration of intentions, desires, feelings.
The Ministry does not bring new money and is not wise enough to prioritize.
As for psychologists – The Ministry’s capability is behind these agreements.  At the time, it was determined that the Ministry would participate in 64% of the cost of psychologists (who are certified by the Ministry), according to its budgetary capacity at the time.
What else is the Ministry there for if not to set policy?  There is a certain kind of policy, an illusive policy, there is no real attempt.











Interview with the Deputy Budget Supervisor
in the Ministry of Finance

The interview took place on July 26, 2000 in the Ministry of Finance in Jerusalem. We were not acquainted with each other, however the interviewee had heard of my national position in local government.
The interview was conducted in a relaxed atmosphere (without a tape recorder).  The interviewee formerly served as an Education Coordinator in the Ministry of Finance.

The following is the content of the interview (as stated):
	
Question:	What in your opinion are the components of the education budgeting policy of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of the Interior?
Answer:	“The budgeting policy refers to the rules according to which the Ministry operates, which are for the most part in conjunction with the local government.
The budgeting policy maintains a balance.
The Ministry does not discriminate against the local authorities.  The local government has a problem with management.  The problem with generating a deficit is the waste and inflating of apparati in the local authority.  Instead of coping with a balanced budget, the authorities complain about deficits.
There are balanced authorities which provide a good level of service.  For example, Carmiel, Kfar Saba, Raanana.  The Finance Ministry’s budgeting policy should not be amended.
The argument that the authorities assert that with more money one can manage better is not true, in the given situation – the proof is to manage correctly.




Interview with the Deputy Managing Director of the Ministry of Education and Head of the Budgets Authority
The interview took place in the interviewee’s office in the Ministry of Education in Jerusalem on June 16, 2000.
The interview took place without a tape recorder as per the interviewee’s request.

The following is the content of the interview:

1.	What in your opinion are the components of the education budgeting policy of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of the Interior?
Answer:	“This involves agreements that were made between the Local Government Council and the Ministry of Education, for example the Gamish-Marom agreement (Gamish was the Chairman of the Education Committee of M.S.M.  And Marom was the interviewee’s predecessor).
The policy was formulated layer by layer with the agreements between the two bodies.
Public committees discussed this issue and determined settlements (Kubersky, Hermelech Committees, etc.), every time the local authorities were in a crisis – a public committee was set up to investigate the issue.
The Hermelech Committee proposed to define all the services that the local authority provides, and then to decide which body would finance what, and this did not succeed because the Ministry of Finance set limits for the execution.  These were not considerations of the Ministry of Education, but rather those of the Ministry of Finance (the interviewee sat on the Hermelech Committee).
The Ministry of Education defined the services, but did not refer to which entity would pay.
There is no government ministry more transparent than the Education Ministry.  The ministry’s payment system combines all parameters, and transfers to the local authority a cheque each month for whatever it deserves.
Likewise, the Ministry operates two committees (support and acquisitions), the criteria of which are published in the newspapers.
The local authority is financed mainly according to two parameters – per class and per students.
There were subjects that were provided historically to a certain authority: one may not take from one authority and give to the next.”


2.	What is your opinion on the research results?
Answer:	“As for the education deficits, there is a standard arrangement.  On average, everything that is dealt with creates gaps, we cannot watch over every authority.
	A deficit may derive from providing service on a level which has not been agreed upon.  If the authority gives more than the agreed upon level then there is a deficit.
	With regard to the socio-economic level of the authority, the stronger the authority, the greater the parents’ demands.  The more involved they are in the education process, the more they know what to demand.  As far as supervision and control are concerned, as long as there is no sanction on which entity generates a deficit, then this question is merely theoretical.
	With regard to the involvement of the mayor, there could be a dominant mayor who takes from different fields and transfers to education.
	With respect to the link between scholastic achievements and the education budget deficit – it is interesting because it underscores the effectiveness of the investment.”

3.	What is your opinion on the causes of the gap?
Answer:	“Your results are interesting.”

4.	In your opinion, is this gap unavoidable, or may one aim to eliminate or diminish it?
5.	What are your suggestions for improving the situation?
Answer:	“A relationship between two partners does not have to be clear.
	There must be a settlement between the central government and the local government – what is the service?  What is its level?  And how do we appoint it?
	An agreement is good if both sides desire it.  One must aspire to settlements.  The Local Government Council refers to the Finance Ministry and requests to change the standards, once every so often, a committee should be requested to examine the needs and update them as required.
	The Ministry of Education must set standards and oversee them, the service will continue in the authority.
	In conclusion – these are dynamic things that are not static, anything that is not regularly updated will ultimately deviate.
	A committee must be set up to examine:
	a.	Determining types of services.
	b.	Defining the level of service – standard.
	c.	It decides which body will finance.














































Interview with Mr. Shmuel Har-Noi – Coordinator of the Dovrat Committee and Head of the Implementation of its Recommendations 

The interview was conducted in Mr. Shmuel Har-Noi's office in Tel Aviv, on July 7,2004  in a pleasant and friendly atmosphere.

I became acquainted with Mr. Har-Noi during our joint efforts on the Dovrat Committee, a State Committee established by the Israeli government in late 2003, with the aim to propose a reform in the education system in the State of Israel as well as in the budget system.  This committee is scheduled to deliver its recommendations at the end of December 2004.

Question
How in your opinion does the ambiguity in the allocation of state and local resources impact the creation of gaps in the budgeting of the education system in the local authorities?

Answer b)  
In my opinion, the ambiguity derives mainly from the following factors: 
a)	Problems in enforcing collection of parents' payments.
b)	"Allocation packages" for the municipal education system are not always distributed equally.
c)	Lack of transparency at all levels.
d)	There is no clear arrangement between the Ministry of Education and the local authorities when it comes to the distribution of budgets and financing. 

Question
Beyond the problems in budgeting, what else in your opinion has an impact on gaps in the financing of the local education system?

Answer
The additional reasons are in my opinion, the authority's political, economic and social power, as well as how important the Mayor deems education to be.

Question
I would request examples illustrating the means or ways of narrowing these gaps.

Answer
I contend that the distribution of budgets between the government and local authorities must be arranged by differentiating according to the strength of the local authority and by restricting and setting payments collected from parents.





How in your view does the relationship between central government and local government have an effect on gaps in budgeting of the education system in the local authorities?

Answer
I maintain that the main features of this relationship are:
a) Lack of trust between the two systems.
b) Political ties between local authority heads and leaders and government ministers, particularly with the Minister of Education, pave the way to larger budgets.
c) Lack of transparency budgeting.
































Central Interview with Ms. Ruth Yaffe – the Legal Adviser of the District of the Ministry of Education and Culture

The interview took place on July 11, 2004 at the office of the Legal Adviser of the Ministry of Education in Tel Aviv in a pleasant, friendly and no nonsense atmosphere.  I became acquainted with Ms. Yaffe in my former post as the Director of the Dept. of Education in the local authority under my jurisdiction.

Question
In your opinion why do ambiguity and/or contradictions exist in the education legislation which is designed to coordinate the local authorities' education budgeting system?

Answer
The legislator did not have any hidden agenda.  The central authority sought to leave its role ambiguous through the legislation, and therefore all education related legislation is vague.  On other issues such as integration in education, there was no legislative framework, but rather a parliamentary decision alone.  Therefore, the situation on the ground is not very good, with a significant number of local authorities not having implemented integration at all.  A state of anarchy currently prevails in budgeting with main issues remaining unsettled from a legal point of view.  This is a serious mishap.  The government is interested in keeping everything close to home.

Question
I would request examples of ambiguity in legislation related to the above funding.

Answer
Possible relevant examples are:
a)	Section 7 b of the Mandatory Education Law of 1949 which states that "the existence of official education institutions for providing free primary education…is the responsibility of the state, and that of the local authority in conjunction", meaning that the state and the local authorities must jointly maintain education institutions; however the role of each authority remains indefinite.
b)	The issue of "the right to free education" which the legislator established - what is the scope of the state's obligation to provide free education?  It does not appear in the legislation.
c)	In the realm of the establishment of new education institutions within        the local and regional authorities, the requisite maximal distance a student    should be from his/her school has not yet been defined.  There have been difficult struggles between the local and particularly the regional authorities and the Ministry of Education regarding the establishment or the lack of establishment of new schools in order to meet the needs of the population.  This entire issue is open to interpretation.



















































































The Gap in Implementation  of the Budgetary Policy   















Local authority distributions (SES) according to the following criteria:
1. Municipal status










The gap in implementation of the budgetary policy (education budget deficit of the local authority)

Scholastic achievements (matriculation exam results)

External and internal supervision and control processes on the education budget in the local authority

Involvement of the head of the local authority and the holder of the education portfolio in the education budget

2 general questions concerning the local authority
5 closed questions regarding the education budget in the local authority.








 9 questions to receive information about the local authority
17 questions on the budgetary data in the local authority
3 close-ended questions related to the research variables
3 personal questions about the Education Dept. Director




Examining questionnaire with focus groups

Cross-comparing budgetary data with government documents


17 in-depth structured and identical interviews with persons holding key positions in ministries of education, interior, and finance, Local Government Authority, the academia and the local authorities.

The interview included 3 personal questions about the interviewee.
2 questions referring to the research results.
2 open-ended questions on the research subject.

2 representatives of the Economy and Finance Company





2 representatives (of the local government authority)

3 representatives from the Ministry of Education

1 representative from the Ministry of Finance

1 representative from the Ministry of Interior














































1.	Central government is characterised as a cluster of independent agencies.
2.	Local government is comprised of different and separate units.
3.	There is inequality in allocation of resources and range of local services.
4.	The central government is not always the determining factor in spite of its share in financing local government.






1. 	The local authority operates as an elected political unit which must answer to its electorate.
2.	The local authority is well familiar with the needs of its residents.


















	The + sign indicates the relevance of the feature as it pertains to the research model.
	The research model is comprised of two parts. The first part includes 7 features from the three models specified above. Features 8-10 are my addition to the model.
	The arrows indicate the reciprocal influence of the models on the research model.

                                                             
                                                                   Research Model
1.	Both government strata are officially built like a pyramid.
2.	Central government encounters difficulties in enforcing its policy on local government.
3.	Central government still finances a significant portion of local government’s expenses.
4.	Local government operates as an elected political unit which is well familiar with the needs of its residents and must answer to them.
5.	Central government operates as a cluster of independent agencies.
6.	Local government consists of different and separate units, which allocate resources unequally and provide an unequal range of services to the public.
7. 	The link between the two government strata includes a multi-channel communication network which includes specific informal agreements in local activity.
          
8.	In practice, both operate within a strategic partnership based on interdependence.
9.	Local government has the authority to collect taxes and provide services, but is still subordinate to the government.




1.	Both government strata operate as a pyramid, at the top of which is the central government with the local government beneath it.
2. 	The central government determines policy and supervises its execution by the local government.
3.	The local authority has no autonomy.





























































Socio –Economic Status of the Local Authority

Supervision and Control on the Local Education Budget.

Involvement of the Head of the Local Authority in the Education Budget. 

0.12

**  p<0.01
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